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ABSTRACT
This thesis alms to develop a comprehensive understanding of cross-project
learning in multiple-project environments. Cross-project learning is the process
through which technologies are transferred and reused within organisations.
Recent years have seen a growing interest in cross-project learning. However,
research in this area has emphasised the rational, classical approach to cross-
project learning. Also, the majority of research on cross-project learning has
largely been on the automobile industry in Japan and the USA. Thirdly, research
in this field has failed to assess the impact that cross-project learning has had on
other organisational processes in product development. The conclusions of these
studies are context-specific, fragmented and lack any critical assessment of the
process of introducing cross-project learning.
This study argues that a rather different approach to cross-project learning is
needed. A three-level analysis is applied in the present study that highlights
operational, dysfunctional and strategic aspects in cross-project learning. The
empirical core of the research is the evidence from three in-depth case studies
conducted in the Israeli electronics defence industry.
Three different approaches to cross-project learning have been identified at the
operational level, offering organisational mechanisms and managerial practices
that have not previously been reported. At the dysfunctional operations level, the
study reveals that the introduction of innovations in cross-project learning has
impacted the past harmony between expertise development and knowledge
management practices. The findings suggest that this harmony has broken down
while the knowledge management and expertise development practices have been
further transformed and developed. Lastly, at the strategic level of analysis, two
potential cross-project learning strategies have been detected: exploit product
success and design to reuse. A contingency model that emphasises the
evolutionary development path of 'modes of reusability', subject to the 'strategic
development' of the studied companies, concludes this study.
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Objectives
This thesis aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of cross-project
learning in multiple-project environments. Cross-project learning is the process
through which technologies are transferred and reused within organisations.
Cross-project learning is argued to be a central factor in knowledge management
practice.
Specifically, this research sets out to achieve the following objectives:
:;:> To study the organisational mechanisms and managerial structures that
support successful cross-project learning;
=> To develop a theory which helps explaining the transformation of activity
systems by analysing the impact that the introduction of knowledge
management practice had has on other practices in the R&D environment;
=> To account for greater or lesser degree of cross-project learning.
The study embraces three distinct levels of analysis: the operational, the
dysfunctional and the strategic. Data are drawn from an in-depth study of the
Israeli electronics defence industry.
1.2 Research Background
In recent years, large manufacturers have faced a growing need to manage their
product line as a multi-project environment; however, they have rarely exploited
the efficiencies that cross-project learning may offer (Nobeoka 1995). Cross-
project learning has been considered as one of the factors that contribute to the
management of product development as a multi-project environment (Clark and
Fujimoto 1991; Nobeoka 1995; Meyer and Utterback 1993; Cusumano and
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Nobeoka 1998). Nevertheless, there has been limited empirical research on the
process of and strategy for transfening a technological platform or component
between projects in an R&D environment.
Only recently has research paid attention to the growing trend in intensive R&D
and manufacturing films to reuse technological platforms and components
(Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). Yet the context within which previous studies
have been carried out, the Japanese and U.S. automobile industry, has led to
specific conclusions, which though valuable, cannot be generalised to other
industries that operate in different contexts. Other studies (e.g. Sanderson and
Uzumeri 1994; Meyer and Utterback 1993) have acknowledged the phenomenon,
but have placed emphasis on the management of product families, which is only
one element in cross-project learning.
There have been a few attempts to study organisational processes and mechanisms
that support cross-project learning. On the strategic level, Meyer and Utterback
(1993) advise companies to move towards the management of product families.
On the operational level, Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) offer managers four
knowledge transfer strategies that are related to situations in managing new,
sequential, concurrent and design modification projects. New organisational
structures have been suggested in order to ease tension between functional- and
project-centred structures (Nonaka and Takeouchi 1995). Another area which has
recently attracted attention is the concept of knowledge in organisations. Some
studies have treated knowledge as an object (Smith 1985; Nobeoka 1995), a view
which emphasises the instrumental, functional character of knowledge in
organisations. Yet knowledge has also been described from a social construction
perspective (Blackler 1995), an approach that highlights its contentious,
provisional, contested nature. The first part of Chapter 2 presents the main debates
in the literature concerning the organisational processes and mechanisms that
support cross-project learning and reviews the main empirical studies in order to
reveal the 'known wisdom' in this area.
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There has been an ongoing debate between the individualist, structuralist and
interactive process perspectives in the process innovation literature. Each school
of thought has emphasised a different set of elements in the process of innovation.
Because the present study concerns the introduction of cross-project learning, the
main literature on process innovation is reviewed in the second part of Chapter 2.
In particular, a major weakness of this specific literature is the lack of reference to
the impact of process innovations, such as cross-project learning, on other
organisational processes.
The empirical core of the research is provided by three in-depth case studies
conducted in the Israeli electronics defence industry. There were two main reasons
to choose the electronics defence industry for a study on technology transfer. The
first reason is that the defence industry presents many cross-project learning
related characteristics that make it a promising candidate for such a study. Among
these characteristics are lines of products that are based on a single technological
platform, and a growing competition in defence markets that push these
companies to improve product development processes. Secondly, changes in
defence markets since the beginning of the 1990s have changed the process
through which products are developed in this industry. This has given the
researcher an opportunity to investigate the nature of these changes, in particular
those which are related to cross-project learning, and the impact that these
changes have had on the entire product development system. Therefore, Chapter 3
will discuss these considerations at length. In addition, issues related to the
research process and the applied research methods will be debated in Chapter 3.
Understanding the context within which the present study has been carried out is
imperative (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991). Changes in R&D practices will be
examined in the present research in the context of recent changes in the global and
domestic spheres, and in specific companies. Product development practices in the
Israeli electronics defence industry, which are based on the historical cost-plus
contracting system, have changed. Since the beginning of the 1990s, as the cost-
plus system faded and was replaced by the strict fixed cost contracting system, the
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Israeli electronics defence industry has faced growing competition, clients have
become more demanding and sophisticated and R&D budgets have shrunk
significantly (Sadeh 2001). To relate the findings of this study to the context
within which these companies operate, a three-tier analysis of the defence
industry, i.e. global, domestic and company-specific, is presented in Chapter 4.
The process of cross-project learning involves the transfer of specific know-how
between projects and the coordination of product development activities across
multi-functional groups through organisational mechanisms and managerial
practices. The 'glue' behind these daily routines is the system of norms, values
and motivational factors that supports, but also occasionally inhibits, cross-project
learning. Thus far, research in this area has provided empirical findings of unique
organisational structures that support technology transfer in the automobile
industry, mainly in Japan (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). Chapter 5 will present
empirical findings on the organisational structures, the managerial practices and
the system of motivational factors that support cross-project learning in the three
studied companies. This chapter will also focus on the differences between the
studied companies in terms of the organisation of cross-project learning, the
applied organisational structures and managerial practices. Several competing
interpretations will be used to explain the disparity in cross-project learning
capabilities between the studied companies.
Cross-project learning is perceived in the present study as a knowledge
management practice (Coombs and Hull 1998). Yet this practice does not exist in
a vacuum. There are other practices in the R&D environment: for example,
expertise development. This, of course, begs the question: how did the
introduction of cross-project learning and the acceleration of product development
affect the expertise development practice? An activity theory lens has been
applied (Engestrom 1992) in order to answer this question. The examination of the
historical development path of these two practices reveals that the past coherence
between expertise development and knowledge management has broken down
following the introduction of cross-project learning and the acceleration of
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product development. Chapter 6 will discuss the sources of the tension between
expertise development and knowledge management. Furthermore, the elements
that drive the transformation of these activity systems will be examined. It will be
suggested that mini-innovations, such as new tools, technologies and procedures,
introduced by individuals in situations of uncertainty or confusion ease the tension
between 'domain innovation' and 'boundary innovation' (Boland and Tenkasi
1995) and between inter- and intra-community interests. A theoretical argument
that examines the 'breakdown' point of an activity system will be developed in
Chapter 6. This chapter will conclude by extending the activity theory argument to
the transformation of activity systems, based on the empirical data.
The unique contextual characteristics of the studied companies suggest that the
technology transfer strategies offered by Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) are
inappropriate to the electronics defence industry and perhaps to other
manufacturing and service industries. Two cross-project learning strategies
emerge from the empirical data: exploit product success and design to reuse. A
possible evolutionary trend of cross-project learning strategies, which is subject to
present identity and future strategic direction, is proposed in Chapter 7. Present
identity is explained in this study as a socially and symbolically structured notion
intended to lend meaning to experience (Whetten and Godfrey 1998:27). Based on
the empirical data, the framework presented in Chapter 7 suggests that the path of
development of cross-project learning is subject to the dynamics of change in
present identity and future strategic direction. Several competing propositions
with regard to the future development of cross-project learning conclude this
chapter.
The concluding section of the study summarises the main theoretical, empirical
and method contributions made by this research. In addition, Chapter 8 will
discuss practical implications, outline the limitations of the present study and
highlight opportunities for future research.
1-18
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW: CROSS-
PROJECT LEARNING IN MULTIPLE-PROJECT
ENVIRONMENTS
2.1 Introduction
This thesis explores the introduction of, and the conditions for, the success of
innovations in cross-project learning in multiple-project environments. Such
introductions not only accelerated product development in the studied companies,
but also led to fundamental changes in some internal processes, in knowledge
management and expertise development.
The challenge in this chapter is to integrate the relevant knowledge accumulated
in the existing literature into a workable framework that will assist in explaining
cross-project learning activities and their implications in the case study
companies. Therefore, our approach in reviewing the literature is first and
foremost to become familiarised with the areas that have already been studied.
Secondly, this review aims to highlight the shortcomings of existing studies and
hence to identify the scope for future research. It must be stressed that, because of
the limited scope of this thesis, some studies were either only briefly reviewed or
excluded from this chapter. This is by no means to imply that other perspectives
are ignored. It simply reflects the fact that some of the areas relating to cross-
project learning and process innovation have attracted the attention of numerous
academics and practitioners, and that it is therefore impossible to cover fully the
entire body of knowledge on this subject. The area of literature covered in this
chapter was carefully selected based on several criteria. Studies that confirm the
findings of the present study were included in this chapter. Also, studies that
contrasted with the findings of this research were included below. Lastly, studies
that use different research methodologies and methods were reviewed and
assessed. These areas of study are provided below in order to assess the strengths
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and weaknesses of the existing literature and to explore opportunities for future
research.
Cross-project learning, technology transfer and process innovation are at the
centre of this thesis, and therefore these areas will be extensively reviewed. Other
areas of research, such as product development and the management of projects,
are of concern here mainly because of the context within which this research was
canied out. Appendix 1 provides an elaborative review of the latter, offering links
between cross-project learning and product development.
The following sections will pave the way for understanding cross-project learning
in a multi-project environment by bringing into the discussion aspects of
technology transfer, knowledge, and organisational structures and processes in
product development.
Section 2.2 will present the body of knowledge on cross-project learning. Section
2.3 will address some key aspects of the literature on process innovation in the
context of cross-project learning. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 will outline the justification
and foundation of activity theory as applied in the context of this study.
2.2 Cross-Project Learning in a Multi-ProjectlProduct Family
Environment
2.2.1 Introduction
Only in recent years has research paid attention to the process of technology
reusability. Markus (2001) coined the term 'reuse' while Cusumano and Nobeoka
(1998) preferred to discuss its implications in the context of a multi-project
environment referring to cross-project learning as the transfer of designs. Victor
and Boynton (1998) positioned the reusability process as the highest stage in their
model for internal growth, suggesting that the central theme of reusability is
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modularity! in technology, products and processes. The present study accepts the
above references and uses, in some cases, these terms interchangeably because in
essence they refer to the same thing: the process through which project-specific
components are shared by a set of projects or products (Meyer and Utterback
1993). The objective of this process, from a company perspective, is the same; to
reduce R&D costs, accelerate product development, improve responsiveness to
customers by enhancing learning in specific areas, and achieve better integration
across projects in R&D environments (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998).
The product platform, which refers to the content of the design and the
components shared by a set of products, is at the heart of the product family. A
product family typically addresses a market segment, but not always (Meyer and
Utterback 1993). An example is the Sport Walkman by Sony, which is based on
the Walkman product platform versions, or Toyota, which manages the ES 300
and the Supra models as one product family and yet targets two different niche
markets. luxury sedan and sport respectively (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998).
Studies (for example, Sundren 1999) link the emergence of product family as an
organisational concept to the need to maintain competitiveness by quickly
introducing new products and yet maintaining low costs. The complexity and
costs involved in introducing new products can be a tremendous burden for most
companies. Thus, academics and practitioners have been interested in the
techniques that support the successful and efficient management of the product
family. These include modularity in design (Baldwin and Clark 1997),
knowledge/design transfer in a multi-project environment (Nobeoka and
Cusumano 1994; 1995; Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998), and interface management
(Sundren 1999). Because the present study revolves around cross-project learning,
a greater emphasis will be given to debating the literature on design transfer in a
multi-project environment.
I The concept of modularity is also presented by Baldwin and Clark (1997).
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2.2.2 Cross-Project Learning: A Strategic Move Towards Product Family
1\lanagement
Clark and Fujimoto (1991: 215) acknowledge that:
[... ] the success of early involvement depends on the level of knowledge available
prior to commencing a given problem-solving cycle. Because much of this
knowledge will have originated outside the project (i.e. the lessons from past
development projects and the results of advanced research projects), cross-project
knowledge transfer - that is, the mechanisms by which a firm stores and makes
available to current projects information about past engineering problems - is
crucial.
Meyer and Utterback (1993) conducted one of the most comprehensive studies of
product families. They assume a correlation between core capabilities and product
family. Core capabilities are associated with 'sustained success in the sense of
product development effectiveness, financial performance or learning and
employee satisfaction' (ibid.: 34). The study shows that not all product families
have matured to the degree that success can be exploited. Hence, their conclusion
is that some specific conditions need to be maintained in order to tum product
family into a core capability. Amongst the barriers that companies face in
achieving this goal are, first, short-term objectives for the development of new
technology, thereby not allowing time for the technology to mature and start
exploiting success. Secondly, a lack of the resources needed to invest in the
product family to maintain its competitive edge may endanger the development of
the product family. And lastly, breaking up design teams once the development of
the product is finished might reduce communications and end the synergy
between key players in the multifunctional team.
Meyer and Utterback (1993) conclude by proposing a new policy for companies
seeking to ensure that the product platform will have a positive impact on their
performance. It is essential to have a clear and deep understanding of what
potential clients need and how the company can integrate the product with its
2-22
other offerings in order to develop a product family. Secondly, there is a need to
transform product planning into product family planning. This means that
companies need to oversee how their product platforms can be applied in products
across a number of product generations (Victor and Boynton 1998). Consequently,
resource allocation needs to change, allocating more resources to long-term
developments. Meyer and Utterback's (1993) study confirms some of our
findings. Their observation concerning the necessary integration between markets
and product development is appreciated, and the present study provides new
findings about the organisation of product development close to markets.
The vast majority of the literature on processes in a multi-project environment,
such as cross-project learning, is based on the classical approach (Chandler 1962).
This approach assumes that management sets a strategy by deciding on long-term
goals and objectives, guiding employees through a course of actions and
allocating resources when and where they are needed. In the same manner,
classical theorists assume that a presumably 'planned' strategy to transform the
management of product development from a single-project to multi-project
management would be a well-planned process, one that will only positively
impact product performance. The present study suggests that the product
development environment is far more complex (Blackler et al. 1999). Perhaps the
quotation provided by one software engineer summarises our view on this matter
'One touches one place and the rest of the system can be affected,3. This poses a
challenge to research and perhaps to the classical approach - can research assume
no 'side effects' when a new 'strategy' is introduced?
2 For example, Meyer and Utterback (1993), Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998), Nobeoka (1995).
3 See reference in section 6.5.3.
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.2 •.2.3 Techniques to Transfer Designs
Nobeoka (1995) and Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) proposed four different
techniques to transfer designs between projects. These techniques are strongly
related to the sequence of projects in an organisation.
The first type is new design. which enables the incorporation of the latest
technology or totally new designs without putting too many restrictions on the
development team (ibid.: 10). The second type is concurrent technology transfer,
which suggests that a new project borrows a platform or a component from a
preceding project before the preceding project has completed its design work. The
authors suggest that this type offers effective and efficient technology sharing.
The third type is sequential technology transfer, which describes a case in which a
project inherits a platform or component from a base project that has finished its
design work. In this case the second project reuses a relatively old component,
Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) argue. Furthermore, changes may have to be
forced in the reused component in order to adjust the transferred unit to product
specifications. They conclude that sequential transfers may not be as efficient or
effective as concurrent technology transfer (also see Thompson 1967). The fourth
type, design modification, describes the case of a project that reuses a platform or
component without needing to borrow components outside the project: for
example, when a project team is designing a series of product generations by
using the same technological platform.
The above four types of technology transfer are also found in the present study.
Nevertheless, Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) present the sequential knowledge
transfer technique as the least favourite choice and later on (ibid.: 189) recommend
managers to apply concurrent technology transfer techniques. This
recommendation needs to be examined in the context within which the
organisation operates. For example, in the context of the present study, the Israeli
electronics defence industry, the contracting method with clients is based on
tenders. Hence, a company cannot choose the beginning of the project and plan
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concurrent technology transfer, but rather follows the client's requirements.
Considering this context, would this mean that the Israeli electronics defence
industry would inevitably choose the least effective technology transfer method?
Obviously the context within which a company operates needs to be considered
(Collinson 2001).
2.2A Organisational Structures for Cross-Project Learning
The theme of organisational structure in the context of this study is crucial.
Studies related to knowledge management and cross-project learning indicate a
few organisational structures that would support the transfer of knowledge
between divisions, directorates, projects and teams.
For example, Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) suggest a modular organisational
design combined with a modular product design. Nonaka and Takeouchi
(1995:161) offer the 'hypertext' structure for knowledge creation, which combines
a formal organisational structure and a non-hierarchical, self-organising
organisational structure (Gold et al. 2001).
On the other hand, empirical studies emphasise the centrality of a matrix structure
with functional departments for cross-project learning (e.g. Nobeoka 1995;
Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). Yet this structure may create some problems, such
as the level of authority held by the project manager as opposed to the functional
department's authority in particular when it comes to decisions around technical
problems (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998:160). The second issue relates to the
responsibilities and the physical location of engineers. Allen (1986) suggests that
three conditions settle the dispute between project-centred or functional-centred
structures. These are, (i) the rate of technological change, (ii) the length of the
development project and (iii) the degree of interdependency among functional
components being developed for the product.
An organisation is inclined to introduce functional structure when its R&D
environment experiences high rate technological change, lengthy projects and a
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high degree of interdependency among functional components (Cusumano and
Nobeoka 1998). The logic for this argument is based on the trade-off between
keeping up with the state of the art (through functional structures) or serving the
short-term goals of the project.
Gold et aI. (2001) look at the same issue but from a different perspective, arguing
that a company may have to trade off between some structural elements that are in
conflict with each other. These structural elements might inhibit collaboration and
knowledge-sharing across internal organisational boundaries and yet might
promote and reward small units.
The debate between functional and project-centred structures manifests the
tension between the ability to develop technology excellence (functional) and to
differentiate products for various niche markets (projects with a high level of
coordination). This tension can be approached from different angles, such as
between exploration and exploitation (March 1999). Perhaps balancing between
these two extremes would be the goal that organisations attempt to achieve when
they organise their operations. Therefore, organisations would like to be
somewhere in the middle, where they can enjoy the benefits that these two
structures offer. The matrix structure combines projects with permanent functional
engineering departments. Therefore, the matrix structure would perhaps provide
the flexibility and coordination required for cross-project learning.
However, early indications of the pitfalls embedded in the matrix structure and
creating coordination problems were provided by Peters (1979). Waterman et al.
(1980) refer to the matrix structure as a 'modish variant' that often caused more
problems than it solved. However, McCollum and Sherman (1993) defended the
advantages embedded in the matrix structure. They suggested that the application
of the matrix structure is first and foremost a result of a lack of specialist
personnel that could be allocated to a sole project. Because of this, individual's
expertise must be shared. This means that the intention behind the matrix structure
was to solve a staffing problem and not to improve knowledge sharing or
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coordination. These are. when implemented properly, 'added values' that the
matrix structure can offer. McCollum and Sherman (1993:25) support their
argument with a statistical analysis of the correlation between R&D personnel
assigned to one, two or three (or more) projects and performance outcomes. Their
analysis suggests some leading performance indicators, such as ROI, growth in
sales, and deadlines. are significantly improved when an individual is assigned to
three or more projects.
Recent years have seen a shift from the traditional matrix structure (see Quinn et
al. 1988:260 for a detailed description). New variations of the matrix structure
have emerged. Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) offer an insight into some of these
structures. In particular, they describe the Differentiated Matrix structure
(ibid.:66) as a mechanism in which project manager and functional managers
share authority. Within this structure, management has introduced coordination
mechanisms that link multiple projects. Their findings have been confirmed in the
present study; however, on a different scale, mainly because of the different
contexts of these two studies. In addition, the importance of design centres in the
matrix structure has received little attention by Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998).
Thus, recent variations in the matrix structure, such as design centres and the
grouping of projects into one programme, need further study.
2.2.5 Coordination and Integration in Cross-Project Learning
Coordination and integration of cross-project learning concern, In fact, the
strategic shift from a single-project to a multi-project management.
Nobeoka (1995) identifies cross-functional integrity through the organisational
structure as one major enabler of the inter-project knowledge transfer process. In
line with Meyer and Utterback (1993), Nobeoka (1995) provides empirical
evidence of companies shifting their orientation from the management of a single
project to multiple projects. One example is Toyota. In practice, the nomination of
cross-project roles and the introduction of cross-project mechanisms are the
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manifestations of coordination of tasks between projects, and the integration of
know-how across projects.
Toyota appointed a number of chief engineers above project mangers responsible
for multiple concurrent projects (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; Sobek et al.
1998). Amongst many other responsibilities, the chief engineer enhanced the rapid
transfer and sharing of new designs among multiple projects. In addition, Toyota
created a variety of working structures supporting the development of design tasks
across projects. A similar organisational structure was also found at Sony
(Sanderson and Uzumeri 1994). These working structures are flexible and may
change according to management recognition of the degree of either inter-project
or cross-functional learning required in this process.
Nobeoka's contribution to this area of study is of major importance. Yet his
approach is atheoretical and does not integrate theoretically with existing research
on corporate strategy. He also does not report insignificant findings in his study.
These three elements inhibit theory building (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). In
addition to the further empirical evidence provided in Chapter 5 on coordination
and integration mechanisms, the present study will seek to integrate these
mechanisms, or perhaps capabilities (Meyer and Utterback 1993; Coombs 1996)
into the area of corporate strategy.
Lastly, Hauptman and Hirji (1999) examme integration and coordination
mechanisms in R&D environments. The emphasis in their study is on cross-
functional teams. Though cross-functional teams are not the main concern of the
present study, the conditions for coordinating and integrating these teams may be
imperative. This is because the context of a cross-functional team is very similar
to the context within which cross-project learning takes place.
Some of the barriers to coordination and integration between members of a team
in concurrent engineering indicated by Hauptman and Hirji (1999) are cognitive
differences, cultural differences, physical distance, and time differences. On the
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supporting side one may find characteristics such as group reward, job rotation,
the use of IT systems, and the power of the project manager.
2.2.6 The Theme of Knowledge in Cross-Project Learning
The theme of knowledge and knowledge capabilities in R&D environments has
attracted the interests of many researchers (e.g. Davenport et al. 1998; Davis and
Wilkof 1988: Nonaka and Takeouchi 1995; Blackler 1995; Collinson 2001; 1999).
The contribution of the above studies to understanding the meaning and the
process of knowledge is invaluable.
Yet the debate in which this thesis engages in is broader and mainly concerns
aspects of cross-project learning. We refer mainly to the debate between cultural
and economic images of knowledge (Scarbrough 1999). Perhaps the tension
between the social conditions that promote the formation of knowledge and the
economic conditions that allow the appropriation of its value (ibid:.6) is the
reflection of the tension between viewing the reusability process as technology
transfer rather than knowledge transfer.
Indeed. the vast majority of the studies that have examined cross-project learning
referred to the subject of the transfer process as if knowledge is an object (e.g.
Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; Nobeoka 1995; Meyer and Utterback 1993). Some
of these studies realised the problem in treating knowledge as an object; however,
they preferred to ignore any investigation of the source of the problem. For
example, Nobeoka (1995) presents a caveat regarding the practice of knowledge
transfer: he proposes that face-to-face learning is much more efficient than
learning through specification and drawing, particularly with regard to some types
of knowledge. Engineers complained that in order to change a base design, they
often needed more knowledge than could be found in standard drawings in CAD
data. Nobeoka (1995:437) concludes that 'knowledge about the base design may
also include other types of intangible or tacit understanding'. Though the
observation is accurate, l.e. face-to-face knowledge transfer is much more
effective than a similar process through design sheets, the implications for
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knowledge transfer are far more complex than Nobeoka suggests. The present
study challenges the distinction between these two types of knowledge transfer,
face-to-face and through drawing and would argue that a socially constructed
perspective is needed in order to understand the extent of the differences between
types of knowledge.
In conclusion. it is only recently that the area of cross-project learning in multi-
project environment has received attention by researchers (Nobeoka 1995;
Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). Research in this area, in particular by Nobeoka
and Cusumano, reveals some of the main mechanisms for the transfer of designs
between projects. Yet research in this area has focused on the Japanese
automobile industry. a very specific context that invites researchers to test current
wisdom on cross-project learning and extend the body of knowledge on this young
and emerging field of research.
Because this thesis is also concerned with the impact of cross-project learning and
acceleration of product development on other organisational processes, and
because cross-project learning is considered in this thesis as process innovation,
we now would like to review some of the relevant main literature on process
innovation.
2.3 Understanding Cross-Project Learning as Process Innovation
Innovation is a process of change. Change can take two forms: change in the
things (products/services) that an organisation offers, and change in the ways in
which the products/services are created and delivered. The latter type of change is
also known as process innovation and is the main concern of this thesis (Tidd et
al. 1997). In particular, the emphasis in this thesis is on cross-project learning as a
process innovation (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998).
Tidd and his colleagues distinguish between five types of innovation, each with its
own distinctive strategic advantage (see Table 1).
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Type of Innovation Strategic advantage
Novelty
Competence-shifting
Complexity
Robust design
'-
Continuous incremental innovation
Offering something which no one else can
Rewriting the rules of the competitive game
Difficulty of learning about technology keeps
entry barrier high
Basic model product or process can be stretched
over an extended life, reducing overall cost
Continuous movement of the cost/performance
frontier
Table 1: Strategic Advantages through Innovation (Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt 1997: 6).
Innovation in this research is studied through the observation of the Israeli
electronics defence industry, which it is first and foremost related to robust design
with elements of the competence-shifting type of innovation. Innovation and
strategic change will be treated here as interchangeable terms (Slappendel 1996),
mainly because both concern the process and implications of change.
The management of process innovation is especially complex because 'most firms
will work on a portfolio of innovations, some of which represent incremental
developments and improvements on existing and proven products and processes
whilst others will focus on more radical change' (Tidd et al. 1997: 9).
The aim of the management of innovation is to bring together people with varied
skills to work effectively on the change process and thereby to introduce a new
process or product. Thus, the integration of these efforts into a coherent package is
essential in order either to deliver new products to markets or to diffuse new
practices in the organisation (Clark and Wheelwright 1994). Indeed, most studies
of innovations seek to reveal the factors that enable successful process innovation,
such as cross-project learning. For example, Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) identify
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five crucial factors in the management of strategic change: understanding the
environment, leading change, linking strategic and operational change, human
resources as assets and liabilities, and coherence.
Walton (1987: 17-23) argues that the capacity for innovative change depends on
the soundness of the model that guides the development of the innovations, the
economic pressures on those who have the power to initiate change, the extent to
which the social context supports the innovation, the strength of the institution's
internal unification (which is essential for problem solving), and the knowledge
and skills held by individuals.
Slappendel (1996) organised the literature on innovation into three main streams:
the individualist, structuralist and interactive process perspectives. Innovation is
here defined as 'any idea, practice, or material artifact perceived to be new by the
relevant unit of adoption' (Zaltman et al. 1973: 158). Table 2 outlines the
fundamental differences between these three perspectives.
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Individualist Structuralist InteractiveProcess
Basic assumptions Individuals cause Innovation Innovation produced
innovation determined by by interaction of
structural structural influence
characteristics and actions of
individuals
Conceptualization Static and objectively Static and objectively Subject to
of an innovation defined objects or defined objects or reinvention and
practices practices reconfiguration.
Based on perception
Conceptualization Simple linear focus Simple linear focus Complex process
of the innovation on adoption stage on adoption stage
process
Core concepts Champion Environment Shock
Leader Size Proliferation
Entrepreneur Complexity Innovative capability
Differentiation Context
Formalization
Centralization
Static type
Research Cross-sectional Cross sectional Case studies
methodology survey survey Case histories
Table 2: Main Features of the Three Perspectives on Innovation (Slappendel 1996).
Wolfe (1994) takes a rather different approach to the organisation of the literature
on innovation. He identifies three different bodies of knowledge on innovation.
These concern (i) the diffusion of innovation, (ii) the determinants of
innovativeness, and (iii) the process of innovation (process theory models).
Process theory models refer to the same body of knowledge as the interactive
process perspective. Since the diffusion of innovation and determinants of
innovativeness are not at the centre of this thesis, we will review the relevant
studies briefly, mainly referring to the work of Slappendel (1996).
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2.3.1 The Individualist Perspective: The Overemphasis on the Role of the
Individual in Innovations
The individualist perspective overemphasises the role of the individual in the
innovation process and ignores internal and external organisational attributes that
influence that process. The individualist perspective is most clearly expressed in
the organisational innovation literature that identifies individual antecedents of
innovation. These antecedents have been defined in terms of individual
characterises and individual concepts such as age, education level, values,
personality, goals. creativity, leadership, and cognitive style. Its emphasis on the
individual as the driver of change has been subject to much criticism (van de Ven
et al. 1989). Moreover, Slappendel points out that individual characteristics may
be diminished by the effect of organisational role and by the impact of
organisational power (Pfeffer 1982). Lastly, the tendency to portray individuals as
'rational beings' who are able to introduce innovations with relative ease seems
quite unrealistic (Slappendel 1996; Cyert and March 1963). The behaviour of
indi viduals searching for solutions does not necessarily produce all possible
alternatives. Rather, according to the individualistic perspective, an individual will
only usually identify a few options which prove to be a satisfactory solution to the
problem at hand (Cyert and March 1963). This approach to innovation assumes
that the adaptive behaviour over time at the 'aggregate level' of the organisation is
the evidence of organisational learning.
Chapter 5 and 6 will engage in this discussion in an attempt to explain some of the
findings of this study. However, a more realistic view is needed which
acknowledges the bounded capacity of humans to deal with complexity and which
takes into account non-routine issues.
2.3.2 The Structuralist Perspective: Mistreating Organisational Processes
This perspective assumes that innovation is determined by organisational
characteristics. It sees the organisation and its subsystems as striving to achieve
organisational goals. Unlike the individualist perspective, the structuralist
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perspective stresses the importance of understanding the relations between the
organisation and its environment. In particular, this perspective highlights the
contribution of customers to the pool of ideas, depending on their sophistication
and their association with an industry (Crocombe et al. 1991). Also, enhanced
communications between the organisation and its customers were found in one
study to promote innovations (Saren 1987). The type of industry (i.e. service or
manufacturing) has emerged as a differentiating factor. Yet existing studies have
failed to highlight the different types of relationships that companies maintain
with customers, even within the same sector. Here we refer to the level of
involvement of customers in the innovation process. For example, there are some
differences between innovation in companies that design and produce made-to-
order products and others that design and produce products based on the assumed
demand in the markets (Pavitt 1984). For the first type the relations between an
organisation and its customers are quite close. This is illustrated in the case of the
Israeli electronics defence industry, which designs and produces products that are
'made to order'. The companies in this industry maintain close relations with their
customers to the extent that sometimes their customers have an office on the
premises of the company. Customers in this specific industry are sophisticated, are
involved in product and process innovation, and maintain a high level of
communications with management and engineers. So far the literature has paid
little attention to the contribution, positive or negative, of this type of relationship
with customers to cross-project learning.
Another interesting element in the environment that affects innovation is the
rivalry between competitors. Competition tends to stimulate 'the minor, but
relatively common, "nuts and bolts" type of innovation' (Slappendel 1996:114).
Also, the study of rapid environmental change and the uncertainty that often
accompanies it points to the conclusion that this scenario will stimulate innovation
in organisations (Ettlie and Bridges 1987). These findings are confirmed in the
present study of firms in the Israeli electronics defence industry.
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Researchers associated with this stream have also studied the relations between
innovativeness and other factors such as the organisation's size, the formalisation
of job descriptions, the professionalism of the organisation's members, and the
centralisation of power. Despite the breadth and depth of these studies, the
correlation between innovations and these factors has not been demonstrated
conclusively (Slappendel 1996). This is mainly because of the lack of agreement
among researchers concerning the precise definitions of these factors, which has
resulted in a fragmented, unintegrated body of knowledge. For example, the
concept of specialisation has been interpreted in different ways in the literature on
innovation. Such a varying interpretation highlights the challenges involved in
maintaining clear and effective communications between different functional
departments in the organisation (such as marketing, production and research).
These challenges are likely to hinder innovation mainly because of the excessive
segmentation between different groups within the organisation and their varying
perceptions of innovation (Kanter 1985). The stream of studies on segmentation
has led scholars from other schools of thought, e.g. Boland and Tenkasi (1995),
Bladder et al.(1999), to develop the concept of 'perspective' in organisational
studies. Yet how can the concept of 'perspective' be used in the context of
technology transfer? The present study will propose a rather different meaning of
'perspective' in the context of cross-project learning.
One major shortcoming of the structuralist approach is the tendency to ignore the
role of central processes (such as strategy and technology) in innovations and treat
them as organisational features. These features are here perceived as 'objective
realities whose factual character is unchallenged' (Slappendel 1996:114).
Thus far a brief review of the individualist and structuralist perspectives has been
provided, emphasising the tendency of researchers from these streams to identify
the key determinants of innovation by using cross-sectional surveys. Despite the
weaknesses and shortcomings of the individualist and structuralist perspectives,
we value the body of knowledge accumulated by these perspectives and consider
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it to be of fundamental importance to the understanding of the role of the major
players in cross-project learning.
Because this thesis studies cross-project learning from a process point of view, the
methodological approach is different from the survey-based approach applied by
these two perspectives. However, the body of knowledge on the innovation
process is also itself fragmented. There are at least two competing views of how
this perspective has evolved and what its main arguments are. The two
perspectives on the innovation process will be presented in the following section.
Slappendel's (1996) work will be described at some length because it is
particularly relevant to the theoretical approach applied in this thesis.
2.3.3 Interactive Process Perspective: The Challenge of Action-Structure Multi-
Level Analysis
There has been a growing interest in the study of the transitory continuousness of
activities which take place during the development and implementation of
innovations (Slappendel 1996). In particular, innovations need to be studied as a
continuous interplay between actions and structure. Accordingly, Wolfe (1994)
argues that process theory models, which are equivalent to the interactive process
perspective proposed by Slappendel (1996), emphasise the nature of the
innovation process mainly by addressing this question: how and why do
innovations emerge, evolve and end? Wolfe identifies two stages in the
development of the literature on the process of innovation. One view relates to
earlier work on stage research, which perceived innovations as a series of stages
and attempted to identify, characterise and put them in order. More recently,
process research has emerged as a second phase of this stream, demonstrating
researchers' attempts to describe fully the sequences of the innovation process and
the conditions that determine those sequences.
Important contributions to the process theory models include the work of Pelz
(1985) and Rogers (1983), who show that identifiable stages in the innovation
process do occur. They suggest that innovation stages tend to be blurred when
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innovation originates within the organisation, whereas they can be identified
clearly when innovation is adapted from an external source. Another major
contribution is related to the understanding of the 'messiness' of the innovation
process (van de Yen 1989). These efforts extended the use of qualitative research
methods when studying innovations and opened up the discussion to new areas of
research, such as strategy (Dean 1987), organisational structure (van de Yen and
Poole 1989) and politics in organisations (Dean 1987).
Slappendel (1996). who prefers to refer to this body of knowledge as the
interactive process perspective, highlights some recent trends in the theory and
methodology applied by researchers. One focus -- on understanding the dynamic
nature of innovations -- has become crucial to this stream. The 'messiness'
associated with how innovation starts, evolves and ends, and the implications of
this for other processes within the organisation are vitally important. Secondly, the
application of longitudinal case studies based on a 'grounded theory' approach has
attracted interest in recent studies and is gradually becoming more acceptable in
the academic community (van de Yen et al. 1989). Lastly, studies in this stream
have rejected the rational economic model of decision making and have
emphasised the non-rational aspects of organisational behaviour, for example the
bounded rationality of managers. Increasingly, these non-economic aspects are
attracting attention in the study of innovations. The present study will debate some
of the findings in the light of the above.
From a methodological and theoretical viewpoint, the approaches that emphasise
context and process, e.g. Pettigrew (1987), have attracted attention in recent years.
Like other perspectives, the interactive process approach has attracted criticism.
Slappendel (1996) argues that while some studies have successfully correlated
variables from more than one level of analysis with factors relating to innovations,
they have failed to interconnect action and structure over time. Van de Yen and
Poole (1988) suggest some future directions for researchers in facing this
challenge: they argue that the use of the concept of time to relate action to
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structure. and the development of new theories of action-structure such as the
structuration theory of Giddens (1984) or Activity Theory (Engestrom 1992;
1996) may enhance our understanding of the dynamics of change. In the late
1960s Normann (Slappendel 1996) presented a multi-level analysis study which
stressed the interplay between action and structure. In his study, Normann linked
factors from different levels of the organisations by describing product
development processes and explaining how these processes were affected by the
task, and cognitive and political organisational subsystems.
Slappendel (1996) evaluates the interactive process perspective and argues that in
the future. researchers need to seek guidance on perspective mediation in order to
integrate action and structure in a multi-level analysis. Another challenge is
related to linguistic constraints. Slappendel (1996) argues that the complex
patterns of processes in innovation, which sometimes present multiple,
simultaneous. parallel relationships, may require 'thinking in circles' and 'writing
in circles'. Put simply, the challenge for the researcher who engages in such
research is to describe complex reality in a way that reflects and demonstrates the
complexity and yet does not mystify the description.
Despite the shortcomings and challenges that the interactive perspective
manifests, we conclude by adopting the view that the use of this perspective is
likely to increase because, of the three perspectives, it would appear to offer more
theoretical mileage in the study of phenomena such as new organisational forms
and management practices, which tend to be highly embedded in social and
historical contexts (Slappendel 1996:124). We position the present study within
this stream and seek to contribute to the body of knowledge on process
innovations by exploring the impact of cross-project learning and the acceleration
of product development on other organisational processes.
2.3.4 Process Innovation: Concluding Remarks
The literature on the management of process innovation is generally prescriptive
in nature. As we have seen, the existing theoretical approaches suffer from
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weaknesses in terms of either their theoretical approach or their applied
methodology. The overemphasis on the individual is one major shortcoming of the
individualist perspective, whereas the structuralist perspective considers the
organisational process as a set of actions rather than a set of features or
capabilities. The interactive process perspective faces the challenge of creating a
robust interconnection between action and structure over time and needs to take
into account the multi-level layers in the organisation.
Despite these shortcomings, the body of knowledge on innovation and strategic
change has provided a broad understanding with regard to the main factors,
determinants and processes central to successful process innovations such as
cross-project learning. On the basis of our review, important opportunities for
future research have emerged. The study of process innovation as an interactive
process certainly needs further development. In particular, the literature in this
stream has failed to develop an understanding of the role of perspective in process
innovation. Additionally, a better understanding is needed of the impact of process
innovation, e.g. cross-project learning, on the entire system. This relates closely to
the work of Engestrom (1992) and Blackler et al. (1999), who seek to understand
how systems change and what the relations are between individuals and their work
throughout the change process. These directions for future research will be
considered further in Chapter 6.
2.4 Cross-Project Learning in a Multi-Project Environment:
Concluding Remarks
Based on the conclusions drawn from the above analysis, this section outlines the
case for applying some aspects of activity theory (Engestrom 1992; 1999;
Blackler 1993; 1995) in Chapter 6 as a theoretical lens to study the impact of
cross-project learning and the acceleration of product development on existing
processes.
2-40
Blackler and his colleagues (1999: 6), based on Engestrom's analysis, explain the
meaning of activity theory: 'a general model for representing the relationships
between personal knowledge and the cultural infrastructure of knowledge, and
between indi vidual actions and the broader pattern of acti vities of which they are a
part. [... ] the notion of activity offers a way of linking events to the contexts
within which they occur'.
Thus, activity theory provides a framework to address the interconnection
between action and structure. Furthermore, it encourages us to study these
relations, as they are the avenues for understanding the process through which
activity systems change (Blackler 1993: 868). Because the unit of analysis is the
activity system. i.e. expertise development, knowledge management and product
development, this means that the fragmentation between different disciplines
within this space is avoided. Lastly, the relationships between individuals, their
co-workers. and the activity are mediated by a number of factors including
technology, procedures. rules, language, division of labour and others. These
relationships are by no mean clear and tidy. Rather, activity systems generate
tension. incoherence and inconsistency (Blackler et al. 1999). Nevertheless, unlike
rational-cognitive theories, activity theory welcomes the investigation of tension
and incoherence as a means of understanding the development of historically
dependent activity systems. For example, studying the tension between processes
of the same activity system, e.g. expertise development and knowledge
management in product development, may assist in understanding the nature of
the relationships between individuals participating in the activity, their
relationships with mediating tools and mechanisms, and the relationships between
these two processes as they change and evolve.
The next section will describe in detail the theoretical foundations of activity
theory.
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2.5 Activity Theory: Aspects of Change and Knowledge
Engestrom ~1996:64) introduces the reader to activity theory with the following
elaboration:
\Vhen I write about the theory of activity, I am using a double-edged notion. On the
one hand, it is necessary to emphasize the unique and self-consciously independent
nature of the Soviet cultural-historical research tradition, which today is commonly
called acti vity theory [... ]. On the other hand, this tradition is not a fixed and
finished body of strictly defined statement - it is itself an internationally evolving
multivoiced activity system. (italics in the source)
Activity theory. which was developed by Vygotsky -- a Marxist scholar -- in the
1920s, has recently been applied to the study of work organisations (for example,
see Blackler 1995: 1997~ Blackler et al. 1999; Engestrom 1987~ 1992~ 1996~
1999). Elementary to activity theory are the relationships between material action,
mind and society (Blackler 1993: 867). Because activity theory is based on
Marxist methodology, the central argument is that it is not the consciousness of
humans that determines their social being; rather, humans' social experiences
shape their consciousness. Unlike rational-cognitive theories, which assume that
individuals and organisations behave rationally and logically, activity theory
suggests that emerging patterns of behaviour are strongly dependent on the
interactions between the agent, the community and the object of the activity.
Engestrom (1992) has provided a contemporary interpretation of the elements of
activity theory. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of human interaction (in contrast to
the animal form of activity) and demonstrates the use of tools and concepts that
mediate between the subject, the community and the object of the activity system
(Blackler 1993). Tension and incoherence are part of the activity system.
Nevertheless, coherence is eventually achieved as individuals, guided by the
system activity object, use their skills and creativity in order to overcome tension
in the activity system (Blackler et aI. 1999).
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Rules
Subject
Instrument
Community
Object-Outcome
Division
of Labour
Figure 1: Engestrom's Model of the Structure of Human Activity (Blackler 1993: 869)
Mediation is central to Marxist Theory and hence plays a key role in activity
theory, which extends the notion of mediation by adding other aspects and
artifacts to this process, e.g. language and the division of labour. Blackler
highlights the areas within which mediation takes place in activity systems, basing
his observation on Engestrom's model: 'the three processes of mediation of tools
between subject and object, of rules between community and subject, and of the
division of labour between community and object' (ibid.:869).
The separation between thinking and acting, common to rational-cognitive
theories, is avoided in activity theory. The theory asserts that people act together
and in fact cannot divorce culture from other aspects of the organisation, e.g.
technology or economic factors (Blackler 1993).
Activity theorists use the activity system as the unit of analysis in organisations.
Activity is much broader than action or operation, as Blackler (1993) explains.
Activity can be work, play, research or war. Nevertheless, understanding activity
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is far more specific and restticted than understanding other major elements In
organisations such as culture.
Explaining complex situations in organisations requires a theory that aims to study
a variety of organisational situations as a dynamic and interconnecting body of
actions. Fundamental to activity theory is the need to understand how people
develop their expertise and how practices evolve in society (Lave and Wenger
1991).
Change in the elements of an activity system often transforms the activity system,
changing the relationships between individuals, groups, their object and the
mediating artifacts. According to Blackler (1993), dialectics arise from this
scenario. Thus, rapid change in the predominant perceptions of the object of the
activity might trigger the contradictory views of the agents who participate in the
activity. There are strong links between different activity systems, and often the
output of one activity system is the input of the other. Thus, tension might emerge
between different activity systems within the organisation, as they do not develop
in isolation from each other.
Engestrom (1992) contributes to the understanding of activity transformation by
identifying the contradictions within and between activity systems. The present
study sees an opportunity to research further the interactions between different
concepts that exist within the activity system in order to understand the impact
that these interactions have on the activity system and other activity systems
within the organisation.
Blackler (1993) concludes by arguing that Marxist theorists such as Vattimo have
presented a strong and deterministic account of the relations between mind and
society which does not correspond to the actual relations between different
elements in societies or organisations. Although activity theory is an exception
among Marxist theories in the way it identifies incoherencies as a feature of
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personal and social life. it offers a limited explanation of incoherencies In
organisations.
Recent devetoprnents in activity theory take diverse forms. Still, the main focus in
activitv theory is to develop a unified account of knowing and doing which
emphasises the collective. situated and tentative nature of knowing (Blackler
1995). Figure 2 presents the relationships between the various elements of the
activity system.
Concepts
Technologies
Operating procedures
Individual
Social
Rules
Community
Conception of
Activity
Division
of Labour
Figure 2: A General Model of Activity Systems (Blackler 1995)
Orr (1990) studied the way Xerox technicians developed their communal identity
through story-telling as part of their daily work. In this sense, Orr proposed an
understanding of learning based on a theory of social construction that relied on
social participation. This learning theory was further developed by Lave and
Wegner (1991) and recently by Wenger (1998). In addition to the development of
technical skills by sharing information between technicians, these studies
highlight the notion of the identity, individual and collective, of professionals and
communities of professionals.
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Engestrom (1991) studied a Finnish medical practice by applying activity theory
and used the socially distributed activity system as the main unit of analysis. The
author studied the relationships between agents, communities and conceptions in
this activity system. Incoherencies and disturbances in this study were observed as
counter-phenomena to management attempts to regulate, rationalise and control
these organisational systems. Blackler (1995), interpreting Engestrom's findings,
suggests that these incoherencies, paradoxes and conflicts in activity systems may
provide avenues for change. To Blackler, these paradoxes and conflicts are the
opportunities for individuals to develop their skills and learn about their location
within the social space in the organisation. It is through participation that learning
and expertise development takes place (see also Lave and Wenger 1991).
Criticisms of activity theory mainly focus on the Marxist origins of the theory. It
is suggested that an attempt to explain the relations between society's past
experience and society's future by stressing the mode of production is too
ambitious and unconvincing in today's complex world. Blackler (1993: 874)
suggests that .a non-deterministic, social constructionist conception of
incoherency and dilemma in activity systems' will overcome these weaknesses
and shortcomings. Sources of tension in activity systems are much more complex
than the tensions between use value and exchange value as expressed in Marxist
theory. Therefore. further investigation is needed into the origins and
manifestations of tension, incoherencies and inconsistencies in activity systems.
In terms of its conception of knowledge, activity theory provides a processual
approach (Blackler 1995). Blackler identifies five different images of knowledge
(encoded, encultured, embrained, embodied and embedded), but goes on to argue
that this conventional view of knowledge, as an entity, is not really helpful since it
suggests that knowledge is abstract, individual, mental and static (ibid.: 1040-
1402). What is needed, Blackler argues, is an approach that sees knowing as
situated, distributed and mediated. In order to achieve this different perspective,
he uses activity theory. Rather than studying knowledge as something individuals
or organisations 'have', activity theory studies knowing as something individuals
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or organisations 'do', and he analyses the dynamics of the systems through which
knowing is accomplished. Knowing from this perspective is mediated (manifested
in systems of language, collaboration, technology and control); situated (located in
time and space and specific to particular contexts); pragmatic (purposive and
object-oriented); provisional (constructed and constantly developing); and
contested. Knowing is a dynamic ever-changing process which cannot be
detached from doing. Knowing and doing are situated in certain contexts shaping
people's interpretation and influencing their behaviour. They are mediated in the
sense that changes in environments may influence both knowing and doing, for
example by changing the ways in which concepts within activity theory evolve
and change. Knowing and doing are also provisional and evolve mainly through
tensions within and between activity systems.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the body of knowledge on cross-project learning and process
innovation has been examined. The existing literature on cross-project learning is
largely limited to the Japanese automobile industry, thereby encouraging the study
of cross-project learning in other contexts. Furthermore, studies in this field tend
to apply the rational-cognitive approach. This calls for the application of other
perspectives on cross-project learning in order to enrich the body of knowledge on
this relatively young and emerging field.
The present study also seeks to explain the impact of cross-project learning on
organisational processes in product development. For this reason we reviewed the
body of literature on process innovation, which appears to be prescriptive and
fragmented, failing to appreciate the development of different perspectives
between communities, and which reveals little about the processes and
dysfunctional actions involved in the introduction of process innovations. More
specifically, the literature does not discuss the impact of process innovation on
other processes within product development. Some authors assume somewhat
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naively that different processes are able naturally to coexist without any tension or
inconsistencv
Therefore. a theoretical framework is needed that compensates for the
shortcomings of the existing literature. Activity theory will be applied in Chapter
6 as a lens to examine the product development activity system as the unit of
analysis. Furthermore. activity theory demonstrates strong foundations in bringing
together the different disciplines and perspectives related to product development
in an attempt to present a coherent and integrated theory in this field. Lastly,
activity theory avoids the separation between knowledge and action and offers an
approach to studying knowing and doing, action and structure, as elements within
the activity system, to be analysed through the dynamics that take place in that
system.
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3 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS AND
PROCESS
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to present the research methods,
process and data collection techniques: secondly, to highlight research constraints
and limitations.
After a brief introduction of the key research interests, Section 3.3 will provide a
justification for using the case-study research method. Section 3.4 will discuss the
considerations for selecting the case study companies and constraints encountered
during the research. Section 3.5 will describe the research process, followed by a
presentation of the data collection methods employed in the research process.
3.2 The Key Interests of the Research
This thesis is very much a result of the inspiration provided by the empirical data.
The primary aim of the thesis is to capture phenomena which have previously
been neglected or perhaps even not reported at all, placing them in their business
context and suggesting new explanations of what has been observed.
Intrigued by the empirical data collected in three leading electronic defence
companies and by the new horizons for theory development offered by the
'rebirth' of acti vity theory (Leont'ev 1978; Engestrom 1992; Blackler 1993), this
thesis finds its main interests in the area of cross-project learning as a strategy to
accelerate product development. In particular, the chief interest of this thesis is to
address the challenge of introducing and managing cross-project learning in a
product development environment.
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3.3 Case-Study Research: The Theoretical Argument
This research is based on an ethnographic multiple case study of cross-project
learning innovations in product development that has affected two processes,
expertise development and knowledge management, in three large hi-tech
companies. A qualitative. retrospective approach is adopted. The research is based
on unstructured interviews and the primary researcher's own on-site observations.
The distinctive strength of a case study is its ability to deal with a variety of
evidence. documents, questionnaires, interviews and observations. In particular, in
exploring an emerging field and its unknown practices, as in the example of
knowledge management, the case-study method seems highly appropriate. In
other words, the study accepts Laurila's (1997:222-223) view that "the feasibility
of the case study approach is thus based mainly on the opportunities it creates for
observing and describing a complicated research phenomenon in a way that
allows analytical organization" (Eisenhardt 1989; Tsoukas 1993). The case-study
approach here focuses on each of the case organisations as a single, universal unit,
and may thus be described as 'holistic' (Yin 1989). In Yin's words, this refers to
the case study of an institution as opposed to the analysis of the functioning of the
separate sub-units within the institution.
The usefulness of the case-study approach is that it allows one to give more
attention to the distinctive and typical characteristics of a particular social scene,
and can reveal the deep structure of a particular behaviour. Moreover, in Yin's
terminology (1989), the case-study design is eminently justifiable because the
case serves a revelatory purpose. The observation of, and insights into, issues
surrounding intra-corporate knowledge-sharing in the selected organisation(s)
should amount to a significant empirical contribution.
Studying a phenomenon within its context usually predisposes researchers to
apply the case-study method (Yin 1993). This involves using data-collection
methods such as archive-search, interviews, questionnaires and observations
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(Eisenhardt 1989:534). Mintzberg (1979) argues that one should go to
organisations with a well-defined focus to collect specific kinds of data
systematically. Formulating a research problem and identifying potentially
important variables with some reference to the existing literature provides a firm
framework for systemic data collection. Still, one should carefully select cases in
order to facilitate the replication of cases for supporting and extending the
emerging theory.
When prepanng data-collection methods, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that a
triangular approach, i.e. with interviews, observations and archive sources, is the
most commonly used combination in qualitative studies.
Though the data collection approach should ideally be decided in advance, one
should bear in mind that altering or adding data collection methods is legitimate as
long as they are coherent in relation to the overall methodology. Researchers
should be receptive to making changes in their collecting methods. Eisenhardt
(1989) concludes by saying that changes in the interview schedule might be
necessary as a result of the preliminary analysis of interviews.
There are three broad classifications of research methods: pure (or basic), applied
and action research (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991). The emphasis of the different
research methods is on the relation between the researcher, the studied
environment and the studied phenomenon. The pure research method focuses on
scientific objectivism and would prefer to see the outcome as a new construct of
theory that explains an organisational or scientific phenomenon (Gummesson
1991). Applied research seeks to explain a problem and produce potential
solutions, but with no actual intervention in the phenomenon. Action research
aims to change a phenomenon by fostering links between theory and practice
(Habermas 1972). It is an interactive research process that seeks to explain a
phenomenon and implement solutions with a high degree of intervention. As will
be explained below, the present study has drawn on the interaction between
applied and action research.
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3.4 Research Methods and Process
This section will outline the research methods used and some central events
during data collection. Section 3.4.1 will outline the process through which the
studied companies were selected. Section 3.4.2 will detail some constraints
imposed by the studied companies on the research.
3.~.1 Selecting the Companies and Projects to be Studied
The Israeli electronics defence industry has significantly influenced the Israeli
economy since the 1970s (Teubal 1993). Major projects such as the Lavi, an
advanced tactical fighter made entirely by the Israeli defence industry during the
1980s, attracted government investment and provided employment to a range of
sectors within the industry, thereby further developing its knowledge base. During
the 1970s and the 1980s the electronics defence industry was considered to be the
premier producer of skilled engineers and technicians, and this effect spilled over
to the commercial hi-tech and start-up industry in Israel (Teubal 1993).
The researcher worked as a training manager for the Israeli Air Force between
1983 and 1990 and as a system developer for YellowTech4 between 1990 and
1996. This experience, as a user and a product developer, was instrumental in the
choice of the Israeli electronics defence industry as the arena for this study.
The Israeli defence industrial base is by and large owned by the government.
Thus, access to financial and employment data has had to rely on popular media
reports and other public sources. Particular reference has been made in the
research to the Israeli daily newspapers Haaret: and Globes, the international
defence magazine Jane's, and studies of the Israeli defence industrial base (Teubal
1983). From this data, the five leading companies were chosen: YellowTech,
4 YelIowTech is a pseudonym; it is one of the studied companies. A detailed description of
YelIowTech is provided in 4.3.3.
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Rafael. the Israeli Aircraft Industries, EL-OP and Elbit. These five account for
9)l~~, of the revenue generated by the defence industrial base in Israel, and they
employ more than 30,000 workers (Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz, 09/08/1999).
In late 1998, discussions with the senior management of these five companies
started. Because of the rules of confidentiality concerning the technologies
developed in some of the projects in these companies, the problem of access was a
major obstacle to the research. After two months, during which the research plan
was presented and in principal a security clearance for the first stage was issued, it
was agreed by the five companies to proceed to the pilot stage. During the pilot
study it was made clear by all five that the research project would require the
security manager's approval. Following the pilot study, two companies, Elbit and
EL-OP. decided to withdraw from the project because of security issues.
YellowTech
Pilot Stage
EI-Op Rafael Elbit TAMAM
CASESTIIDIES
Case Study Stage
Figure 3: Pilot and Case Study Companies
The three remaining companies (Rafael, Israeli Aircraft Industries and
YellowTech), which accounted for 80 per cent of defence-related revenue in 1999,
agreed to participate in the second stage of the research project as long as certain
conditions were met.
Two product families were selected in each company: a well-established product
family and a relatively young product family. Within each selected product family
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one project was chosen. In total, six projects were studied in three companies.
This research design provided the researcher with access to empirical data about
projects that have had 'high mileage' and to those that have had 'low mileage' in
practising the reusability strategy. Yet the specific selection of the projects was
decided by the co-researcher of the company. There were other constraints worth
discussing in the study.
3.....2 Research Constraints
The three studied companies. through the Israeli MoD and based on the rules that
govern security in the Israeli defence industry, decided to restrict access to
authorised areas and people. In addition, they restricted the discussions to non-
technology matters, though in reality this line was not always clear. Lastly, all
material that the researcher used during the research project was checked by the
security manager. In addition, each company set its own preconditions for
participation in stage two.
TAMAM was interested in a consultancy project and hence asked for a
consulting-style report and a presentation to senior management. It asked the
researcher to focus on three main areas: (i) knowledge centres, (ii) collective
learning processes and (iii) unlearning and mistakes. It was expected by
TAYIAM' s management that the researcher would propose some practical steps to
improve the management of knowledge and learning in the company. TAMAM
nominated a senior manager to be the co-researcher to ensure progress and
manage the research project. The co-researcher did not participate in interviews,
but was available to answer questions where issues were not clear. This
arrangement was helpful for both sides. The researcher validated information
through consultation with the co-researcher, while the co-researcher maintained
high involvement in the project.
Secondly, Rafael used this research as an element in the power struggle between
the Head of the R&D Division, the Head of the Patent Group and the Head of
Human Resources. When this research project started, there was a debate in
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Rafael about who owned knowledge-management activities. The researcher was
brought in to satisfy the HR desire to be more involved in KM activities. Rafael's
objectives from this study were similar to TAMAM's, i.e. to study how
knowledge and learning evolve and are managed within the company, and to
identify areas of dysfunctionality in these processes. In addition, the Head of HR
requested the researcher to bring one HR manager up to date with the current
thinking on research and theory in the area of knowledge management. For this
reason, an HR manager was instructed to accompany the researcher and to take
notes during interviews. This situation, which was at first perceived negatively by
the researcher. turned out to be a positive move for two reasons. First, the HR
manager served as another source of information, clarifying points which were not
clear during the interviews. Secondly, the HR manager took responsibility for
managing the interview timetable, making sure that all interviewees appeared on
time. and reporting back to management on progress. Rafael requested a
presentation to senior management as soon as the project ended.
Thirdly. in complete contrast, YellowTech co-operated with the researcher on a
scientific interest basis and as an act of good will. YellowTech nominated the
Head of the Hardware group as the co-researcher of the research project. Two
weekly meetings were scheduled with the co-researcher, aiming to answer
questions, clarify unclear issues and monitor progress. YellowTech requested that
the researcher would present the research results as soon as the project ended.
3.5 Research Process
The researcher worked for YellowTech between 1990 and 1996. In 1993, he
initiated a project that facilitated knowledge sharing across the R&D division.
Since then, between 1993-1996, he was involved in promoting KM initiatives at
the company. In 1998 and 1999, as an informed outsider, a two-phase study was
carried out which examined the process through which project teams participated
in KM activities. Apart from interviews, ethnographic research methodology was
adopted to allow for capturing, understanding and analysing social relations,
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social processes and means of management support through retrospective research
as an insider in the organisation (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).
In order to relate our findings to the body of knowledge on product development,
cross-project learning and innovations, the researcher decided to approach the
research from a wide perspective, engaging with as many elements and factors as
possible in a multiple-project environment. However, in order to focus on specific
issues, the researcher conducted a pilot study in late 1998 in which the researcher
interviewed ten top managers from five leading electronics defence companies in
Israel. including YellowTech, Elbit, Rafael, Israeli Aircraft Industries, and EL-
OP.
Furthermore, through cooperation with one of the leading consulting firms in
Israel. Dr. Edna Pasher and Associates, and via participation in cross-industry
knowledge-sharing forums (also known as Know ledge Cafes) organised by Dr.
Edna Pasher. information about recent trends in the Israeli defence and hi-tech
industry has started to emerge. The main findings from these pilot interviews
emphasised that product-development practices have changed since the beginning
of the 1990s. A more detailed study of the multiple-project environment at
YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael was then launched in early 1999.
Between January and April 1999, the researcher conducted 87 interviews with top
managers, middle managers, project managers, technical managers, engineers,
configuration managers, planning and control managers, and technicians (see
Appendix 2 for a full list of interviewees and time spent with each interviewee,
and Appendix 3 for interview schedule). In addition, the researcher conducted two
observations of problem solving in action in each company and participated in one
knowledge-management committee at Rafael. Documents and information about
the studied companies were collected through various sources, including the Web,
Jane's magazine, popular media and company publications.
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3.6 Data-Collection Methods
The data on the companies were collected by two main methods: semi-structured
interviews and documentary analysis. In addition, data were collected from
observation and participation in meetings. Each of these methods will be
examined to identify the general limitations of the data that were gathered.
3.6.1 Interviews
This was the most effective method of establishing the type of information
required for this study. Therefore, this method was chosen to be the primary
method of data collection. Through interviews, data were collected about the
historical development of the companies and their innovation processes. In
addition. interviews provided an opportunity to collect different perspectives on
the transformation of the studied activity systems at different levels of the chosen
companies. The rationale for interviewing a diversity of professionals from
different disciplines was that these professionals could provide different
perspectives on the transformation of the innovation process in their company, and
together they would cover almost all product development-related activities.
Semi-structured interviews were used as these provided the most flexible format,
with the potential for the interviews to develop in areas felt to be relevant by the
interviewees (Brenner 1985). The intention was to make the interviews
sufficiently open so that issues unforeseen by the researcher could be introduced
and developed. For each interview a detailed schedule of issues and questions was
prepared. However the interviews were conducted in a flexible way, allowing the
interviewees adequate opportunities to pursue the issues they themselves
percei ved to be relevant. The result of this was that there were significant
differences in how each interview developed. This format was deemed to be
successful: the character of each interview varied, but the researcher was still able
to pursue all the questions and issues perceived to be important, thereby ensuring
that the interview data were comparable. In each company, between 25 and 30
engineers and managers were interviewed, thus allowing some triangulation to be
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done between interviews, and reducing the reliance on the opinion of any single
person.
One concern with emphasising the process of change was that the information
collected might not provide an explanation of the quality of the decision-making
process (Child and Smith 1987) that led to the change process. This was
considered a minor concern, as the purpose of revealing the process-related data
was to establish an understanding of how systems change rather than studying the
decision making involved in the change process.
As Kahn and Cannell (1957) argue, when conducting interviews it is important to
reflect on the motivation of the interviewees, as this may influence the
information provided. It was therefore recognised that engineers may be
moti vated to present a certain viewpoint, for example that the change in their
practice was greater than what it was in reality, whereas other professional groups
such as. for example. sales or marketing staff, might present a different picture.
While it was not always possible to verify the accuracy of all data, a number of
methods were available for carrying out checks.
For example, interviewing a range of personnel was one method through which
data were triangulated. In addition, there was an opportunity to consult documents
and talk to informed insiders, such as the consulting firm Dr. Edna Pasher and
Associates, before the interviews in a specific company to establish the most
significant information about that company. This provided another source of data
triangulation during and after the interviews.
The interview schedule was tested at the beginning of 1999 by the co-researchers
of two companies, YellowTech and TAMAM. The schedule was sent by fax, and
the companies' comments were discussed over the telephone. The research design
was not altered drastically following these pilot interviews, as they were generally
found to be successful, with the interviews conducted providing data which were
more than adequate for the purpose of the research.
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3.6.2 Documentary Sources
A wide range of documentary sources was used to provide information on the
studied companies. While this information provided a method of triangulating and
cross-checking some of the interview data, it was also a rich source of original
data itself. providing a great deal of information which could not have been
collected from interviews alone. Examples of the sort of information collected
from these sources include: revenue and sales figures, ownership information and
governmental trade and procurement rules. The range of sources used was
extremely diverse and included: Israeli newspapers (on the Web) and specialised
journals such as Jane's Defence Weekly, Aviation Week and Space Technology. It
needs to be stressed that the Israeli defence industry had been poorly researched,
and therefore there were few academic publications about their operations In
general, let alone about their innovation processes in particular.
There is always a concern with the possibility of bias in secondary documentary
data. Reports can serve the purpose of a specific individual, group or institution to
promote their interests rather than providing an objective perspective (Scott 1990).
For example, a company brochure may present a picture that emphasises the
positive side of working for this company in order to make it more attractive to
graduates, whereas in reality this company may suffer from poor management-
employee relations. Also, it is common to find discrepancies in national
parameters between independent and government sources about employment and
spending figures related to the defence industrial base. The reason for these
discrepancies is the different definition of the parameters between the two sets of
institutions. This does not mean that documentary data should not be used, but
simply that it is necessary to consider the motivation of the authors and the
assumptions made by them to support their arguments.
3.7 Data Analysis
The data analysis emphasised the unit of analysis activity systems. In this
research at least three activity systems were studied: product development,
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expertise development and knowledge management. On the basis of the traditional
approach to research suggested by activity theory (Leont'ev 1978; Engestrom
1992; Blackler 1993), the analysis of the data emphasised the following areas: (i)
the historical development of the activity system, (ii) the development of
mediating artifacts and processes within each activity system, (iii) the subject,
community and object of the activity, (iv) the outcome of the activity, and (v) the
tensions generated within and between activity systems.
Any researcher conducting qualitative research must acknowledge the presence of
ambiguity, since there are very few procedures or instructions to adhere to during
the research process. However, there are some steps a researcher can take in order
to reduce the ambiguity. For example, in this thesis the researcher analysed and
made empirical categorisations from qualitative data to clarify the main themes
emerging from the data. Guided by activity theory, the researcher sought to
categorise and associate stories and events as an element within an activity
system. From this categorisation, an illustration of the elements involved in the
studied activity system emerged, allowing the researcher to report on the
transformation of the activity system.
3.8 Research Methods and Process: Conclusion
In this chapter a description of the research methods, constraints and process has
been provided, highlighting the challenges and dilemmas the researcher has faced
in conducting this research.
In the following chapter, an industry background at three levels of detail will be
outlined: global, national and company. This description aims to provide the
reader with some of the parameters that the studied companies faced before,
during and after the transformation of their cross-project learning innovation
systems.
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: INDUSTRY AND COMPANY
BACKGROUND
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the context within which the present study was carried out.
When one compares innovations systems of two or more companies,
understanding the context within which these companies operate is imperative to
understanding the differences in their strategies (e.g. Pettigrew and Whipp 1991)
and organisational mechanisms (e.g. Collinson 1999).
Thus. the following sections will provide a background description of the defence
industrial base. starting with the global defence industry, then describing changes
in the Israeli electronics defence industry, and finally providing a detailed
description of the studied companies. Lastly, the closing section will outline
changes in defence markets in recent years that have affected the organisation of
innovation in product development in the Israeli electronics defence industry.
4.2 Trends in Global Defence Markets
The end of the Cold War in 1989-1990 resulted in increased pressure on the major
powers' defence budgets. As a consequence, the global defence industrial base
experienced a dramatic reduction in the demand for military equipment. For
example, arms sales by the largest arms-producing companies in the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (GECD) fell by 15 per cent between
1991 and 1994 (Anthony 1998). Defence procurement markets saw a fall in the
value of trade in defence equipment from some $60 billion trade in 1985 to $23
billion in 1999 (Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz, 15/11/1999), and world-wide
employment in the defence industry fell from 17.5 million to 11.1 million workers
between 1987 and 1995 (BICC 2000). In addition, conventional weapon trade
flows have been dominated increasingly by the United States, which recently
accounted for at least half of total defence sales (Klieman 1998).
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There have been various explanations of the decline in defence expenditures. Wulf
(1993) and Walker (1991) argue that the changing political climate in Europe
following the collapse of the Soviet bloc is one of the most significant factors.
Since 1991, declining European and US threat perceptions have led governments
to re-evaluate their defence needs, cut defence budgets and decrease their defence
procurement. Wulf (ibid.) suggests two additional causes: (i) the growing pressure
on governments and regional organisations to manage their economies with
minimum deficits, and (ii) the growing number of arms control and disarmament
agreements. particularly in Europe. Despite the significant reduction in global
defence procurement, there are some regions, such as the Middle East and the Far
East, in which military expenditures have actually increased because of inter-state
threats. However, the demand from these relatively small countries cannot
compensate defence industries for the lost markets among the major powers.
It must be stressed that the defence industry is by no means homogeneous. It is an
amalgam of different capabilities, technologies, products and markets.
Furthermore, not all parts of the defence industrial base have suffered to the same
extent from the decline in trade during the last decade. Indeed, many states have
sought to upgrade their armed forces, thereby generating a growing demand for
advanced military systems. Therefore, trade at the high end of defence systems
has not fallen but in some cases has actually increased, despite shrinking global
military expenditures (Anthony 1998).
4.2.1 Government Policy in Some Regions towards Defence Industries
Some regional economies were severely affected by the reduction In defence
expenditures, but others were not (Wulf 1993; Todd 1988; Clark 1995). In some
cases -- like that of Israel -- where governments have made long-term
commitments, their defence industrial base has retained most of its capabilities. In
addition, some governments have chosen to protect regional economies by
supporting national defence industries or by providing unique financial support to
areas that have suffered from a large number of plant closures related to defence
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business. For instance, Germany, certain states in the USA, the former Soviet
Union mainly in Russia, and China have pursued a protective policy (Clark 1995).
In the USA, a major reaction to change in defence markets did not occur until the
US Secretary of Defence, Mr Cohen, stated explicitly in 1994 that firms in the
defence industry must merge in order to ensure their survival. As the result of
subsequent consolidation, by the end of the 1990s employment in the US defence
industry had declined dramatically, with a loss of almost 600,000 jobs (BICC
2000).
The case of Western Europe is different. The West European defence industrial
base is relatively small, and hence economic readjustment problems have been
less severe. Nevertheless, co-operative defence arrangements between countries in
Europe. e.g. in defence production and defence industrial policy, are still largely
decided at the national level (Wulf 1993). The ongoing political debate concerning
the respective roles of EU institutions and national governments with regard to
defence issues remains an obstacle to the attempt to establish a truly European
defence industrial policy (Nicoll Alexander, FT, 24/01/2002). Wulf (ibid.: 10)
argues that consequently" ...European governments have not managed to 'down-
size' their large over-capacities. These policy recommendations have never been
put into practice on a large scale because of national idiosyncrasies and powerful
industrial interests".
The defence industry in Japan has retained only a small proportion of defence
R&D and production relative to its large industrial capacity. Therefore, it has not
been greatly affected by changes in global defence markets. Indeed, Japan has
steadily increased its domestic defence market in the last decade, a trend which
stands in contrast to the predominant situation in the Western world.
Changes in global defence markets have also influenced 'third-tier' countries,
where, according to the typology proposed by Wulf (1993), five scenarios induced
by government policy can be identified: (i) countries that have developed a
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defence industrial base in the past but have encountered difficulties in keeping up
with advanced technology and utilising their capacities (e.g. Brazil and South
Africa): (ii) countries that have paid a very high cost for maintaining their defence
industrial base by investing a fortune in developing unique technologies (e.g.
Israel and India): (iii) countries that have recently started to expand their defence
industrial base, and have been willing to upgrade their armed forces following
growing external threats (e.g. South-Korea and Taiwan); (iv) countries that have
specialised in certain sectors of defence production and have tried to co-operate
internationally (e.g. Israel and Singapore); and (v) countries that are known, or
claim, to have important defence capacities, but where information is very
speculative (e.g. North Korea, Iraq and Iran).
Hence. it can be seen that governments have implemented different policies in
relation to their defence industrial base. In many cases governments have regarded
the base as a national laboratory which is essential in order to develop adequate
defence systems. However, in the 1990s the trends of globalisation and the
liberalisation of markets have compelled defence industries to take appropriate
responsive measures.
4.2.2 Corporate Strategies in the Post-Cold War Defence Industry
There is little written information that describes how defence industries have
coped strategically with changing defence markets (Hougui and Shenhar 1995).
Nevertheless, some information from newspapers and other popular media sources
can assist in describing the most common strategies taken by defence industries in
the USA and Western Europe. There have been three major strategies: (i)
downsizing, (ii) concentration on defence products, and (iii) diversification to
commercial markets. The largest contractors have practised a mix of the three, but
downsizing has undoubtedly been the single most common strategy.
Concentration on defence products has taken place in some defence companies
through mergers and acquisitions. This strategy has aimed to develop further
defence-related production capacities and sometimes to reduce R&D risk.
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Consequently. companies following this strategy have developed larger market
share. thus allowing them to survive. while smaller contractors have experienced
difficulties. For instance. the mega-merger between Lockheed Corp and Martin
Marietta Corp in 1995 did not take place before Lockheed had acquired General
Dynamics in March 1993 and Martin Marietta had bought General Electric Co.' s
GE aerospace division in early 1994 (Harrison 1995).
The diversification of defence-related capabilities to commercial markets, also
known as conversion strategy. was implemented by large defence industries in the
late 1980s. Over a decade later. it is evident that companies have maintained their
defence production capabilities while making more effort to use military-purpose
technologies in civilian products. However, the conversion strategy has not always
been successful. In many cases, defence companies have realised that they were
facing high barriers in their efforts to penetrate civilian markets because of the
defence industry' s high labour costs, project management style and lack of
marketing skills (Dvir et al. 1996).
However, some defence companies in the USA have failed to react to changes
even when their business performance has declined. Clark (1995) proposes
explanations based on the arguments that (i) the full extent of cuts will be
experienced in the industry only after a time lag; (ii) large contractors are sharing
the remaining contracts; (iii) other contractors are buying up competitors, thus
further reducing competition; and (iv) some companies have specialised in certain
niches which were not affected by cuts in defence expenditures.
It is thus clear that the late 1990s saw more consolidation, cooperation and joint
ventures between defence industries at the national and international levels.
4.3 The Israeli Electronics Defence Industry: Key Characteristics
The electronics defence industry in Israel is a second-tier world-leader supplier of
electronics defence products. Much of its reputation was built on its proven
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products in the battlefield. During the 1960s and 1970s the Israeli defence
industry grew dramatically because of the high level of tension in the Middle East
and the weapons-sale embargo imposed by several European countries. These
conditions prompted the Israeli government to develop in-house capabilities to
produce defence products. During the 1980s and the 1990s, following the fall of
the Soviet bloc, the Israeli defence industry experienced a dramatic decline in
sales, and consequently the number of employees in the industry dropped from
80,000 in the early 1980s to 18,000 by the end of 1996 (Inbar and Zilberfarb
1998). The forced cancellation of the ambitious Lavi fighter project in 1987, due
to prohibitive costs and American opposition, contributed greatly to the reduction
in military production labour (Klieman 1998).
4.3.1 Core Technological Capabilities in the Israeli Electronics Defence Industry
in the 1980s and 1990s.
The Lavi project led the Israeli electronics defence industry to concentrate on the
upper level of defence design and production, and to acquire unique knowledge
and capabilities with the financial support of the Israeli government and
technology transfer from the US. Amongst the areas developed during the 1980s
there was an increased concentration on sub-systems and specialised components.
There was a move into the area of 'smart weapons', which combine hardware and
software devices in various sub-systems and mainframes: for example, laser
sensors, night vision optics, communication equipment, diagnostic systems, air-to-
air missiles, air-to-land missiles, pilotless drones, and electronic warfare systems.
In addition, upgrading and retrofit data packages were designed and put out for
sale on the open market. Amongst the leading electronics companies in Israel is
Israeli Aircraft Industries (JAI), with its range of subsidiaries including TAMAM
and Elta, Elbit Systems, Rafael, EI-Op and Elisra Systems Ltd.
4-66
·t3.2 Markets and Financial Results in the Israeli Electronics Defence Industry in
the 1990s
Despite the evidence of a global decline in the arms trade, figures published by
government officials indicated that Israeli military exports in 1993 were the same
in terms of value as in 1992, and that military orders in 1994 showed an increase
of 20% (Klieman 1998). This information has been confirmed by sources at the
studied companies. For instance, IAI's sales in 1998 amounted to $1.9 billion, and
in 1999 to $2.1 billion (Dror Marom, Globes, 22/07/1999). Rafael's backlog broke
all previous records in 1999 and was more than $1 billion before 2000 (Dror
Marom, Globes. 04/01/2000). Elbit has been awarded a large number of upgrade
contracts. bringing its orders backlog to a peak of $670 million in 1998 (Ami
Ginsborg, Globes, 07/01/1998).
The Israeli electronics defence industry has benefited directly from the global
interest in upgrading defence products. In recent years it has developed specific
skills in converting out-dated electronic systems into new ones, thereby improving
the performance levels of combat platforms. Elbit Systems was the pioneer in this
area, as its General Manager, Yossi Ackerman, explained (Ami Ginsborg, Globes,
07/01/1998):
For many years now, we have taken every opportunity to insinuate the notion of
'upgrade', until it finally started to catch on.
Nowadays, the Israeli electronics defence industry trades with at least 70 countries
(lnbar and Zilberfarb 1998). A number of markets, including the Far East,
Australia and some European countries, have been widened (interview source).
Seeking new markets, the industry has often been associated with controversial
clients. However, a rather decentralised and uncoordinated decision by industry
leaders to focus on the upper rung of military and dual-use technologies has
enabled the industry to reduce its dependence upon marginal third-world
countries. Many of the industry's most recent clients are among the prosperous
and liberalising Asian 'tigers', which spent some $130 billion on defence in 1995
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alone (Klieman 1998). One newspaper report shows that in 1997 25 per cent of
orders in IAI originated in the Far East (Dror Marom, Globes, 13/01/1998).
The three following sections will introduce the companies studied in the present
research.
..1.3.3 A Description of YellowTech
This case study company asked to remain anonymous. Therefore the researcher
named it YellowTech. Located in the Tel-Aviv area, YellowTech was founded in
1967 by a group of Jewish-American engineers who believed in Zionism and saw
it as their mission to extend the Israeli electronics industry. YellowTech was
instituted as a private business, and it was not until the late 1980s that it was sold
to a large Israeli communication conglomerate. Since then, YellowTech has been
managed as a subsidiary, but has enjoyed considerable autonomy in managing its
own affairs.
YellowTech started to develop electronic warfare systems as a three-engineer
business. and has since grown to become a leader in domestic and global markets.
With some 800 employees, the company has an amalgam of capabilities in the
areas of electronic and mechanical engineering. For almost 30 years, YellowTech
has researched, developed, produced and marketed electronic warfare systems at
the cutting-edge of technology. It enjoys strong relationships with the Israeli Air
Force, which has assisted YellowTech in developing broad engineering
capabilities. In addition, YellowTech provides technology tailored to the needs of
a long list of customers, including some of the world's leading armed forces.
YellowTech has three divisions: the Defence Systems Division, the Production
Division and the Microelectronics Division. Each division has developed its own
distincti ve technical capabilities. Specialising in a range of warfare systems and
components with customer support -- avionics, ground and sea systems --
YellowTech is also actively involved in the development of commercial
applications and technology transfer.
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YellowTech, like other defence-related businesses in Israel, is a mature and
ageing company. Many of its employees have elected to stay with the company
for many years in order to enjoy unique social benefits such as up to 250% night
shift pay. Consequently, YellowTech has always had an experienced workforce.
Collinson (2001) reported a similar pattern about the career development system
in one Japanese chemical company. YellowTech recruitment policy has benefited
from close links with the air force. During air-force service, technicians and
engineers acquire a unique knowledge of warfare systems, which is crucial for
YellowTech.
The Defence System Division at YellowTech operates in a matrix structure.
Software and hardware engineers and technicians are assigned to projects but they
belong to separate groups. In the Hardware Group the ASIC team (Application
Specific Integrated Circuit) is the only team providing services to projects. Other
groups that provide service in the matrix structure are the Computing Support
Unit, Configuration Group, the Mechanical Group, and the Planning and Control
Group.
During the last decade, there has been repeated industrial unrest at YellowTech.
Following the market decline of the 1980s, the company downsized its workforce
from 1,200 to 800 employees. This led to confrontation between top management
and the trade unions, souring a long tradition of co-operative industrial relations.
The beginning of the 1990s saw additional problems: the new management
introduced further restructuring plans, which required more cuts in employees'
benefits. Almost a decade later, YellowTech has become YellowTech Group,
made up of YellowTech, Tadiran Spectralink and BVR, three companies in the
area of warfare systems, data link systems and pilot rescue systems. YellowTech
Group's operations profit in 2000 increased 300% from $4 million in 1999 to $12
million in 2000. The Group's gross profit in 2000 was $50 million, 250/0 higher
than in 1999 (Dror Marom, Globes, 16/01/2001).
4-69
YellowTechs technological market is also in upheaval. The company has to cope
with rapid changes by acquiring technology and knowledge quickly and applying
them directly into systems. In addition, it has to respond to the growing
competition in electronics defence markets by diversifying its products and
services, Another strategy recently adopted by YellowTech is a strategic co-
operation agreement with domestic and global competitors. Recent examples
include a marketing co-operation agreement with Elta of Israel (Ora Koren,
Haaretz. 08/10/1999) and with Trak of USA (Eli Landau, Globes 06/08/1999) and
a joint venture with Northrop Grumman (Dror Marom, Globes, 20/01/1999).
Despite operating in markets which are greatly influenced by global politics and
economics. and are also regarded as monopolistic and homogeneous, YellowTech
remains a business-orientated company and bases its product development
strategy on innovative technological solutions according to its clients' needs. As
tenders become more and more demanding, YellowTech finds itself in the almost
impossible position of having to balance clients' growing demands for
sophisticated battlefield solutions and the requirements of shorter projects with
shrinking margins.
Two specific projects were studied at YellowTech. The first project is the SPS-
1000 product family, which is a light electronic warfare system supplied to clients
by YellowTech for more than a decade and having more than a dozen different
configurations for various avionics platforms. It consists of more than ten sub-
units located in different places in avionics platforms, and is an amalgam of
capabilities and knowledge in the areas of physics, electronics, aerodynamics,
software and mechanical engineering. The team that worked on this project drew
upon established knowledge and skills accumulated through many years of
expenence.
The second project was first developed as a technology at YellowTech during a
period of more than 10 years, and has only recently been offered as a product to
clients. The project's technology, which was based on a digital analysis of
electromagnetic data, aims to provide high-resolution radar signal detection.
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Yellow'Tech has always considered this to be a revolutionary project in its area.
Accordingly. the company formed a group of scientists, engineers and software
engineers to combine their unique experience and skills in order to meet the
challenge. However, between 1993 and 1996 the project was shut down because
of the team' s poor results and unsatisfactory progress. It was restarted only in late
1996 following a contractual agreement with a client. Another team was given the
responsibility for continuing to develop the technology alongside the product.
~.3...1 A Description of Rafael
Rafael. established in 1958 and located in the north of Israel, is a sub-unit of the
Israeli Defence Ministry (MoD). It has since gained the title of 'the national
laboratory for defence research and development'. During its early years Rafael
concentrated on research and development (R&D) activities, and only during the
1960s did it extend its capabilities by starting to produce defence systems in order
to avoid quality problems induced by a faulty knowledge transfer process between
Rafael and its sub-contractors. Enjoying the financial support of the MoD, Rafael
has for many years focused on developing in-house, sometimes double,
capabilities in technological areas that consume much of the organisation's
resources and create internal competition.
During the 1960s and 1970s Rafael symbolised the traditional Defence
Corporation claiming to know better than its clients what products they needed.
Marketing activities and co-operation with external R&D institutions were
considered to be a waste of time (Rafael Bulletin 1998). Changes in domestic and
global markets have pushed the company to readjust its strategies. Hence, after
focusing originally on knowledge creation, Rafael has recently redirected its
efforts to other areas in order to enhance its understanding of clients' needs
(Rafael Bulletin 1998). New markets have been explored -- e.g. Australia, Greece
and some countries in the Far East -- in an attempt to attract more clients. Some
sections of the organisation have attempted to introduce business-orientated
practices. For instance, management have invested in developing Marketing and
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Sales teams at different levels of the organisation. Quality Assurance (QA)
processes have been transferred from central QA functions to suppliers and
employees in order to achieve continuous improvement. Together, these new
approaches have been presented as a transformation from 'quality at any price' to
'pricing the quality' (Rafael Bulletin 1998). In addition, Rafael has diversified its
technologies. seeking new business opportunities in three commercial markets:
communications. medical equipment and semi-conductor testing equipment.
Rafael now has five divisions: Missiles, Ordnance Systems, Electronic Systems,
Platforms and Launchers, and the Propulsion and Explosives Directorate. Three
quarters of the 4.250 employees are organised on the basis of a collective
agreement, while the rest have individual contracts. Some 48 per cent of the
workforce hold an advanced degree; 47 per cent of these have first degrees, 35 per
cent have second degrees. and 18 per cent have doctorates. The 1998 sales
distribution figures showed that Rafael sold 60 per cent of its products to the
Israeli Defence Force and 15 per cent to clients in the Far East. Europe and North
America accounted for a further 25 per cent of sales. Despite the increase in sales
in recent years, Rafael has shown a loss of $375 million since 1994. In 1999
Rafael broke all previous records in recording a $1.1 billion backlog of orders
with a loss of at least $42.5 million. The continuous loss is seen by commentators
as the result of poor management at Rafael, which has been unable to overcome
the problems of hidden unemployment among the workforce and the high salaries
paid to research employees (Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz, 26/07/1999).
In recent years it seems that Rafael has developed two different personalities. On
the one hand, it has tried to act as a commercial company driven by profit. On the
other hand, it has continued to perform the role of a national defence laboratory
focusing on R&D and paying little attention to costs. In addition, the future of
Rafael has been uncertain for a number of reasons. First, past Israeli governments
have sought to change the status of Rafael to that of a government-owned business
in order to improve financial results and increase Rafael's concentration on
markets (Haim Bior, Haaretz, 02/11/1999). The company's employees have not
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welcomed this plan, arguing that as long as Rafael retains its autonomy, they
would be willing to negotiate. So far, governments have not come to any firm
decision about whether Rafael should become more of a commercial organisation.
Because Rafael is responsible for 80 per cent of the generic defence R&D, also
known as non-project R&D, for the Israeli government, government officials find
it difficult to transform the company while also preserving its unique R&D
capabilities (Rafael Bulletin 1998). Secondly, the massive financial support
provided to Rafael by past Israeli governments has come to be questioned by the
Israeli public.
In addition, there are other factors casting a shadow over Rafael's future. The high
average age of employees, recently reported as 45, has now become a serious
problem. A recent attempt to recruit young engineers on personal contracts has
ended in an industrial relations crisis, with trade unions claiming that management
was trying to reduce trade union power and replace old and experienced
employees with a young, cheap workforce (Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz,
03/10/1999). As a result, the general atmosphere at Rafael has deteriorated. The
internal turbulence has been aggravated by the company's tight financial situation,
the ongoing debate about its future identity and ownership, and the growing
market pressure for better performances with fewer resources.
Two specific projects were studied at Rafael, both from the Missile Division. The
latter employs some 1,100 employees and is divided into four different
Directorates: Air-to-Ground, Air-to-Air, Electro-Optic and Anti-Tank Personal
Missiles. Each Directorate manages a number of projects or programmes.
Programmes are managed in the same way as projects, but are different in the
sense that they have more clients for the same product. Each Directorate operates
in a matrix structure, which distinguishes between two different areas of
responsibilities: project managers and system engineers from the administration
are responsible for the management of projects, while engineers and technicians
from the R&D and Engineering Field are responsible for engineering tasks. These
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engineers and technicians are assigned to projects according to the workload.
Hence. engineers are often involved in more than one project.
The Missile Division has developed distinguished, widely tested solutions for the
Israeli Air Force for the last 40 years. The recent exposure to global defence
markets has affected the Division's operation. The development of marketing
knowledge and the incorporation of product development activities to marketing
efforts have become major factors in the Division's strategy. Many of the recent
successful marketing efforts were promoted through joint ventures with large
American defence conglomerates such as Lockheed-Martin and Northrop-
Grumman. However. the Israeli Air Force (IAF) is still the most important client
of the Missile Division. The close relations between the Missile Division and IAF
have resulted in the development of innovative solutions such as the air-to-ground
missile Popeye. which is one of the studied projects at Rafael.
Popeye has gained a reputation as one of the most accurate air-to-ground missiles
in the world, developed during almost two decades of improvements and
adaptation to different avionics systems. Popeye was developed into a product
family. and one of its configurations was recently modified to fit F-16 combat
aircraft. This has opened up new markets for the Popeye product family - a
success based on a recent joint venture with Lockheed-Martin. As the Head of the
Popeye programme explained:
Popeye is a leading project in the Directorate, which allows us to cash in on
existing properties with only minimum effort by reusing the knowledge developed
in so many years ofR&D.
A second project, another flagship product at the Electro-Optic Directorate, is the
Litening programme. This revolutionary product, a navigation and attack pod, has
established a worldwide reputation. Litening comprises technological capabilities
that were developed in the electronics defence industry over many years, inside
and outside Rafael; and these capabilities were integrated to one product, offering
innovative solutions for recent battlefield problems.
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..t3.5 A Description of TAMAM, a Subsidiary of Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI)
TAMAM Division, located in the centre of Israel, is an integral part of the Israeli
Aircraft Industries' Electronics Group, which in tum is part of Israeli Aircraft
Industries (IAI), a state-owned business and a global leader in military and
commercial aerospace technology, accounting for approximately 50 per cent of
Israel's defence exports in 1997. Founded in 1953, and a limited company since
1968, IAI has achieved impressive results, being ranked 30th in the 1998 list of
the world's 100 largest aerospace manufacturers, with sales reaching $1.87 billion
(Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz, 09/08/1999). Operating as autonomous businesses --
with separate management research and development and marketing activities -
IAr s four Groups co-operate in order to offer their customers solutions under one
roof. The four groups are: the Bedek Aviation Group, the Commercial Aircraft
Group, the Military Aircraft Group, and the Electronics Group.
The Electronics Group is a world leader in advanced Defence and Aerospace
Electronics, with a turnover of some $860 million per year and a backlog of over
$1.6 billion in 1999. About 60 per cent of its activities are related to exports. The
Electronics Group comprises four divisions, each of which is a player in its
respective niche in the global market: ELTA - Electronics Industries Ltd.;
MABAT -- Weapon Systems & Space Technology; TAMAM - Optronics and
Navigation; and MALAM -- Systems Design and Integration. The driving force
behind the diverse and distinguished technological capabilities at the Electronics
Group is the 5,300 or so employees, of whom over 65 per cent are engineers and
technicians (TAMAM's company profile 1998).
Since its foundation in 1964, TAMAM has specialised in advanced electro-optical
systems, navigation and inertial technologies for use in air, land, sea and space
platforms. It has developed a close working relationship with the Israeli Defence
Force which has assisted TAMAM in producing solutions for modem military,
users. Amongst the company's main products are day/night electro-optical
payloads for helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, and night targeting systems for
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helicopters. TAMAM employs 860 highly experienced personnel, more than 200
of whom are engineers and scientists, while 300 are technicians. TAMAM is
organised in five professional-orientated directorates: Optronics, Navigation,
Engineering, Operations, and Product Assurance. The company operates In a
matrix structure, dividing project tasks between the five directorates. The
management of a project is the responsibility of the Optronics or Navigation
directorate. The Engineering directorate is responsible for the design of the
product. The Operation and Product Assurance directorates are responsible for the
production and quality assurance of the product respectively.
Like Yellow'Tech and Rafael, TAMAM faces the problems of the workforce's
high average age and low turnover. Because TAMAM is part of IAI, any attempt
to recruit newcomers starts within IAI, and only if this is unsuccessful does the
company look outside IAJ. The practice of transferring employees between groups
and divisions has become a company policy, and this has helped IAI to maintain
good relationships with trade unions. However, it has not been the best solution
for managers and engineers, who have been expected to recruit any available
employees to their team irrespective of their skills.
Recent years have seen massive layoffs at IAJ. TAMAM released 20 per cent of
its workforce during the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, the strong family
atmosphere among employees has declined. In addition, the highly regulated
reward system at TAMAM has further complicated management's ability to
reward individuals for high-value performance. Rewards at TAMAM have not
included any financial benefits. Rewards were in the form of citation in the
company's newsletter.
Moreover, confusing information from the media about the government's
intention to shut down IAJ because of heavy losses in the early 1990s generated
further industrial unrest in IAI and its subsidiaries (Dror Marom, Globes,
27/11/1997). In the past, persistent cash flow difficulties in IAI have led to
government officials stating that JAI might have to be sold to investors. At the
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same time. management at IAI have sought to downsize the organisation and seek
new markets. In this confusing environment, employees have developed a high
level of solidarity with trade unions at IAI and at the national level. For instance,
in 1997 IAI's employees joined a one-day strike, demonstrating against the
government's intentions to privatise Bezeq, the Israeli national
Telecommunication Company (Dror Marom, Globes 17/07/1997). The unstable
political system in Israel for the last ten years has generated more unrest at
TAMANt Announcements by government officials about the government's
intention to sell IAI to private investors, though these were usually followed by
immediate denials, further generated speculations about the future of TAMAM
and the possibility of it becoming a private company (Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz,
15/11/1999).
Two specific projects were studied at TAMAM. The first was involved in the
development of a Multi-mission Optronic Stabiliser Payload (MOSP). Engineers
and technicians involved in this project demonstrated high-level skills and
expertise in the areas of microelectronics, mechanical engineering and physics.
"\10SP is supplied to clients in different configurations for airborne, land and sea
applications and consists of two to three sensors. MOSP's technology has matured
for more than a decade, thereby minimising R&D workload in exploiting the
product' s success and making MOSP a well-developed product family.
The second studied project was involved in developing a Plug-in Optronic
Payload (POP) technology over a period of nearly ten years. Only recently has
POP been offered as a product -- a navigation system based on a Ring Laser Giro
(RLG) technology, which has been proven to be more accurate than, but not as
reliable as, the mechanical payload technology. For this purpose, TAMAM had to
acquire and develop knowledge relating to RLG technology and its application as
a POP product.
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·t3.6 Sinlilarities and Differences between the Studied Organisations
In many ways the studied organisations are similar (see Table 3). All of them have
operated in domestic and global electronics defence markets for the last 30 years.
Their combined sales for 1999 accounted for 80 per cent of the industry, and
together they employ 68 per cent of the industry's workforce'.
In terms of competition, Rafael and YeIlowTech compete in the electronics
warfare systems market, while TAMAM and Rafael compete in the Optronics and
Payload systems market. YeIlowTech and TAMAM do not compete on any
specific product: however. YeIlowTech and Elta, a sister company to TAMAM
and part of the Electronics Group Division, compete and co-operate in the
electronics warfare systems market.
The studied organisations have developed and produced defence systems for more
than three decades. In the 1990s they all faced major changes in their
environments following a worldwide reduction in defence trade. Consequently,
they reorganised their innovation systems by introducing project-management
tools and cost-effectiveness concepts. Changes were introduced in their
approaches to marketing, sales and contracts. More emphasis was given to the
integration of product development teams and their co-operation with sales and
contract teams. In addition, changes in organisational structure were introduced,
emphasising the need to enhance flexibility and communication using a matrix
structure. TAMAM and Rafael now operate under matrix structures with a clear
distinction between the management and the engineering functions of projects. A
matrix structure was introduced at YellowTech during the 1980s. However, recent
organisational structure initiatives have introduced functional teams, such as the
ASIC group, which provides hardware design services to projects.
5 Because the studied organisations have not published annual reports, these figures were taken
from the popular media and were based on interview data.
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The studied organisations downsized their workforces significantly during the
1980s and 1990s6 • Defence industries in general have suffered from a negative
image because of poor financial results resulting in low wages, an inability to
reward employees, and a lack of resources for innovative R&D projects (Amnon
Barzilai, Haaretz, 15/1111999). Thus, the industries have become unattractive to
young graduates. Because the studied organisations have traditionally recruited
their employees from the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), their declining image has
led to difficulties in recruiting employees of the highest quality. In recent years
there has been more of an emphasis on the need for a flexible workforce, and this
has led to electronics defence organisations recruiting employees through
manpower companies for shorter periods of time.
In spite of the many similarities between the studied organisations, there are also
some differences between them. First, each has a unique structure of ownership.
YellowTech is owned by a large Israeli communication conglomerate; TAMAM
is a government-owned company; and Rafael is a sub-unit of the Israeli MoD.
Secondly. the financial performances of the studied organisations have also
diverged in the last decade. Between 1994 and 1996 YellowTech showed
marginal losses, mainly because of compensation packages to redundant
employees. YellowTech achieved a marginal profit of $2 million in 1997 and
1998. In 1999 YellowTech purchased BVR, an Israeli company which specialises
in rescue systems for pilots. In 1999 YellowTech registered a loss of $9 million,
which was associated with the recent purchase. In year 2000, after becoming a
group, YellowTech showed a profit of $50 million.
After poor financial results in the early 1990s, IAI is now presenting a profit
again. A profit of $30 million in 1997 grew to $52 million in 1998. During the
6 Official figures were not available. According to interview data, the reductions in workforce were
as follows: YellowTech - 20 per cent in 1994; IAI -- almost 40 per cent during the 1980s and
1990s; and Rafael -- more than 30 per cent during the 1990s.
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1990s, TAMAM, as paIt of IAJ, constantly presented a break-even balance, but
with a marginal profit of $1 million in 1998, $2 million in 1999 and 2000. Rafael
has suffered heavy losses totalling $354 million in the last five years. These losses
have been covered by successive Israeli governments. In the year 2000 Rafael
showed a first-ever $2 million profit.
Thirdly, although the future for the entire industry is unclear, there have been
important differences between the strategic approaches to each organisation by
past governments and the mother companies. At the present time, the studied
organisations are involved in negotiations about their future ownership structures
and their identities. In 1999 YellowTech negotiated a potential merger with two
other electronics defence companies in Israel in order to achieve an improved
position in the electronic warfare systems markets (Ora Koren, Haaretz,
08/10/1999). In February 2000 YellowTech became YellowTech group,
consisting of three companies in the area of electronics warfare and pilot rescue
systems.
IAI has considered a government plan to privatise the company. In November
1999 a special committee investigating the defence industry in Israel suggested
that the industry should be restructured by merging R&D laboratories into one
body owned by the government and privatising their production lines (Amnon
Barzilai, Haaretz, 15/11/1999). At present negotiations with trade unions and the
Israeli government still continue but without conclusion.
TAMAM, as part of IAI, is expected to be privatised if this plan goes ahead. This
may mean that TAMAM will become either a private business or a public
company. Rafael has considered a government plan to change its ownership status
from an MoD sub-unit to a government-owned company (Haim Bior, Haaretz,
02/11/1999). Strong objection from the employees hampered past Israeli
government's plans to change Rafael's ownership.
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-YellowTech TAMAM Rafael
Organisational Matrix with Matrix organised by Matrix organised by
tructure functional teams project management project management
and professional and engineering
fields groups.
Ownership A Group owned by Government owned Israeli Ministry of
private company Defence
Identit Business driven Business driven with Research driven with
strong roots in growing business
research awareness
ProfitILoss +50 (Group) +2 +2( miIIion/_000)
Strategic Seeking to create an Focusing on core Competing in new
De velopment Israeli Electronics defence-re lated markets incl uding
warfare products, seeking to Australia, Greece and
conglomerate, joint maintain its present Germany. Jo int
ventures with ownership status. ventures with
international international
companies, companies. Seeking
diversification to to maintain its
commercial products. current ownership
status.
Markets Electronics warfare Optronics and Air-to-Air/Air-to-
systems Payload Land Missiles,
Optronics and
Payload
Table 3: Similarities and Differences between the Studied Companies
It is imperative to describe the changes in market conditions that managers and
engineers from the studied organisations have faced in the last ten years.
4.4 The Israeli Electronics Defence Industry: Key Changes in
Market Conditions during the 1990s
The Israeli Electronics defence industry has experienced a global slow-down in
defence systems procurement. In 1993, YellowTech, one of the studied
companies, showed a loss for the first time in 30 years. The other two studied
companies, Rafael and TAMAM, struggled with shrinking markets and new rules
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of competition. Two main practices have changed in the electronics defence
markets since the beginning of the 1990s. One is a shift from cost-plus contracts
to a fixed price contract system. Secondly, there has been an intensification of
competition in new markets. The next sections describe in detail these two trends.
~.4.1 From Cost-Plus Contracts to a Fixed-Price Contractual System
The cost-plus contract era dominated the defence industry until the beginning of
the 1990s. Sadeh and his colleagues (2000) argue that cost-plus contracts may
reduce the uncertainty from the developer's point of view and may lead to better
performance: however. cost-plus contracts motivate the developer to stretch the
project timetable and consume more money, and are thus less efficient in terms of
resources. Cost-plus contracts promise to pay for all development and production
costs plus a flat rate of between 5 and 15 per cent. Fixed-price contracts lead to
better efficiency in meeting schedule and budget constraints. But, when high
levels of technological uncertainty exist, there may be a conflict between
economic considerations and design considerations, which in tum may lead to an
inferior technological solution.
In the case of the Israeli Defence industry the flat rate was around 10 per cent. The
early 1990s saw a shift from a cost-plus contract to a fixed-price system. Sadeh
and his colleagues (2000: 14) explain that 'when technological uncertainty at the
start of projects is high, cost-plus contracts result in better performance. Fixed-
price contracts are better suited for projects with lower levels of technological
uncertainty' .
Thus clients in the Israeli electronics defence industry sought to control,
expenditures in R&D projects and therefore pushed companies to agree to fixed-
price contracts. When signed, based on an estimation of the extent of work
required in the project, the fixed-price contract guarantees the total cost for the
development and production of the system. Cost-plus contracts did not completely
disappear and are still applied in some projects in the Israeli defence industry. In
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particular, cost-plus contracts are common In projects that have high levels of
uncertainty in the R&D stage.
'-
4...1.2 Competition in Electronics Defence Markets
The beginning of the 1990s saw growing competition in defence markets. Mega-
mergers, such as that between Lockheed Corp and Martin Marietta Corp in 1995,
a multi-million dollar acquisition of General Dynamics by Lockheed in March
1993. and of General Electric Co.' s GE aerospace division in early 1994 by
Martin Marietta, have put more pressure on second-tier defence companies to
maintain their market share (Harrison 1995).
The studied companies have experienced a growing pressure to market their
products in new and more traditional markets. Traditional markets include
governments in South America and the Far East, which traditionally purchased
well tested (preferably in the battlefield) defence systems from the Israeli industry.
However, because of political conditions in some of these countries, the Israeli
defence industry has sought to extend its pool of clients and enter new markets
(interview source, special consultant to the Israeli Ministry of Defence).
Competing in new markets such as Australia, Greece, Canada and Germany or
even the US has not been easy. International politics played a major role in
decisions about the next generation of defence systems. The pressure that the USA
government put on the US Navy to prefer an Air-to-Air missile produced by an
American company over the Israeli product is one example of the impact of
politics on the defence business (Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz, 26/07/1999).
Competition also means that clients become more sophisticated and demanding.
Before the 1990s product performance and technological innovation determined
the winning system in the bidding process. Late delivery and overrunning projects
were common in the defence industry, and usually the technological complexity
took the blame. Since the beginning of the 1990s, clients have put a greater
emphasis on project control that includes the proper management of the project,
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and proper and realistic budgeting, including late delivery penalties (interview
source). Clients have become more involved in projects and often request a
representative on their behalf who resides in the company and participates in the
design process. All studied companies have received such requests from their
clients and in most cases have agreed to the conditions.
These changes in market conditions have had an impact on the management of
product-development projects. The product-development process has changed and
new processes have been introduced. Amongst the changes in product
development was the introduction of cross-project learning mechanisms aiming at
transferring designs, platforms and components between projects (Cusumano and
Nobeoka 1998; Nobeoka 1995).
4.5 Research Background: Summary
The present chapter provided a three-tier description of the defence industry,
addressing global, local and company-specific changes in trade and management.
In addition, the case for similarities and differences was outlined, demonstrating
the high level of heterogeneity of the selected companies and the differences that
need to be considered. Finally, recent changes in the Israeli electronics defence
industry have been described, thereby providing a background to the introduction
of cross-project learning mechanisms.
Chapter 5 will focus on cross-project learning mechanisms in the three studied
companies. More specifically, Chapter 5 will analyse organisational and
managerial issues relating to the reusability approach that dominated the product
development environment in the studied companies. Of particular interest in
Chapter 5 is the following question: what were the organisational mechanisms and
structures that were introduced in the case study companies which aimed to
support a successful cross-project learning and how did cross-project learning
enhance product success and market performance?
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: CROSS-PROJECT LEARNING IN
MULTI-PROJECT ENVIRONMENTS: LESSONS FROM
THE ISRAELI ELECTRONICS DEFENCE INDUSTRY
5.1 Introduction
Large manufacturers face a growing need to manage their product line as an
environment of multiple development projects; however, they rarely exploit the
efficiencies that cross-project learning may offer (Nobeoka 1995: Cusumano and
Nobeoka 1998). There is a large number of studies that have focused on the
efficient and effective management of new product development projects;
however. most of these take a single-project effort viewpoint (e.g. Gupta and
Wilemon 1990; Clark and Fujimoto 1991). Only recently has research paid
attention to the growing trend in intensive R&D and manufacturing firms to
reuse technological platforms and components through the management of
product development as a multi-project environment (Cusumano and Nobeoka
1998).
Yet the evidence provided by researchers about the organisational and managerial
settings is largely limited to the context of the Japanese automobile industry. This
chapter aims to fill this gap by addressing the following question: what were the
organisational mechanisms and structures that were introduced in the case study
companies which aimed to support a successful cross-project learning, and how
did cross-project learning enhance product success and market performance?
The three studied companies have already been introduced alongside a detailed
description of the changes that have taken place in the context within which these
companies operate. These changes pushed the case study companies to transform
their product development environment. Of particular interest is the growing
emphasis on the reusability of designs, technologies and products promoted by the
three studied companies. Such activities are perceived in this thesis as cross-
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project learning, referring mainly to the transfer of designs between and across
projects.
This chapter explores the organisational and managerial mechanisms introduced
and implemented in the companies studied to support a successful cross-project
learning process. These organisational and managerial mechanisms can also be
perceived as knowledge management practices (Coombs and Hull 1998). This
view emphasises the way knowledge activities become core capabilities for cross-
project learning through the way they are organised and made routine in R&D
environments. In many ways, the findings in this chapter confirm the findings of a
recent study carried out by Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) at Toyota and other
automobile manufacturers. Yet the present study also reveals a different pattern of
strategies applied in the Israeli electronics defence industry.
After outlining the case for the success factors associated with cross-project
learning, Section 5.3 will describe the mechanisms and processes put in place at
Yellow'Tech. Section 5.4 will provide the picture of mechanisms for cross-project
learning at TAMAM and Rafael. Lastly, section 5.5 will compare the three cases,
drawing conclusions with regard to the similarities and differences in
implementing cross-project learning.
5.2 Cross-Project Learning and Product Success
Research suggests that cross-project learning may improve product and market
success (Clark and Fujimoto 1991). The contribution of cross-project learning to
product and market success has mainly been associated with two management
contexts: product development (Slappendel 1996~ Wolfe 1994~ Krishnan and
Ulrich 2001) and project management (Kerzner 1995; Stone 1985~ Smith 1995~
Bergman 1990~ Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). In this section, a brief review of
the main success factors in product development and project management is
provided in an attempt to highlight some of the main factors in the case study
material.
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It is not the intention of this dissertation to review the extensive literature on the
success factors in product development and project management. Some of the
main factors were reviewed in Chapter 2 (see for example; Clark and Wheelwright
1992: Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt 1997; Utterback 1994).
Nevertheless, some factors have dominated the field and are worth mentioning. A
flexible organisational structure is considered to contribute to success in product
development (e.g. Bart 1986: Nonaka and Takeouchi 1995). Open communication
channels between departments through cross-functional teams have also been
mentioned as positively con-elated with a successful product development effort
(For example. Wheelwright and Clark 1998; Saren 1987). External
communication with customers has also been indicated as improving product
design (e.g. Von Hippel 1988). Lastly, a well-defined product description and a
clearly outlined project plan that minimises technical uncertainties were suggested
by Morris (1997) as positively impacting on product success (see Figure 4).
Clear Product Definition
Open Communication Channel
Factors Affecting Product Success
Product Success
Interactions with Customers
Flexible Organisation Structure
Figure 4: Correlation between Contextual Factors and Product Success
In line with such suggested con-elations, the next section will assess the
mechanisms put in place at YellowTech, evaluating the contribution of cross-
project learning mechanisms to product success.
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5.3 Cross-Project Learning: Lessons Learned at YellowTech
5.3.1 Introduction
The lessons learned at YellowTech will be outlined in this section, revealing a set
of mechanisms that were put in place in order to facilitate cross-project learning
activities. An assessment of the contribution of these mechanisms to the
successful introduction of cross-project learning and product development will
then be offered.
The analysis of cross-project learning mechanisms at YellowTech will place an
emphasis on the contribution of various mechanisms to cross-project learning
throughout the different stages of a project. In addition, the analysis will aim to
validate the presumed correlation between the implemented mechanisms and
product success.
The next section presents the notion of organisational design (Myers 1996) that
will be used in this research as the infrastructure for cross-project learning.
Following this, an analysis of organisational design elements will be offered.
5.3.2 The Organisational Design and Mechanisms for Cross-Project Learning
Organisational design consists of three critical performance factors: strategy,
organisation and motivation (Myers 1996). In line with this approach, these areas
will be studied in relation to cross-project learning activities at YellowTech. First,
the process of change at YellowTech will be introduced.
5.3.2.1 The Process of Introducing Cross-Project Learning at YellowTech
The process of introducing cross-project learning mechanisms at YellowTech
started at the beginning of the 1990s with the introduction of a matrix structure,
which aimed to foster knowledge transfer between projects by centralising the
pool of expertise under the professional group. Additional formal mechanisms
such as design centres and the organisation structure emerged only in the mid-
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1990s. However. the reusability of software and hardware components has taken
place since the beginning of the 1990s through the support of the matrix structure
(Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998).
KM Consultants
Reusability of SoftwarelHardware Components
20001999199819971
Knowledge Cafe
Chi f S' . ~ Reuse Metrics
Ie . cientist ] Conference
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· .
· :
1995
Design Centre
1990
Matrix Structure
DO
Commonality
Project Stages
Knowledge Transfer
Structure
Figure 5: The Process of Introducing Cross-Project Learning at YellowTech
Figure 5 indicates the most distinct instances related to cross-project learning
between 1990 and the year 2000. Some of the most significant steps are the
introduction of design centres, such as the ASIC group in 1995, the appointment
of a Chief Scientist, the reorganisation of project management practices, and the
introduction of a new organisation structure to support knowledge transfer during
1997. Since 1998 YellowTech has become further involved in knowledge
management initiatives. This includes the participation of the Head of the
Hardware Group in a Knowledge Cafe, a cross hi-tech industry forum for
knowledge management, and the presentation of knowledge reusability metrics
implemented at YellowTech at conferences, and engineers' participation in
reusability seminars. Finally, YellowTech has recently launched a knowledge
management project with a consulting firm that still continues as this thesis is
being written. This project will map knowledge centres within the company (e.g.
R&D Division, Marketing, Sales), and pinpoint critical practices, technologies
and system engineers, in order to reorganise activities around the reusability
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strategy and develop knowledge management capabilities (Victor and Boynton
1998).
Thus. a gradual involvement in knowledge management is evident, fostering the
reusability of software and hardware components and supporting cross-project
learning. These steps will be described in detail in the following sections.
5.3.3 Strategy. Priorities and Decisions: Cross-Project Learning
To understand the extent of the strategic change of project management at
YellowTech, we first briefly review some of the more common models for stages
in projects from a project management perspective. Following this, an analysis of
the reorganisation of project stages at YellowTech will be undertaken.
5.3.3.1 Stages in Projects: A Project Management Perspective
Researchers associated with project management, such as Kerzner (1995), have
attempted to identify the stages that a product development project goes through.
Stone (1988) suggested three stages in a project: proposal, authorisation and
implementation. Smith (1995) proposed a cyclic process of eight stages: initiate,
appraise. define and design, implement, test and commission, deliver products,
and use products, records and experience. Bergen (1990) takes a more time-
related approach to describe the different stages in projects. A project life-cycle
comprises eight stages and starts with a market demand, continues with defining a
proposal, conducting a feasibility study, planning and estimating costs, conducting
an experimental study, designing and developing a product, testing a prototype,
and eventually producing a product. Repenning (2001) offers only two stages;
concept development and product design and testing.
While the above categorisations help in understanding the content of project
stages, they by no mean describe the organisation of project stages which emerged
at YellowTech. Further, these categorisations lack the dimension of managing
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multi-project environments that were emphasised by YellowTech through the
organisation of cross-project learning activities (Nobeoka 1995).
The framework which has emerged from the data describes three main stages in
projects from a cross-project learning perspective.
5.3.3.2 Stages in Projects: A Cross-Project Learning Perspective
Managers at YellowTech described stages in projects as divided into three main
parts: (i) conception. (ii) development, and (iii) testing and integration of the
product (See Figure 6).
Conception
Figure 6: Three Stages in a Project from a Cross-Project Learning Perspective
One Project Manager portrayed these categorisation of stages in projects as stages
in a flight:
First, there is the take-off stage.[' ..J If you prepared the aircraft properly for a
long flight then the cruising phase should be smooth. The landing, like the take-off,
is always risky, but does not necessarily have to be bumpy.
Each stage represents a different set of activities from a cross-project learning
perspective.
The conception stage consists of activities that aim to minimise risk and reduce
the uncertainty associated with R&D projects. This is done through careful
assessment of resources, scheduling of tasks, and by communicating the necessary
resources across the organisation.
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The development stage presents activities associated with a high level of
coordination and integration of the technical and project management effort within
and outside the R&D Division.
The integration stage ends in the testing of the system before the delivery to the
customer. This stage is characterised by an emphasis on technical problem
solving. In each stage, different mechanisms were put in place to support cross-
project learning.
5.3.3.3 The Conception Stage
YellowTech has placed a significant emphasis on effectively utilising cross-
project learning mechanisms during the conception stage.
From a cross-project learning perspective, a clear set of priorities and the scope of
activities involved in this stage was put forward by management at YellowTech,
urging project managers to conclude the conception stage with a clear direction of
the product and project (Morris 1997). These activities were aimed at improving
the match between the set of activities performed during the conception stage and
the environment that YellowTech was competing in (Johnson and Scholes 1989).
The Chief Scientist at YellowTech explained:
The way we define the product will determine the success of the entire project. At
this point in time, we need to make sure that the project starts on its right leg.
The Head of the Hardware Group reiterated this approach, claiming that:
It is important that project mangers avoid surprises throughout the project. There
is not 100% guarantee that there will be no hiccups down the road; however, they
(project mangers) can and should foresee what is needed in the beginning and if
there is a problem they (project managers) need to raise aflag.
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Project managers confirmed the above, arguing that management has reprioritised
processes relating to the execution of projects. One of the distinct priorities put
forward was the assessment of the reusability option during the first stage of the
project.
The strategy to manage the conception phase includes a five-stage process during
which the project manager reviews, assesses, transfers, designs and presents the
reusability option (see Figure 7). A decision-making tree was put in place at
YellowTech to clearly communicate priorities and guide project managers
throughout the process (see Figure 8). This decision-making tree was proposed by
the Chief Scientist and, according to project managers, the scheme has been
helpful in navigating their way through the first stages of the project.
Technology
Transfer
Initial Design
Figure 7: A General Schema for the Decision-Making Process during the Conception Stage
-
.. Kick off
Review reusability f1 meetingoptions
-
.. 1Assess potential ...... Report
reusability level
1-10
-
.. Allocate source Code DesignExchange .... ~ ~ ~ documents
meetings
...J Initial design r-~
"'1Reuse Case ~report Run simulation ........../confirm results
..
Brainstorming
... (DRS)
Figure 8: Decision Making and Action during the Conception Stage
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Figure 8 captures the decision making process in one Light Systems project during
the conception stage. This process begins with the reusability option phase, in
which the reusability option is assessed while potential existing in-house solutions
are reviewed. A go/no-go decision with regard to the reusability option is reached
by the end of this phase. Following this, a series of decisions is made by the
project manager, including the assessment of the reusability process that is
summarised in a Reuse Case report.
One project manager from YellowTech explained the objective for introducing the
decision-making tree:
lVe have been reusing components for a long time now but in an unsystematic way.
These procedures [the decision-making tree] introduced some order to what used
to be a messy process, and put reusability up in the priority list.
The above prioritisation of cross-project learning activities achieved a high level
of standardisation in the product development process at YeIlowTech (Victor and
Boynton 1998: Sobek et al. 1998). In addition to spreading designs across
different product development projects, YellowTech has also customised the way
projects are managed and run for each and every client (Victor and Boynton
1998). Through the documentation of the reusability process and its outcomes,
YeIlowTech has paved the way for continuously improving the process.
From a strategic viewpoint, the emphasis in the conception stage was on ensuring
that the development stage started with a clear definition of the technical,
operational and managerial objectives and the resources needed to successfully
execute the project in order to improve success in product development projects
(Morris 1997).
5.3.3.4 The Development Stage
From a cross-project learning perspective, the strategy in the development
stage has shifted from an intense knowledge transfer process in the conception
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stage to a rather high concentration on coordination of projects and technical
issues within the matrix structure (Sparrius 1994; Hauptman and Hirji 1999):
Senior managers at YellowTech claimed that the coordination of project
activities within the portfolio of product development projects was planned
from a multi-project strategic approach. The Head of the Hardware Group
claimed:
In my mind. the structure 1\'e created (the matrix) allows us to manage a pool of
projects by using the resources currently available. I don't care whether this
project just started or is going to end. All I care is that we will be able to move
resources when and "where they will be needed.
This VIew demonstrates the strategic approach by senior management seeking
flexibility in the organisational structures during the development stage (Clack
and Fujimoto 1991: McCollum and Sherman 1993).
In order to achieve coordination and yet maintain flexibility, management at
YellowTech promoted the work of a cross-functional team which acted as a
decision-making group involved in coordinating technical and manufacturing
issues inside and outside the R&D Division.
The Head of the R&D Division envisioned the learning in this group as based on
problem-solving, involving debates and different perspectives on how resources
should be allocated and priorities should be set during the development process
(Hauptman and Hirji 1999). Nevertheless, he concluded by saying:
This is a group of highly qualified professionals. And despite the differences and
politics, they always find a way to overcome problems and work together
effectively.
Thus, autonomy, freedom to act, and coordination through a cross-functional
team, were strategically envisioned as stimulators for cross-project learning
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activities. by promoting the development of problem solving skills that are crucial
for a successful product development project (Tushman and Nadler 1996).
5.3.3.5 The Integration Stage
During the integration stage, management conveyed a rather 'fire fighting'
(Repenning 2001) or 'crisis management' (Perlow 1999) strategic approach which
set up priorities to allocate engineers and other resources to fix problems
discovered during the late stage of the project. Usually, these problems impose
numerous costs on the project. In addition, problems in the last stage of the project
could overrun product delivery deadlines, and hence might risk relationships with
clients and bear financial consequences.
The Head of the Hardware Group justified this strategic approach, claiming that:
At this point in the project we cannot afford deep and thorough study of the
problem. \Ve have to come up with a solution in no time and implement it right
mray.
Thus, from a cross-project learning perspective, priorities were diverted towards
rapid problem-solving practices by deploying engineers from the matrix
organisational structure. It is the combination of flexibility (McCollum and
Shennan 1993) and a high level of problem solving (Victor and Boynton 1998)
that management sought to promote during the integration stage.
From a cross-project learning perspective, the deployment of experts from one
project to another was considered as a learning process across different projects.
This action created a mutuality of engagement (Wenger 1998) that serves as a
learning mechanism through the ability to engage with other colleagues and
enhance participation across projects.
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5.3.3.6 Strategy, Priorities and Decisions for Cross-Project Learning at YeIlowTech:
Summary
The strategy, decisions and priorities at YellowTech for cross-project learning
revolved around the three stages of projects. Proper project management practices
were conceived by management as essential in order to facilitate cross-project
learning. In particular, those project management practices that support specific
cross-project learning actions needed for each stage of the project; conception,
development and integration were given high priority. Indeed, cross-project
learning mechanisms have been different for each stage in product development
projects. Cross-project learning activities were intense in the conception stage,
ensuring that uncertainties and risks would be minimised through the reusability
strategy. A high level of learning took place during integration, in which experts
from different groups exchanged knowledge while engaging in problem solving,
whereas the development stage is characterised by a formal project management
with a high level of coordination between different professional groups.
Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) confirm the above findings. Furthermore, in the
context of the Israeli electronics defence industry, the present study highlights the
importance of project stages which were not reported previously.
Nevertheless, strategic planning tends to be implemented rather differently than
envisioned (Johnson and Scholes 1989). Therefore, the following sections will
analyse structures put in place to support cross-project learning activities and their
impact on cross-project learning and product success. These mechanisms first and
foremost demonstrate the experiences learned in implementing cross-project
learning at YellowTech and yet also reveal the constraints within which
organisations operate.
5.3.4 Organisational Structure
The organisational structure at YellowTech evolved into three forms that
accommodated different needs in each project stage.
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5.3..1.1 The Conception Stage
YellowTech introduced a network structure, based on a 'hierarchy' of
knowledgeable individuals (Nonaka and Takeouchi 1995). This structure, also
known at YellowTech as the Knowledge Transfer structure, enhances
communications between knowledgeable engineers and project managers during
the conception stage of the project (see Figure 9). It was acknowledged that the
network structure was not part of the matrix structure but rather a separate entity.
The Head of the R&D Division at YellowTech explained:
Implementing the knowledge network helped us tremendously in opening
communication channels and allocating those who have answers to our most acute
problems.
This network structure, which represents a knowledge mapping directory, does not
necessarily represent any means of control (Sobek et al. 1998). Rather, the
network structure emphasises the exposure of individuals to organisational
knowledge and the channels through which knowledge can be communicated to
others (Kanter 1996).
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Figure 9: Knowledge Transfer Organisational Structure
One system engineer from YellowTech explained the value In linking these
knowledgeable engineers in a network of knowledge:
The system engineer has a better overview on projects than the project manager.
The Head of the Hardware Group knows more than the system engineer about who
is doing what. Therefore, the network of people was defined in such a way that
helps project managers to get to the right solutions faster.
Another system engineer from YellowTech summarised the essence of the
knowledge network in three words:
Visibility is feasibility
This slogan suggests that the position of a system engineer within the
organisation, metaphorically described as higher than the project engineers', may
give system engineers the ability to see the broad picture of products,
technologies, and people involved in these projects and thus advise project
managers on potential use or reuse of these resources.
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First and foremost, the network structure supports the ability of those positioned at
the higher levels of the structure to quickly identify existing technological
resources within the organisation and offer these resources to project managers
while the project is in the conception stage. This helped project managers in the
process of assessing and evaluating potential platforms and components for
reusability during the conception stage (see Figure 7). It has been argued that,
because of the growing trend to reuse technological platforms and components,
the network structure has become critical in facilitating a smooth, clear and well-
focused conception stage of the project. To demonstrate this argument, the Head
of the Hardware Group presented Figure 10 to the researcher. This figure was also
presented in a forum of project/programme managers as part of a one-day
conference on 'Software and Hardware Design for Re-Use' in Hertzelia, Israel.
Figure 10 suggests that there has been a 50% growth in the number of projects
based on reused platforms and components between 1995 and 2000. At the same
time, the number of generic R&D projects has dropped by 25% in the same
period of time and by 66% between 1985 and 2000. Also, 82% of the projects in
the R&D Division engaged in reusing either a platform, component or a software
module in 2000, in comparison to 55% in 1990.
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Figure 10: Trend of Projects Characterised as Generic R&D versus Reused Projects
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However. the Head of the Hardware Group explained that, though the graph
suggests that more recent projects were based on reused technologies, in reality
some genetic R&D projects in the past have been practising the reusability
strategy long before 1995 without 'making a fuss out of it'. Yet, he further
indicated that only recently had formal mechanisms to support the reusability
strategy been put in place.
In those cases where the reusability option was adopted, it was acknowledged that
the network structure helped in allocating the technology and the people involved
in the project. This action resulted in a better use of internal resources, which
reduced the risk of falling behind deadlines and increased the probability of
meeting technological challenges on time (Lester 1998:36; Dyer and Gupta 1999).
Despite vanous difficulties in transferring a design to another project, mainly
expressed by project engineers, and to be described in detail in Chapter 6, the
overall results were satisfying. The Head of the R&D Division claimed:
The fact is that we are doing more work with fewer people in the last five years and
our clients are getting a better product [' ..J Projects take less time [...J the cost of
the development has gone down [. ..J we are much more focused.
Focusing on objectives and results from the very beginning of the project
contributes to product success (Morris 1997; Bernasco et al. 1999). However, it
requires leadership, communication channels and a structured process. These will
be reviewed in section 5.3.7.
5.3.4.2 The Development Stage
A high level of coordination across professional teams has become the
management's strategic concern in the development stage. In order to achieve this,
management has focused on utilising the matrix organisational structure. Different
mechanisms within the matrix structure were implemented and used during the
development stage, supporting cross-project learning.
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From a cross-project learning perspective the matrix structure is seen as a social
space within which software and hardware engineers are allocated and then
reallocated to different projects (McCollum and Sherman 1993). Through work
with members of different project teams, involving debates, discussions, the use of
tools and procedures, these engineers share experience, expertise, learning and
know-how of the product, technology and organisational systems (Wenger 1998).
This process. mainly through debates and discussions, leads to the build-up of
collective expertise (Lave and Wenger 1991; Robbins 1987; Engestrom 1999).
One system engineer from Yellow'Tech explained:
The matrix structure that we put in place back in 1990 allows us to deploy
engineers from one project to another. This is one way to keep the learning system
gomg.
The matrix structure at YellowTech was also structured to contain some design
centres that were organised as teams of highly qualified engineers. These design
centres maintained their autonomy and were not associated with either the
project/programme management field or the professional field (see Figure 11).
One of these design centres is the ASIC team which acted as a knowledge centre
for ASIC developments (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998:29). The justification for
centralising ASIC developments in one group was to reduce the costs associated
with the learning of the ASIC development.
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Figure 11: Functional Matrix Structure in the Development Stage
Data about the ASIC group suggest that since its constitution the costs associated
with ASIC developments have gone down significantly despite the growing
complexity needed in products (see Figure 12). It has been suggested by the Head
of the ASIC team that by creating a knowledge centre for ASIC technologies,
considered to be one of the most advanced current technologies, the team has in
fact preserved knowledge, enhanced learning from their own experience and was
able to quickly address projects' needs (Adler and Shenhar 1990). In addition, the
team has built a knowledge base for ASIC solutions and was able to reuse
solutions for different projects.
Thus, during the development stage, once the team received the specifications of
the design from the project manager, the ASIC team reviews the specifications,
searches for similar designs in the ASIC knowledge base, and once found, makes
the modifications needed to adjust the reused design to the new specifications.
Figure 12 shows a major reduction in learning time as the team has become more
skilful and experienced with ASIC developments. The Head of the ASIC team
suggests that his team spends on average 2 man/months per order in comparison
to 2.5 in 1995 (see Figure 12).
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Another mechanism implemented in the R&D Division was one cross-functional
team that promoted manufacturing activities across YellowTech. This team
consisted of middle level managers from the R&D Division and the
Manufacturing Group. The discussions revolved around acute and most recent
problems in coordinating processes in concurrent engineering. The team focused
on problem-solving related to the transfer of the design from the R&D Division
to the Manufacturing Group. Though the direct contribution of the cross-
functional team to cross-project learning was not central, this group of people has
indirectly supported the multi-project management approach.
The multi-functional team consists of managers and engineers who are working
on one specific project. More importantly, these individuals are responsible, each
in his/her own area, for promoting product development and manufacturing
acti vities of the same product family. This means that when the multi-functional
team encounters problems in coordinating activities between the R&D Division
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and the Manufacturing Group, they often solve these problems by 'borrowing'
solutions from past projects of the same family. From the learning perspective,
this process supports the notion of 'perspective making' that is essential for
developing 'boundary innovation' across different communities (Boland and
Tenkasi 1995). Figure 13 describes the shared histories of learning of one multi-
functional team. The participants were involved in various versions of the Light
Systems product family.
L i g h t S~' s t ems , . e r s ion 1,2,3
L igh t System s Version 2,3
Project
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Product
Configuration
Mana er
Multi-functional team
Light Systems
Version 4
1\1 anufacturing
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Light System s Version 2,3
Light System s Version 2,3
Figure 13: Shared Histories of Learning in Multi-Functional Teams
5.304.3 The Integration Stage
Activities during the integration stage revolve mainly around testing and problem-
solving activities while the client gradually becomes part of the testing and finally
the acceptance process of the product.
The opportunity to learn collectively during this stage is twofold. First, this occurs
through learning by working closely with the client, particularly when it comes to
the Israeli Air Force, which was considered to be the most demanding and
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sophisticated client for YellowTech when this study was carried out. The learning
from interactions with a client has various sides. Some of the benefits in bringing
the client into the last stage of the project were described by the Head of the
Hardware Group:
In general it is good to be in touch with the client. It helps to maintain good
relations with the client. understand their present and future needs and to be
prepared with a solution when they issue an RFP (Request for Proposal).
Yellow'Tech has invested in maintaining close relations with their clients by
providing office space for some of their large clients on the company's premises.
This arrangement becomes useful during the integration stage in particular, when
the project is in its final stage and troubling problems tend to occur. In such a
situation the project manager from the client side becomes part of the decision-
making process and follows the implementation of the solution. The Head of the
Hardware Group argued that:
The client becomes part of the design and he [or she] becomes aware of the
difficulties. This helps us tremendously in satisfying the client and quickly pushing
the product out.
In other words, the involvement of the client in critical decision making actually
makes them part of the decision and therefore makes the delivery of the product
much smoother. Working closely with the client has been regularly mentioned in
the literature as one of the most significant factors for learning and product
success (e.g. Victor and Boynton 1998; Gehani 1998; Crocombe et al. 1991; Saren
1987).
It can also be argued that the learning from interactions with clients becomes
collective because of the structure of problem-solving teams during the integration
stage.
In line with management strategy to promote flexibility and the deployment of
people across the matrix functional structure in order to address problems in the
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integration stage, the structure of the project team and its relation to other teams
becomes more interactive and boundless .
One svstern engineer from YellowTech described the nature of this process:
The malfunctions H 't' get durin g integration and final testing are often far more
complex. Rarely can W t' immediately understand whether the malfunction is
software or hardwa re related, or which sub-unit is failing. To get the system out to
the client ASAP, It' e get the best brains we have and the client together, get a
dec ision that is within our ability to implement considering the time and resources,
and go fo r it. The client is happy and we are happy.
The structure that emerged from discussions with engineers and project managers
is presented in Figure 14, which demonstrates the close working relationships
during problem sol ving sessions between the project team and other experts, and
the involvement of the client in the decision-making process.
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:'::::::::::: ::: ~ : : :>: Manager .
.:: :::: :)" ....:;T~ j j ~ ~ ~ j ~ ~ ~ j ~ ~ ) ;:: :; : ;:::; : :: : : ;: ~
.::: :::: System :;:: : :;::: ; : ;:: : Technician I :<~~~ ~: Eng ineerl( ~ ) ~ ~ < T!i !~-: : -: -:.:- : -: -: -: . ~~<
0. ":-: ::::: : : ::: :: ::: :: : ::
Figure 14: Interaction s bet ween the Project Team and other Experts during Integration
To conclude, YellowTech implemented mechanisms that supported the
invol vement of the client in the last stage of product development and enabled the
dissemination of knowledge across the R &D Division through flexibility and by
deployin g ex perts from one project to another.
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5.3.4.4 Organisational Structure: Summary
Mintzberg (1988) suggests that organisations may implement a number of
organisational structures within one setting. As seen above, YellowTech
implemented a number of concurrent structures, most of them based on the
functional matrix structure, to support cross-project learning and link cross-project
learning mechanisms to product development activities.
Of particular interest is the emphasis that YellowTech put on the conception stage.
In addition. the inclusion of clients in problem-solving teams and the
dissemination of knowledge through the matrix structure is another mechanism
supporting cross-project learning activities.
However, the matrix structure, presented above as one of the mechanisms
supporting cross-project learning, does have its limitations. Managers suggested
that the matrix structure presents staffing complexities, leads to conflicts between
the management of the project and the management of resources concerning
priorities, and incorporates a dual reporting structure that tends to confuse and
create tension between project managers and the heads of the professional fields
(McCollum and Shennan 1993). These areas of tension will be further explored in
Chapter 6.
5.3.5 Technology Management: Commonality in Hardware and Software
Development Tools
In order to enhance the transferability of designs between projects, the Chief
Scientist of YellowTech decided in early 1995 to introduce commonality in
hardware and software tools. To enforce this practice, the Head of MIS, an
experienced engineer, was appointed to manage the technological platform of
software development tools. These are software packages that are used by
software engineers as the platform upon which the code is developed. For
example Borland has a software application that supports developing programmes
using C++. Microsoft offers the same type of application. In the case that the code
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was developed on the Microsoft platform, it will not be transferable to another
platform. Since 1995, the Head of the MIS department has been the 'watchdog' at
YellowTcch concerning the management of software packages. No longer could
engineers upgrade their development tools individually.
The Head of the MIS department explained the process:
The system for software upgrades has changed. Now the MIS team is doing all the
upgrades. H'c schedule a specific day on which all users will get an update of the
software once they switch on their computers.
Software upgrades were coordinated by the MIS manager to ensure compatibility
of software versions across projects. In addition to the benefits associated with
cross-project learning, it was commented by the MIS manager that this move has
improved the MIS team response to software problems. The team is more
experienced in troubleshooting and demonstrates a higher level of skills than
before.
A rather similar process has taken place with regard to hardware components;
however, with less restrictions and control. The Head of the Hardware Group has
indicated that more attention is given to the components used in development. The
Head of the Hardware Group argued:
There has to be a good justification to purchase a component that offers the same
functionality as an existing one.
However, this practice is not always enforced, as project managers enjoy the
autonomy to run project matters with little interference from top level managers.
Lastly, modularity in design (Baldwin and Clark 1997; Sanchez and Mahoney
1997) was introduced, mainly in software development. The Head of the Software
Group pointed out that YellowTech has followed this practice for many years.
This practice enabled projects to 'lend' sections of software code from one project
to another.
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Figure 15: The Concept of Software Modularity at YellowTech
This practice has certain rules. For example software engineers need to clearly
define inputs and outputs for each section of the programme and to write the
programme in a way that will avoid direct dependency between two sections.
Figure 15 demonstrates the concept of modularity in software (Sanchez and
Mahoney 1997). The emphasis is on the independence of each stand-alone module
and on the clear definition of inputs and outputs, i.e. the Pulse Time of Arrival.
This way, projects needing to 'borrow' module B do not have to inherit module A
as well. This practice paid off well, according to the Head of the Software Group,
because many modules of software become exchangeable with very little work
needed to adjust them to client-specific requirements.
5.3.6 Integration with Sales and Clients
The Sales team at YellowTech, consisting of four people, has been fully integrated
with the engineering function. This was achieved through physical and
organisational positioning of the Sales team in the central floor of the R&D
Division (Hull et al. 2000).
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The Head of the Sales team explained:
'Fe H'C"C first located in the headquarters building. But then we realised that we
spent most ofour time in the R&D building. It was only reasonable to relocate the
team to where it really belonged.
Furthermore. the Sales team, which is relatively young in the company, is made
up of talented engineers who have spent many hours designing electronics warfare
systems but also have engaged with clients extensively in their previous role as
either project engineers or project managers. These two factors have had a
tremendous impact on the communication between R&D engineers and the Sales
team. Concerns about 'common language' (Coombs 1996) were less an issue for
the Sales team mainly because of their engineering background. However,
interviewees indicated that sometimes information about recent technological
developments in the R&D Division was not always available to the Sales team,
mainly because of the frequent travelling that the Sales team was committed to as
part of their jobs.
Interactions with clients were intense. Because the products produced by
YellowTech were 'made-to-order', consultation with clients about features,
systems configuration and malfunctions was essential for the product design
process. Thus, in some cases YellowTech accommodated clients on the premises,
providing them with office space and other secretarial services. In one case, the
chief client of YellowTech has a permanent office close to the R&D laboratory
in which the development of this client's systems is undertaken. This geographical
arrangement was described by engineers and managers as assisting the transfer of
designs between different generation systems (Van den Bulte and Moenaert
1998). However, this process was not systematic and was very much based, we
have been told, on informal communications.
The next sections review additional mechanisms and factors, mainly motivational
elements (Myers 1996), that facilitated cross-project learning in product
development.
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5.3.7 Motivational factors
5.3.7.1 Autonomy
The overall impression from the data is that engineers and managers were granted
a relatively high level of autonomy when it comes to their area of responsibility.
Yet. recent years have seen more discipline in the area of project management,
introducing more strict scheduling and planning practices. The tension between
knowledge management processes and expertise development, presented in
Chapter 6, is one example of the impact that recent changes have had on
employees' perception of autonomy. As suggested in Chapter 6, employees felt
that the newly introduced project and knowledge management practices have
restricted their exploration-related activities and directed their efforts towards
exploitation-related activities (March 1999; Cohen et al. 1999).
Yet job design and job description at YellowTech has always been loose and
rarely well-defined, a factor that acted as an enabler to pursue innovations (Orr
1996). In addition, engineers rarely moved horizontally between professional
groups. Specialisation was mainly vertical and within the same professional
group. In some cases, engineers have specialised in one product family for ten
years before moving to another. This long specialisation in one product family did
not seem to bother the engineering force, perhaps because in any new product
there were some new designs to introduce in addition to the reused components.
5.3.7.2 Informal Communications Networks
In addition to the formal communication channels, YellowTech has established
through the years wide informal communication networks between experts
(Tushman and Nadler 1996: Van Aken and Weggeman 2000). These
communication networks have taken place in many forms and through different
channels. For example, interviewees claimed that they often discuss work with
colleagues while commuting home. Also, chitchats in the corridors were
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mentioned as another channel through which employees learned about recent
developments and other people's work.
Research on the contribution of informal interaction is inconclusive. For example,
Kreiner and Schultz (1993), who studied informal networking between two
organisations. suggest that informal collaboration needs to be channelled through
and monitored by management for the reason that information can be exploited by
others (ibid:~06). Tushman and Nadler (1996) argue that informal communication
is vital for innovation because it improves problem-solving interactions and
creates a direct channel of feedback. Victor and Boynton (1998) see the
importance of informal communication in story-telling that communities of
practice generate, which leads to the development of identity (Orr 1990) and
expertise (Lave and Wenger 1991).
Data from YellowTech suggest that informal interactions support the development
of individual and collective expertise, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6.
Communications with peers were through the formal channels as well as based on
social interactions. This enhanced employees' mobility between projects and
stimulated their participation across projects, while they engaged in problem-
solving sessions (McCollum and Sherman 1993). The strong presence of informal
channels helped in bridging boundaries between different professional groups and
facilitated the creation of shared language and histories of learning (Wenger
1998). However, in line with Kreiner and Schultz (1993), managers argued that
such interactions would be beneficial to product success only if the interactions
were goal-orientated and sought a specific result. On the other hand, engineers and
technicians argued that much of their learning took place through informal
interactions. They argued that sharing experiences collectively helped them in
problem solving (Tushman and Nadler 1996).
Thus informal communication networks are indeed an integral part of cross-,
project learning activities; however, the contribution of informal networks to
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cross-project learning at YellowTech, as was voiced differently by managers and
engineers. is inconclusive.
5.3.7.3 Rewards
Against the common belief in recent studies that rewards are essential for the
organisational learning system (e.g. Tushman and Nadler 1996), YellowTech
lacks a reward system that remunerates either individual or groups for
successfully executing cross-project learning activities or any knowledge sharing
activity. Nevertheless, rewards for reusability activities are common in a number
of Israeli companies. including Motorola Israel. In Motorola Israel, developers
may receive a reward if they have properly catalogued a component in a special
directory and the component was reused by another project. In 1998 Motorola
Israel gave about $25,000 to designers whose components were reused by others
(Tal-Or 1999).
When asked why YellowTech is not implementing the same policy, the Head of
the Hardware Group replied:
We prefer to diffuse reusability as a practice necessary to our business
In other words, learning and participating in reusability activities is of value to
managers. The value of this practice, according to the Head of the Hardware
Group, needs to be realised through the understanding of changes in markets and
other conditions within which YellowTech operates. According to the Head of the
Hardware Group, indi viduals and groups need to internalise changes in markets
and consequently change their values and behaviour (Bandura 1977).
5.3.7.4 Leadership
The Chief Scientist, who took up his position in 1997, was given the mandate to
lead the cross-project learning activity. The Chief Scientist coordinated and
aligned reusability-related activities from the beginning of the project until the
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deli very of the product. His leadership was considered essential to the successful
diffusion of the reusability and learning strategy (McDonough and Barczak 1991;
Starkey 1996).
The Chief Scientist explained his role as follows:
Putting me in this position (Chief Scientist) gave me the opportunity to make use of
the success H'e have achieved with Light Systems. All we needed to do then was to
exploit success [..] The trick was to get to project managers before they start
connecting wires.
One example of the impact that the chief scientist has had on cross-project
learning is the Light Systems program. The Light System (SPS-I000) is a
successful product family that has produced numerous systems in different
configurations for various clients in the last decade. The Chief Scientist in his
previous position managed the Light Systems Programme. During this time he
pushed the reuse of software, hardware components and documentation across
projects within the Light Systems Programme. In addition and perhaps more
importantly, since he entered his new role numerous software modules and
hardware components from the Light System programme have been transferred
and implemented in other programmes and projects.
The Chief Scientist has been described by his colleagues and sub-ordinates as a
pleasant person. His management style has been described by managers as based
on human contact and he has always been open to new ideas. His clear vision on
the process of reusability, his consistent promotion of knowledge management
initiatives and persistent involvement in projects paved the way for the
implementation of the reusability strategy (Haque and Pawar 2001). Yet he was
demanding and highly involved in almost any detail.
Perhaps the best way to describe his leadership is in the way Starkey (1996:371)
describes Petersen's strategic role in the transformation of Ford:
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Petersen WllS responsible for disrupting conventional thinking in Ford, for getting
Ford managers to think the 'unthinkable' and for shifting the focus from the
functional to the strategic.
In the same manner, the Chief Scientist at YellowTech was one element in the
introduction of cross-project learning, contributing to the transformation of the
conventional thinking about product development projects from a single-project to
multi-project management at YellowTech. His vision that product management
starts with the assessment of existing solutions has shifted the conventional
thinking of managers that projects are mainly about technological development.
Moreover. the shift in paradigm was on the strategic level, as the practice of
project management has also changed tremendously.
The Chief Scientist led discussions about knowledge transfer and reusability
assessment and made them open to all. This act encouraged technicians and
programmers to participate and become involved. The Chief Scientist made
occasional visits to the laboratories and engaged in discussions. This has given
him appreciation and respect at all levels within the R&D Division.
5.3.8 Summary: Organisational Characteristics and Capabilities for Cross-Project
Learning at YellowTech
Organisations have a variety of structural forms from which to choose when
implementing a strategy (Olson et al. 1995:51). In the case of YellowTech, a
handful of mechanisms interrelate in the activity of cross-project learning
including the organisational structure, project management routines, technology
management practices, integration procedures of R&D activities with clients and
Sales, and various motivational factors.
One way to look at the organisational and managerial issues involved in cross-
project learning is by treating them as the capabilities that a company has
developed to support cross-project learning (Coombs 1996; Collinson 2001).
These capabilities are technical expertise, managerial practices, structural
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arrangements, and values and norms that YellowTech developed in many years of
technological and organisational development (Schilling 1998). Coombs argues
that core competencies consist of (1996:346) 'the bodies of technological
expertise (both product and process) and the organisational capacity to deploy that
expertise effectively'.
Figure 16 provides a case in point that exemplifies the capabilities developed in
reusing the technology of a display card in three different products.
Dynamics of Capabilities and Competencies
Leadership
Disciplined
project
management
Multi-communication
channels Core Product
Reused Hardware
Display Card
Products
Light Systems V 1
Light Systems V 2
The Galilee Rose
Figure 16: Dynamics and Products of Cross-Project Learning Capabilities at YellowTech (Based
on Coombs 1996)
The dynamics of the capabilities described in Figure 16 suggests that the process
of reusing a display card technology involves various factors, mechanisms, values
and priorities that can all also be perceived as the reusability routine (Nelson and
Winter 1982). The term 'routine' does not necessarily imply that the process of
reusing is systematic, but rather demonstrates the know-how embedded in
individuals, groups and systems about the actions associated with, and results
expected from the reusability process.
In the following section, business performance from the last five years will be
presented, suggesting that these years saw a gradual improvement in market
penetration, product marketing and business performance.
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5.3.9 YellowTech: Business Performance Indicators
Following the presentation of the mechanisms supporting cross-project learning,
this section seeks to address the following question: did YellowTech enhance
product success following the implementation of these mechanisms?
In order to suggest an answer to this question some business performance
indicators have been analysed, in addition to the objective and subjective factors
already presented above. These business performance indicators refer to new
market penetration, success in bids, annual revenue, backlog and future growth.
5.3.9.1 New Market Penetration
Very little is known about the Israeli defence industry, let alone about the
countries that the defence industry trades with. Figure 17 shows an estimate of
market penetration for the last five years provided by the Chief Scientist at
Yellow'Tech. Market penetration is considered here as new contracts signed by
countries that YellowTech has never traded with before. As mentioned above,
these figures are based on a rough estimation by one senior manager at
YellowTech and could not be confirmed by other sources.
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Figure 17: New Opening Markets for YellowTech
Amongst the countries that recently signed a contract for the first time with
YellowTech are Germany and Singapore (1995) and Australia (1999) (interview
source). Only very recently has it been announced that Greece is in final
negotiations to sign a first-ever $500 million contract with YellowTech Group
(Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz, 2.12.2001).
Thus, data suggest that YellowTech is constantly improving its market penetration
into new markets. This data may suggest that YellowTech has achieved product
success in these countries that have made contracts with the company for the first
time in the last five years.
Nevertheless, other factors may negate the conclusion suggested above. In
particular, the involvement of international politics often affects governments'
decisions concerning defence procurement.
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5.3.9.2 Success in Bidding
Success in bidding is another indicator of product success. Nevertheless, as
mentioned above the involvement of political factors in the decision making
process may hinder a clear correlation between these two elements.
Nevertheless, YellowTech has strategically targeted this factor as an indicator of
market competitiveness. To accommodate this approach, the company has decided
to submit bids more often than before, even in areas that in which the chances
were slim, in order to demonstrate its strong presence in defence markets and
possibly to be considered as a sub-contractor to the winner.
An estimate of the last five years' success rate was received from the Head of the
Sales team, and is presented in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Success Rate in Bids at YellowTech
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Data suggest that the company has improved its success rate in bidding from 25
per cent in 1995 to 33 per cent in 2000. Figure 18 suggests that the company has
been more successful in competing in the last 3 years than before.
5.3.9.3 Revenue
Based on data from the popular media, Figure 19 suggests that YellowTech has
constantly increased its annual revenue and order backlog in the last five years.
Yet it has to be noted that the figures for the year 2000 actually represent the
results of YellowTech Group, after the February 2000 merger. Nevertheless, a
steady improvement in revenue and backlog between 1999 and 2000 was reported
for the three companies involved in this merger (Marom Dror, Globes, 16.01
2001).
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Figure 19: Backlog and Revenue at YeIlowTech between 1997-2000
Figure 19 suggests that YellowTech has steadily improved its financial
. 1997 We suggest that the successful implementation of cross-performance SInce .
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project learning mechanisms played a role In hi "ac ievmg product and market
success.
5.3.9..1 Reusability: The Cost Effectiveness Factor
YellowTech introduced a few metrics to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of cross-
project learning activities. A case in point, presented by the Head of the Software
Group. demonstrates the cost-effectiveness of the reusability strategy, when
implemented properly in three consecutive, reused projects.
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Figure 20: ManIHours in a Reusability Process at YellowTech
Three consecutive projects between 1991 and 1997 were involved in reusing a
specific source code. Figure 20 shows the man/hours invested in each project,
indicating that the cost of developing the source code in the third project was only
2% of the first project. The extent of the cost-effecti veness of the reusability
process is fully understood when one makes the link between the growing trend to
reuse technologies and designs presented in Figure 10 and the tremendous saving
in man/hours in three consecutive 'reused' software projects presented in Figure
20. When these two figures (i.e. Figure 10 and Figure 20) are analysed together,
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the implications for Yellow'I'ech' s business performance become evident
suggesting that the company significantly reduced R&D costs in 'reused'
projects, improving its product and market success.
In addition to the cost-effectiveness of the reusability system, the Head of the
Software Group claimed that the reusability system helped in getting a better feel
for estimating the costs involved in software development before the project starts.
5.3.9.5 Summary: Business Performance at YelIowTech
The above-presented business performance suggests that YellowTech has
improved market penetration, order backlog, revenue and success rate in bidding
in the last five years. Evidence presented in previous sections has shown that
throughout the years between 1995 and 2000, the company has aggressively
pursued the introduction of cross-project learning mechanisms in the form of
reusability strategy.
We conclude this section by suggesting that the recent improvement in product
and market success may possibly be linked to the successful implementation of
cross-project learning mechanisms. We realise that the variables we use to suggest
the above have some limitations; however, the primary purpose in this section was
not to develop a comprehensive model to predict product and market success
(Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). Obviously, selling products in defence markets is
a complex task. Some of the aspects involved are political and there is a strong
political and industrial lobby that promotes purchasing defence systems from the
domestic defence industry. Yet doing a better job than the competitors in
designing, building and maintaining defence systems would support a long-term
successful sales strategy. In this sense, the reusability strategy at YellowTech was
aimed at achieving these objectives.
Before moving forward to organisational and managerial issues at TAMAM and
Rafael, we acknowledge that further study is needed, in particular with regard to
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statistical con-elation between product success and cross-project learning
mechanisms.
The next section reviews cross-project learning mechanisms implemented at
Rafael and TAMAM.
5.4 Cross-Project Learning: A Review of Lessons Learned at
TAMAM and Rafael
5...1.1 Introduction
Thus far, the above sections reviewed in detail the mechanisms put in place at
YellowTech. As seen, data suggest that YellowTech has improved product
success and market competitiveness following the introduction of these
mechanisms.
This section presents organisational and managerial mechanisms and processes
supporting cross-project learning implemented at TAMAM and Rafael, and
stresses their contribution to product success.
5.4.2 Lessons Learned from TAMAM: The Strategy for Cross-Project Learning
Despite the similar objectives shared by TAMAM and YellowTech with regard to
cross-project learning, a rather different approach has been taken by TAMAM in
implementing mechanisms supporting this activity. TAMAM, which has been
urged to demonstrate strong financial results by the Israeli Aircraft Industries, its
mother company, relied on the centrality of the system engineer in the design
process to support cross-project learning activities.
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Figure" 1: The Process of Introducing Cross-Project Learning at TAMAM
Two major actions were taken at TAMAM between 1995 and 1997 that changed
the nature of cross-project learning (see Figure 21). The first, in 1995, was aimed
to create product families through the grouping of projects in programmes. The
second was the decision that system engineers would be at the centre of the
technology transfer process, making a link between the base project and the
receiving project. This new role gave system engineers the name 'knowledge
centres' .
Nevertheless, managers at TAMAM reported that projects were reusing software
and hardware components before 1995 mainly through informal channels. Also,
Design Review sessions and other knowledge exchange forums were indicated by
managers as helpful in exploring reusability alternatives (Sobek et al. 1998).
Indeed, TAMAM has been paying attention to the benefits offered by reusing
technologies.
The rhetoric at TAMAM was similar to YellowTech's, peppered with the slogan
'avoid re-inventing the wheel' , aiming to promote the reusability of platforms and
components across projects. Yet, the implementation of cross-project learning has
not always been aligned with present project management philosophy at
TAMAM. For example, management insisted on managing projects as profit
centres. This practice has directed project teams' efforts towards internal affairs,
supporting 'domain innovations' (Boland and Tenkasi 1995). By contrast,
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management's intention was to promote the reusability of technologies, through
'boundary innovations' (Blackler et al. 1999). In this atmosphere, project
managers. engineers and system engineers cooperate in order to reuse
technological platforms and components.
In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics, TAMAM also relied on the
matrix structure (McCollum and Shennan 1993); however, with an attention to the
centrality of the system engineer in the process of transferring designs. In
addition, the organisation of projects in programmes has been another mechanism
put in place to foster the reusability of components between projects of the same
product family. Other mechanisms, mainly informal in nature, were described, yet
they portray a similar picture to those presented above and therefore will be
briefly reviewed. This mainly refers to informal communication channels,
autonomy and the reward system.
SA.2.t The Organisational Structure at TAMAM: The Role of the System Engineer
In essence TAMAM implemented the classic matrix structure, which horizontally
accommodates the five directorates and vertically the different programmes. A
good description of a similar organisational structure that was implemented at
TAMAM can be found in Quinn et al. (1988:290).
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Figure 22: Matrix Structure at TAMAM
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The role of the system engineer is central to cross-project learning activities. The
system engineer is associated with the vertical integration of technologies that are
organised horizontally in the professional directorates (see Figure 22). On the
other hand, the management of the programme, i.e. the horizontal integration of
different professional teams within the matrix structure, has maintained a clearer
picture of current activities across different projects. Yet the management of
programmes at TAMAM has lacked the technical knowledge needed to facilitate
cross-project leaming. This was because the personnel in this section of the matrix
structure was project management and Sales orientated, with little or even no
engineering background. One project manager explained:
There are tH'O dimensions in the matrix structure. One is the professional fields and
directorates and the second is project management. [. ..] project management at
TAMAA! has two areas of responsibilities. One is about scheduling and
coordinating project activities. The second is to work with clients. Project
managers at TAMAM don't have an engineering background. Most of us come
from project management positions in the Israeli Air Force.
This situation posed a dilemma to management at TAMAM. On the one hand
project and programme managers were most suitable to lead reusability efforts
because of their visibility on different projects across directorates and within their
own programme; however, they lacked the understanding needed to lead a
reusability effort, which might jeopardise the project objectives and goals. On the
other hand, system engineers, the experts who hold knowledge about the various
technologies and solutions that can be reusable, were located in the professional
directorate. Initially, this location of the system engineer was logical because of
their engineering orientation. However, from a cross-project learning perspective,
system engineers as part of the professional directorate were not effective. Their
exposure to new projects, client's requirements in these projects and the
technological base that the client would like to see were all limited and often
relied on reports that the project management team provided.
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Thus. the role of the system engineer has changed, and metaphorically they have
been relocated into a space between project management and the professional
field. In reality, system engineers become more involved in project management
activity.
In a way. system engineers developed a dual identity which allowed them to cross
community boundaries (Wenger 1998). System engineers integrated shared
histories of learning from the area of engineering with fresh learning from the
project management field. However, the system engineer was also put in the
almost impossible position in which he or she needed to satisfy both the
professional directorate and the programme unit (Sobek et al. 1998).
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Figure 23: The Role of System Engineer in Vertically Integrating Knowledge
Therefore, the structure and dynamics that emerged at TAMAM demonstrates a
high level of participation of system engineers across different project teams
(Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998).
5.4.2.2 The Organisation of Projects in Programme Setting
The organisation and management of several projects in one programme has also
supported cross-project learning activities. Projects were clustered together based
on their source technology, creating islands of product families within the matrix
structure (Meyer and Utterback 1993; Nobeoka 1995; Sundgren 1999). Figure 24
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presents the relationships between core technology and a number of projects that
may be managed as a programme or perhaps will be treated a product family.
Figure 24: Core Technology and Projects at TAMAM
Figure 24 illustrates the use that five different products (A-E) are having in the
same core technology. Figure 25 describes the development of product family
from one core technology through time and through different programmes. Mayer
and Utterback (1993 :32) provide an analysis of these dynamics, suggesting that in
the long run product families are the core capabilities of a firm.
Core
Technology
Figure 25: The Development of Product Family
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This grouping of projects in programmes is essential for cross-project learning at
TAMAM. This organisation provided a better exposure to multi-project activities
within one programme for the system engineer. Through this exposure, it can be
claimed. TAMAM managed to successfully reuse components within the same
programme? The main pitfall in this approach was the lack of a cross-programme
learning process. However, it has been argued by managers that a programme
would usually specialise in one core technology and transferring this technology
to another programme is quite rare and even does not make sense. For example, in
the Navigation directorate there are two types of core technologies. One is based
on the giro technology and the other one on laser technology. It would be a rare
case to see these two share technological platforms or components.
5A.2.3 The Role of Design Reviews and Knowledge Exchange Meetings
Design Reviews at TAMAM were indicated as a mechanism that supports,
amongst other things, cross-project learning. Because of the separation between
project management and technological design roles at TAMAM, design reviews
have addressed both project management and design issues. One system engineer
from TAMAM explained:
During Design Reviews we had to discuss design issues as well as project
scheduling and coordination matters. Most of the issues were relevant for both
project engineers and people from the professional directorate.
Project management Issues were presented by the project manager, whereas
design matters were presented by the senior project engineer in the project team.
The participants in these sessions, most likely system engineers, the Head of the
Directorate, and project leaders from the various directorates, commented on
issues regarding the management of the project and the design.
7 See an example of a successful knowledge reusability process in section 6.5.3
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With regard to the management of the project, discussion would revolve around
tirnelines, milestones, resource allocations and coordination. The decisions that
were agreed in this session would be crucial to the successful execution of the
project.
From the cross-project learning perspective, the presentation of the initial design
generates feedback, mainly from system engineers, about existing solutions in-
house that can cut short the development process. These existing solutions can be
part of the same product family or perhaps reside in another product programme.
Yet the linking point, as described in section 5.4.2.1, was the system engineer.
In addition to Design Review sessions, TAMAM also introduced numerous
Knowledge Exchange sessions; however, these forums did not have a fixed time
schedule and attendance has been reported as low. One forum addresses Sales
issues and aims to share 'war stories' between the participants. It has been
reported by one project manager who attended this session that only a few Sales
people attended: however, they were reluctant to speak up about their experiences.
This project manager theorises that the reason for this was perhaps the internal
politics between different desks organised by geographical areas.
Engineers and managers from TAMAM actively participated in the Knowledge
Cafe forum, a cross hi-tech industry forum organised by Dr. Edna Pasher and
Associates. This forum provided TAMAM with an exposure to recent knowledge
management and product development practices in other electronics defence
companies in Israel.
5.4.2.4 Technology Management: Commonality and Modularity
Commonality at TAMAM with regard to software packages supporting hardware
and software development has emerged as a common sense practice. It has been
suggested that there has not been any decision about who would be responsible for
this matter. Yet engineers pointed out that the Head of IT Services at TAMAM
'took care of this issue'. One senior hardware technician from TAMAM claimed:
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The IT Services department is responsible for upgrading software versions. We are
informed once software packages are upgraded.
However, engineers indicated that there are cases in which individuals upgrade
their own software, and often this creates problems when versions of software
development platforms are not compatible.
Software development practice at TAMAM has followed the Object Orientated
practice since the mid-1990s. For a detailed description, see section 5.3.5.
Software engineers reported that indeed the Object Orientated practice improved
the transferability of software modules between projects.
5..t.2.5 Integration with Sales and Interactions with Clients at TAMAM
The Sales team at TAMAM is part of the programme structure (see
Figure 26). Sales people are allocated to a specific programme and a distinct
geographical area within the programme (Van den Bulte and Moenaert 1998). At
TAMAM the Sales team lacks any engineering background. Most of the personnel
in the Sales team are retired high rank officers from the Israeli Air Force. The
integration of the Sales team into R&D has been achieved through the matrix
structure. It has been argued that the Sales team participates in almost all project-
related meetings. However, because of their lack of technical skills, the immediate
contribution to cross-project learning in the sense of transferring specific designs,
has not been significant. However, their participation in project meetings has
contributed to the effectiveness of communication between R&D personnel and
the Sales team. The impression is that gradually the Sales team has started to
speak the 'engineering language'. Perhaps more importantly, their participation in
some project meeting has contributed to the development of the 'pilot language'
by engineers.
5-132
r---------------------------- --------,-
/
Optronics
'-- --J'1r-
.~
Sales
Figure 26: Sales Team in the Matrix Structure at TAMAM
Interactions with clients at TAMAM portrayed the same characteristics as In
YellowTech. YellowTech also accommodated some of its clients in the
company's premises. Some geographical areas within the R&D space were
allocated to specific client projects which created sections of product families.
However, despite the impression that the above geographical layout may have
boosted interactions between project teams, these interactions were not
systematic; nor was it claimed that the geographical arrangement was a chief
factor in facilitating knowledge transfer.
5.4.2.6 Motivational Factors at TAMAM
5.4.2.6.1 Autonomy
As in YellowTech, engineers and managers were granted a relatively high level of
autonomy within their area of responsibility. However, the move towards the
reusability practice has caused some unease with regard to engineers' autonomy,
in particular concerning the balance between exploration and exploitation of
technologies (March 1999).
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Job design and job description was another factor in promoting cross-project
learning activities, as this area enjoys a loosely-defined set of responsibilities
(Sherman and Nadler 1996).
Thus, the combination of a high level of autonomy and loosely-defined job
description stimulated interactions, discussions and participation across projects
(McCollum and Sherman 1993). These activities facilitated participative learning
leading to collective learning through the development of communities of
practice, by creating a sense of belonging and shared language (Wenger 1998).
5.4.2.6.2 Informal Communication Network
Communities of practice at TAMAM were the foundation upon which a wide
informal communication network between experts was established (Tushman and
Nadler 1996; Van Aken and Weggeman 2000). These communication networks
varied in form and objectives, and included such as informal chitchats while
commuting home, in the corridors or during lunch. These channels were
considered useful although in most cases the results of these interactions did not
target a specific problem. A rather more focused and problem-solving informal
session was the Cafe forum every Thursday afternoon. In this session project
teams of the same programme gathered to have a cake to celebrate the end of the
week. Managers and engineers interacted in discussions about problems and
progress in different projects and often learned about common and repetitive
problems in design.
As argued above, research on the contribution of informal interaction to learning
is inconclusive. Our data suggest that informal interactions supported cross-
project learning at TAMAM. In particular, informal interactions between project
teams of the same programme were indicated as a source for sharing solutions and
becoming aware of potential problems in their design of the core technology.
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Rewards
TAMAM, similarly to YellowTech, lacks a reward system that remunerates either
individual or group effort for successfully executing cross-project learning
activities.
5.-+.2.6"+ Leadership
Data suggest that leadership and sponsorship of cross-project learning was
vaguely defined at TAMAM. The co-researcher of this study has been promoting
knowledge management and learning activities but without a well-defined budget,
resources or the full support of the General Manager. The co-researcher
participated in numerous knowledge management forums and was often presented
as 'the knowledge management person' at TAMAM. Yet there were mixed signals
within the company with regards to the importance that TAMAM has given to
knowledge management.
When the results of this study were presented to top management, including a
review of most recent knowledge management practices in intense R&D
companies, the General Manager of TAMAM summarised this exercise by saying;
We will probably never be like Buckman Industries or IBM, but it was a quite
interesting exercise to do.
This statement can perhaps be interpreted as if TAMAM' s management would
like to see engineers reusing technologies and platforms to cut R&D costs;
however, without investing in the organisational infrastructure that would
effectively support cross-project learning.
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5"'.2.7 Summary: Organisational Characteristics and Capabilities for Cross-Project
Learning at TAMAM
The system engineer integrates learning between different projects within a
professional directorate by operating in the area between project management and
the professional field.
The organisation of a number of projects in one programme formulates a small
cell of individuals who transfer learning and experiences within the programme
boundaries. However, the same programme entities obstructed cross-programme
participation. hence inhibiting cross-project learning across the R&D Division.
Values and norms at TAMAM were characterised by the high level of autonomy;
however, with mixed signals from management. Yet market pressure to reduce R
& D costs, shorten R&D project times and supply a reliable and yet simple to
maintain defence system pushed project managers and system engineers to choose
the reusability strategy.
Dynamics of Capabilities and Competencies
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Figure 27: Dynamics and Products of Cross-Project Learning Capabilities at TAMAM (Based on
Coombs 1996)
Figure 27 presents a case In point of the Payload family,
Stabiliser component was reused across different products.
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In which the Giro
5....2.8 Business Performance Indicators: TAMAM
Data about TAMAM' s business performance in recent years was not available
from management. Neither had TAMAM monitored or analysed the cost-
effectiveness of the reusability strategy. Yet it was claimed by the Head of the
Quality Assurance directorate that project development time has been much
shorter since attention was given to the management of programmes and since
there has been more attention to reuse components.
Data of the last four years' sales performance suggest that TAMAM is improving
its positioning in the electro-optic/navigation system markets (Dror Marom,
Globes. 28/02/2001). Figure 28 presents a steady growth of sales.
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In terms of profit, TAMAM presented a marginal profit of $1 million in 1998 and
$2 million in 1999 and 2000 (see Figure 29).
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Figure 29: Profit at TAMAM 1998-2000 (in $M.l
Thus, it may be argued that, similarly to Yellowtech, TAMAM improved its
market success and maintained profitability following the implementation of
cross-programme learning mechanisms, with the caveat that the limited success
indicators available from TAMAM may blur the true correlation between
implemented cross-project learning mechanisms and product success.
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5A.3 Lessons from Rafael: The Strategy for Cross-Project Learning
Rafael, a research-driven organisation that only recently adopted business
objectives, has formulated a robust informal communication networks within its R
& D Division. Data suggest that Rafael has successfully harnessed social networks
to facilitate cross-project learning. This activity was supported by a matrix
organisational structure, design review sessions, technology management and the
high involvement of individuals in problem solving activities.
Knowledge Cafe
Matrix Structure
KM Committee Map Knowledge
Reusability of Software/Hardware ComponentsDO
1980s 1997 1998 2000
Figure 30: The Process of Introducing Cross-Project Learning at Rafael
Rafael reused software and hardware components well before 1997. However,
only recently has Rafael been putting an emphasis on cross-project learning by
setting up a committee to explore knowledge management initiatives, promoting
knowledge exchange forums, through participation in Knowledge Cafe activities,
and by launching a knowledge management project aiming to map knowledge
centres. Nevertheless, the vast majority of cross-project learning activities have
relied on social interactions. The following section will demonstrate the nature of
cross-project learning at Rafael.
5.4.3.1 Social and Informal Communication Networks at Rafael
The situation portrayed by managers, engineers and technicians suggests that
cross-project learning activity has taken place at the lower level of the
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organisation, meaning that cross-project learning activities were driven by project
managers, engineers and technicians. It has been suggested that social networks at
Rafael were well-established, developed over many years of shared research
interests, of a high level of autonomy (Sherman and Nadler 1996) and of loose job
descriptions, which all facilitated informal interactions between individuals and
groups (Wenger 1998). A description of the process of cross-project learning at
Rafael provided by the Head of the Popeye Administration demonstrates the
above:
H'e reused many components from the core technology of the Popeye missile. [... J
There is more than one "way to ensure that components will be reused and we trust
our engineers to find a way that makes sure that we don't waste time and money on
reinventing wheels.
At Rafael, cross-project learning activities were generated at the project level
during either the design stage or while the team has encountered a problem in the
design.
In either cases, the person who identifies the opportunity to reuse a component
from a base project becomes an internal entrepreneur for the cross-project learning
process (Nonaka 1994). During this process, this person harnesses more people
and creates a network of experts who attempt to solve the problem (Floyd and
Wooldridge 1999). Data show that the entrepreneur is usually one of the more
experienced engineers in the project, who has been with the company for many
years, established network centrality within the professional field (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978), and hence is usually free to pursue his or her own goals and gain
structural autonomy (Floyd and Wooldridge 1999).
During the process of creating a network of experts that will facilitate cross-
project learning, the entrepreneur engages in discussions with members of the
project team, suggesting that a solution to the problem can be found in another
project (Nonaka 1994). The entrepreneur has either a specific knowledge of the
solution that resides with another project or he or she make an assumption about
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the potential reusability process based on a generic knowledge he or she possess
about the other project (Floyd and Woolridge 1999).
It was argued by the Head of the Popeye Programme that Design Reviews were
often the stage in which the build-up of social networks for reusability were
formed. However, to execute a reusability process, the flexibility of the matrix
structure at Rafael was needed (McCollum and Sherman 1993).
System
Engineer
Figure 31: Interactions between the Entrepreneur and Other Members of Projects in Social
Network
Figure 31 suggests that the entrepreneur, who can be the project manager,
engineer or technician, is central to the cross-project learning activity. The
network is created through discussions that the entrepreneur initiates with
individuals who are potentially in positions to support the transfer process.
One engineer from the Lightning project at Rafael explained:
When I am facing a problem that I cannot immediately resolve by myself, I will
start asking colleagues from the Division, those who should have some knowledge
of the technology. Usually what happens is that one engineer brings another
colleague and we eventually find a solution.
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One aspect of the development of cross-project learning at Rafael is the expansive
nature (Engestrom 1999) of the activity, during which more participants join and
new themes emerge (see Figure 32).
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Figure 32: The Expansive Nature of Social Network in Cross Project Learning Activity
For example, a reusability process of one electronics card from one Popeye
project to another started with one system engineer checking the input/output
socket of the base component to validate the compatibility of the card. A few days
later further tests were carried out, including checking the processing time of
some of the functions. As this activity between two projects progressed, the
participants raised more concerns and debated the feasibility of reusing the card
until the point at which a decision was made by the project manager that 'it was
worth bothering' .
One project engineer from the Popeye project at Rafael claimed:
Usually when we reuse a component this [activityJ starts with a couple of people
involved but soon it becomes much bigger. There are activities that need to be
coordinated and not always tho~e who are first involved have all the knowledge
required to complete the reusability of the component.
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Another aspect in this process at Rafael, which emphasises the informal nature of
the activity, is the role of the system engineer. One system engineer reflected on
this process, claiming that in fact they are involved in reusability processes
because it is their responsibility to approve the design. Yet they confirmed that
there are cases in which the initiative to reuse components started in the project
level. One system engineer explained:
This is the project manager dilemma, whether they want to reuse or not. If a
project manager comes to me with a request to help with this [reusabilityJ, I will
help them as much as I can.
Thus, the picture which emerges from cross-project learning activities at Rafael
emphasises the informal nature of the process (Van Aken and Weggeman 2000),
demonstrating rather a process that is entrepreneurial in nature, supported by
formal and informal structures such as the matrix structure, design review
meetings, system engineers and informal communication channels.
5A.3.2 The Role of Design Reviews and Knowledge Exchange Meetings
Similarly to TAMAM, Design Reviews at Rafael have become the stage where
individuals become aware of their possible contribution to the design effort. The
process through which the social network was constituted, leading to the
reusability of components, is described in detail in section 5.4.3.1.
Knowledge Exchange forums were another mechanism introduced by
management to help the crossing of project boundaries. Two distinct professional
areas used this medium in order to transfer knowledge between teams. These were
the Sales group at Rafael and the Popeye Programme.
The Sales group maintains a multi-layer structure that is described in Figure 33. In
order to maintain consistency in terms of the Group sales strategy, Rafael
management promoted Knowledge Exchange forums for the Sales force. These
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forums were reported as successful, in particular when a guest lecturer was invited
to discuss Sales strategies.
'--
The Popeye Programme maintained a monthly knowledge exchange session
during which one senior engineer would present recent technological development
in Rafael. Because of the specificity of the subject many employees chose not to
attend and the value of these sessions to product development and product design
was indicated as low.
5A.3.3 Technology l\lanagement: Commonality and Modularity
In many ways the pattern for commonality at Rafael was similar to the one at
TAMAM. The Missiles Division has attempted to control the vast offering of
software packages and maintain a reasonable pace of upgrades across the division.
The responsibility for commonality in software development platforms was
associated with the IT manager of the Missiles Division. Engineers and managers
who referred to this matter argued that this area should not be subject to financial-
related considerations but rather open to project-specific needs to keep up with
technological development. One project engineer claimed:
There l-vere times when we needed to either upgrade a software package without
waiting for the MIS team or purchase a tool that the MIS team did not offer. These
cases were rare but they can happen. For example, we had to make our
development tools compatible with those of the IAI in one joint-venture project,
therefore we purchased and implement a development tool that nobody in the
Division had used before.
In practice, the general impression was that the Missiles Division has followed
this practice despite the mix of voices calling for balance between technological
autonomy and financial control in this area.
Data suggest that modularity in software programmes at Rafael followed the same
pattern of implementation that was present at YellowTech and TAMAM (Sanchez
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and Mahoney 1997). Because this is a common practice in the software industry,
these findings are not unexpected. As in the other two cases, the Object Orientated
practice has been indicated as the common sense practice for developing
interchangeable software modules.
5A.3A Integration with Sales and Interactions with Clients at Rafael
In the same manner as at TAMAM, Rafael integrated the Sales team into different
programmes in the Mattix structure (see
Figure 26 for a similar structure at TAMAM). However, Sales at Rafael
maintained a hierarchical structure of three layers; top management, Division, and
Programme (see Figure 33). In practice, Sales personnel on the Programme felt
disconnected from the Sales team at the Division and top management level. They
affiliated their identity with the programmes. This often created knowledge-
sharing problems between programmes as well as between the three layers of the
hierarchical structure of Sales. Sales personnel often did not report back to either
the Division Sales manager or the Director of Sales about their experiences in the
field. This information was circulated between members of the programme and
was hardly available to neighbouring programmes.
Sales people were allocated within a programme to a specific geographical area.
For example, the Sales team in the Litening Programme was divided into four
geographical areas: Asia and Middle East, North America, South America and
Europe. The group was an amalgam of individuals with various backgrounds,
including one person who had worked in the past in the 'white goods' field. Only
one person had some engineering background and none of the members was a
pilot. These unique and unusual characteristics for Sales personnel in the defence
business were portrayed by the Head of the Litening Programme as an advantage.
In his words, these characteristics are in favour the Programme because he can
'convert' these individuals to speak the 'Litening' language. Indeed, Litening is
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considered as the 'flagship' programme In this division, mainly because of its
recent market success".
The integration of the Sales team into R&D was achieved through the matrix
structure and through their participation in project-related meetings. However, the
Sales team at Rafael suffered from a lack of technical skills and therefore their
contribution to cross-project learning in the sense of transferring specific designs,
has not been significant. Yet, their involvement in project meeting was indicated
as a significant factor in the coordination of project activities and in managing
customer relationships.
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Figure 33: Sales Group at Rafael
Interactions with clients at Rafael followed the same practice as described In
sections 5.3.6 and 5.4.2.5.
8 Data about sales and clients of the Litening programme are confidential but from interview
sources the estimate is that the customer-base of the Litening programme, which is only 7 years
old, is wider than that of Popeye 's, which is over 20 years old. Amongst the chief clients are the
Israeli Air Force, the US Air Force and Germany.
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5....3.5 1\ lotivational Factors at Rafael
5.-L3.5.1 Autonomy
A pattern of high degree of autonomy has emerged from the data, suggesting that
engineers and managers enjoyed a relatively high degree of freedom in their area
of responsibility. The first project manager of the Litening Programme explained
how flexible the system was and how powerful social networks were in promoting
product development activities.
When the first Lightning project reached its production stage after a very troubling
development effort with some critical deadlines approaching rapidly, the project
manager had a dilemma. He was very concerned that the project might encounter
further difficulties during the production stage because of the novelty of the
system and the first-time integration of laser and navigation systems. He consulted
with his boss and together they decided to physically relocate the project manager
to the production plant. In one phone call the matter was resolved and the Head of
the Production plant agreed to give the project manager a desk close to the
assembly line. The project manager describes how, through having coffee together
in the morning and going to lunch together with the production team, he quickly
became part of the team and participated in discussions, debates and decisions,
making sure that the project priorities are maintained and been properly promoted
(Sobek et al. 1998).
5.4.3.5.2 Rewards
Rafael maintains the same approach as TAMAM and YellowTech. TAMAM does
not have any reward system for activities related to cross-project learning.
5.4.3.5.3 Leadership
Though knowledge management has attracted the attention of a number of top
managers at Rafael, including the Head of the Patent Department, the Head of R
& D and the Head of HR Department, none of these top managers has taken the
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lead and sponsored cross-project learning in particular. Furthermore, the
ownership of knowledge management has been at the centre of a long dispute
between these top managers and often the impression that was given to the
researcher was that part of the effort towards knowledge management and cross-
project learning was driven by power games rather than by professional interest in
promoting efficiency and learning.
5A.3.6 Summar)': Organisational Characteristics and Capabilities for Cross-Project
Learning at Rafael
Cross-project learning activities at Rafael revolved around social networks and the
matrix structure. These two mechanisms are based on intense participation within
and across communities of practices, generating an expansive learning activity
each time a new reusability process begins.
Dynamics of Capabilities and Competencies
IFntrepreneurship I
Social
[etworks
Vertical Integration
Programmes
Matrix Structure
Core Product
Reused Infra-Red
Head
Products
Popeye
PopeyeUte
Spice
Figure 34: Dynamics and Products of Cross-Project Learning Capabilities at Rafael (Based on
Coombs 1996)
At the heart of the social network activity there is the entrepreneur who starts a
new cycle of cross-project learning each time the solution cannot be found within
the group.
5-148
Figure 34 provides a case In point in which the head sensor of an air-to-Iand
missile, based on infra-red detection technology, was reused by three different
product fami lies at Rafael.
5....3.7 Some Success Indicators: Rafael
Managers at Rafael claimed that the company has extensively reused components
in the last five years. Indeed, in the same manner as in YellowTech and TAMAM
,
the phrase 'avoid reinventing the wheel' was used by mangers, engineers and
technicians as a guideline to their project and product management philosophy.
However. Rafael did not apply any methods to measure return on investment with
regard to the reusability process. In addition, data about recent new market
penetration by Rafael has not been released for confidentiality reasons. Yet data
from interviews suggest that Rafael has penetrated a few new markets between
1997 and 1999 including Greece, Australia, India and Holland.
Because of the subjectivity of this information, which impedes any conclusive
statement about the correlation between the mechanisms put in place for cross-
project learning and product success, some objective indicators will next be
presented.
Rafael's recent performance indicators will be evaluated in the light of the
changes implemented in product development aiming to enhance product success
and improve market positioning. These performance indicators suggest that Rafael
significantly improved its performance between 1998 and 2000 (Dror Marom,
Globes, 04/0112000; Dror Marom, Globes, 28/03/2001). Thus, it may be argued
that, similarly to YellowTech and TAMAM, Rafael may have improved its
product and market positioning following the implementation of cross-project
learning mechanisms.
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5.4.3.7.1 Profit
Rafael has posted a first-ever annual profit of $2 million in 2000, compared with a
$30 million loss in 1999 and $80 million in 1998.
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Figure 35: LosslProfit Figures between 1998-2000, Rafael
5.4.3.7.2 Sales
Data suggest that sales at Rafael steadily grew, presenting a 50% growth in three
years (1998-2000).
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Figure 36: Sales between 1998-2000, Rafael
5..+.3.7.3 Backlog
Backlog at Rafael grew by 550/0 between 1998 and 2000.
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Thus. the above business performance indicators suggest that Rafael has
significantly improved business performance in the last three years, in particular
since the company has promoted the reusability of software and hardware
components by supporting cross-project learning.
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5.5 Patterns of Cross-Project Learning Capabilities
The above analysis examined organisational and managerial issues related to
cross-project learning in three companies. The impact of cross-project learning on
product and market success was also assessed, suggesting that the studied
companies significantly improved revenue and sales . Also, in some cases the cost-
effectiveness of the reusability practice was evident.
The next section will seek common organisational and managerial patterns for
cross-project learning between the study companies.
5.5.1 Overlapping Cross-Project Learning Capabilities
Table -+ captures the main similarities between organisational mechanisms
supporting cross-project learning in the three studied companies.
YellowTech TAMAM Rafael
Organisational Matrix/Functional Matrix Matrix
structure
Integration with Physically and Physically and Physically and
Sales structurally integrated structurally integrated structurally integrated
Interactions with Physically integrated, Physically integrated, Physically integrated,
clients highly involved highly involved highly involved
Autonomy All levels with All levels All levels
emphasis on project
manager
Job description Loose and undefined Loose and undefined Loose and undefined
Multi-functional Cross R&D and Cross R&D Cross R&D
teams Manufacturing
Communication Social networks, Social networks, Social networks,
channels Design Reviews, Design Reviews, Design Reviews,
multifunctional teams multifunctional teams multifunctional teams
Table 4: Similar Organisational Mechani sms for Cross-Project Learning across the Industry
It appears from Table 4 that there are many similarities between the studied
companies. For example, the matrix structure has dominated the studied
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environments. This confirms Cusumano and Nobeoka's (1998) findings, that
indeed the matrix structure is perhaps the most useful for cross-project learning.
Also, multi-functional teams were involved in providing solutions based on the
participants' experience and work in the same product family. This contribution of
multi-functional teams is in addition to their horizontal coordination of concurrent
engineering activities.
Furthermore, the three companies invested in linking the Sales team to R&D
activities by relocating members of the team from the headquarters to the R&D
area, and by positioning the Sales team within the matrix structure either as a
functional group or associated with project management. Also, the case study
companies invested in maintaining close relationships with their clients.
Representatives of various air forces were allocated to offices within the premises
of these companies and become involved in the decision-making processes in
cases where the project team faced acute and troubling malfunctions during the
last stages of the project.
A high level of autonomy has been reported in the three case study companies.
And a web of communication channels, formal and informal, has been described
by interviewees from YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael. This area will be further
analysed in Chapter 6, though in a different theoretical context.
However, despite operating in a similar context, i.e. the same country, industry,
and markets", the studied companies have shown great diversity in other
organisational aspects.
5.5.2 Company-Particular Cross-Project Learning Capabilities
Table 5 illustrates those organisational mechanisms supporting cross-project
learning which are particular to each company.
9 See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of global, domestic and company-specific defence markets
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The management of projects at YellowTech has included processes relating to
cross-project learning. In particular, the emphasis on knowledge transfer during
the conception stage stood out as a distinct feature supporting cross-project
learning. In addition. YellowTech implemented learning centres (Cusumano and
Nobeoka 1998:29) within the matrix structure in the form of Design Centres (e.g.
the ASIC team). Lastly. data suggest that different levels of individuals were
involved in leading the knowledge transfer process. Furthermore, the role they
were playing in the knowledge transfer process has varied significantly, from
leadership to entrepreneurship.
-- --- -- ---I YellowTech TAMAM Rafael
Project Three distinct stages:
management Conception,
practices Development &Integration
Learning centres Design Centres
Reuse metrics Mainly in software
projects
Technological Structured and Unstructured, centrally Unstructured, loosely
commonality centrally controlled controlled controlled
Modularity in Hardware and Software, highly Software, highly
design software, highly controlled controlled
controlled
Projects organised Mixed, both project- Programme-based Programme-based
in programmes based and programme- organisation organisation
(product families) based organisation
Leading role in Chief Scientist System Engineer Project member
transferring (Leadership) (knowledge centre) (entrepreneur)
knowledge Project manager
(Operations)
Table 5: Organisation Mechanisms Supporting Cross-Project Learning Distinct to a Specific
Company
Yet, in addition, there are variations in the way the studied comparues
implemented some organisational mechanisms. For example, the matrix structure
at YellowTech also accommodates functional teams such as the ASIC team
(Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998:29). The grouping of projects into a programme
has been observed in all the three companies; however, YellowTech did not
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maintain a consistent structure of programmes. Also, the level of control in the
commonality practice introduced at TAMAM and Rafael falls short of
YellowTech's standards. Lastly, though modularity was practised by the three
studied companies, only YellowTech attempted to enforce modularity of hardware
components, which are far more difficult to control.
Perhaps one should wonder what would explain these variations and differences?
How can they be interpreted?
5.5.3 Competing Interpretation of Differences and Variations in Cross-Project
Learning Capabilities
There are numerous competing explanations that may address the above question.
This debate between strategy approaches cannot only be limited to internal
organisational matters. It has to embrace the context within which the studied
companies operate. Hence, the following paragraphs debate the present study's
findings using some of the leading strategic thinking, in an attempt to produce an
explanation for the differentiation and variation in organising product
development for cross-project learning.
5.5.3.1 Classical Approach
Classical strategists would argue that these differences are the result of different
long-term goals and objectives, courses of action and allocation of resources
aiming at achieving higher profitability (Chandler 1962). Accepting the classical
approach argument would mean that YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael have had
different short- and long-term objectives, because each company believed that the
organisation of its capabilities for cross-project learning would be sufficient to
enhance profitability. In essence they were right. Indeed, the three studied
companies improved their financial results in the last four years despite the
different implementation of cross-project learning.
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Yet the present study may raise one uncertainty about this explanation. The
premises in the classical approach that individuals plan the future strategic
direction of the company (see Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998) has not been the
case for TAMAM and Rafael. Data suggest that in these companies, especially at
Rafael, the process was rather loose, and emerged from the bottom of the
organisation. How would classical theory explain this? If strategy is a matter of
careful planning. then any bottom-up cross-project learning management style
perhaps results from poor strategic management?
5.5.3.2 Bounded Rationality Approach
We tum to the 'bounded rationality' VIew to explain the latter phenomenon.
Bounded rationality would argue that it is in human nature to create different
solutions. Managers are only able to consider a handful of factors at a time and
tend to choose the first satisfactory option that presents itself, rather than the best
solution (Cyert and March 1963). Thus, the differences between YellowTech,
Rafael and TAMAM are the result of managers' bounded rationality decisions;
that is, not necessarily the best or perhaps the worst cross-project learning
practice, but just the first satisfactory practice that they have found. Theoretically,
this argument sounds convincing; however, evidence supporting this argument
was not found in the studied companies. Instead, data suggest that changes in
markets were the driving force behind the introduction of cross-project learning.
Thus, if strategic planning and managers' incompetence do not explain the
differences in the organisation of cross-project learning capabilities, perhaps the
environments within which the studied companies operate would produce an
explanation?
5.5.3.3 Evolutionary Approach
Evolutionary strategists would argue that these differences do not matter because
'whatever methods managers adopt, it will only be the best performers that
survive' (Whittington 1993: 17). Environments, not managers, dictate the winning
strategies within a particular context. Hence, the different mechanisms and
5-157
strategies between the studied companies, according to the evolutionary approach,
matter only in the context of the environmental fit.
Thus, according to evolutionary strategists, YelIowTech' s careful planning is in
vain. Despite the leadership of the Chief Scientist who carefully planned the
cross-project learning strategy, evolutionary strategists would argue that applying
methods to measure the cost-effectiveness of the reusability process is irrelevant,
because competition is not about these calculations but rather about a constant
battle for survival. It is a long process of adaptation to the new game rules in
defence markets that the three studied companies are experiencing, and they are
still taking steps to achieve a fit with the environment. At the same time,
YellowTechs approach would be explained by evolutionary strategists as the only
approach for survival. Instead of focusing on a single rational strategic plan,
YellowTech, the evolutionary strategists would argue, has spread its strategic
options by launching various strategic initiatives to support cross-project learning.
So, if YellowTech realised these game rules for survival, why have not the other
two companies?
The concept of strategies of differentiation introduced by Henderson (1989)
suggests that it is better for companies competing in the same environment to
adopt different strategies, such as in the case between TAMAM and Rafael. This
concept may explain the case of these two because of their competition in the
Optronics and Payload markets. Coexistence is impossible if organisms make
their living in an identical way (Whittington 1993). This biological rule may
explain the differences between TAMAM and Rafael; however, it does not
explain the differences between these two and YelIowTech.
In Chapter 4 we outlined the case that changes in defence markets pushed the
studied companies to pursue the cross-project learning strategy. Suppose that the
degree of competition that each company encountered was different: would this
lead to differentiation in organising cross-project learning capabilities?
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Penrose's (1952) argument that large oligopolistic corporations, such as defence
conglomerates, have 'buffered' their structures from the influence of market
because of their monopolistic power in these markets, would rule out the case for
market influence. Furthermore, this study proposes another argument against this
explanation: how can evolutionary theorists explain the case of markets that
become part of the managerial process?
Our findings suggest an intensive involvement of vanous au forces
representatives in product development work. Can one therefore draw a boundary
between markets and managers, in this case? What would be a market decision or
a manager decision, when clients and product developers work together to solve
product problems?
Thus. perhaps the differences are not the result of market competition as we
proposed in Chapter 4. These differences could be the product of other markets,
such as the market of corporate stakeholders. The three companies present three
different ownership schemes: private, government-owned and a sub-unit of the
Mol). which may suggest that these stakeholders present different levels of
tolerance to the development of the organisation. This raises the possibility that
the dynamics of the development of cross-project learning is related to the impact
that ownership has had on the organisation. We tum now to competence-based
approach to propose an explanation to the observed differences.
5.5.3.4 Competence-Based View
Competence-based theorists (Hamel 1994; Prahalad and Hamel 1990) would
argue that YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael have integrated some specific
capabilities that (i) make a disproportionate contribution to customer-perceived
value, (ii) are competitively unique, and (iii) provide an entry into new markets.
By integrating these capabilities, YellowTech, Rafael and TAMAM identified
their core-competencies. These are integrity-related competencies 'like quality,
cycle time management [... ] which allow a company to do things more quickly,
flexibly or with a higher degree of reliability than competitors' (Hamel 1996).
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Yellow'Techs core competence is in its ability to integrate market knowledge into
decision-making in the design process through project management practices that
allow the vertical integration of knowledge about technological platforms. This
process builds series of product families which are the core capabilities of the
organisation (Meyer and Utterback 1993). Product families support the build-up
of specialist knowledge which is essential for the innovation process (Collinson
2001), and further reinforce the notion of 'avoid reinventing the wheel' .
TAMAM on the other hand integrated market knowledge around the activity of
the system engineer. The mobility of system engineers as knowledge centres on
the axis between project management and the professional directorate generates
opportunities to realise market opportunities and hence to offer more reliable,
cheaper and yet customised products. These are the integrity-related competencies
that TAMAM developed during the years. The continuous investment in product
families through programme entities only strengthens the value of reusability as a
competence.
Rafael developed social networks and a sense of entrepreneurship support by a
high level of autonomy that was integrated with market knowledge, to realise that
the reusability approach would give a competitive edge over competitors. The
autonomy to create a network of individuals from different projects, to deploy
experts when needed, is a capability that is unique to Rafael. Because of this
capability, Rafael is responsive to its clients and is able to quickly address their
needs.
Thus, differences in organising capabilities are associated with three 'conditions'
for core competencies. In other words, as Hamel (1996) says to top managers:
whatever satisfies these three conditions is your core competence. According to
the business performance analysis undertaken above, the results of the integration
of core capabilities in each company has been satisfying. As seen, YellowTech,
TAMAM and Rafael penetrated new markets, significantly increased their
turnover, and are profitable again. YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael invested in
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developing capabilities that were essential for the fit between their core
competence and the environment. Yet the notion of 'developing capabilities'
would suggest that this process is lengthy. How would theory explain the
differences in cross-project learning in the time-dimension?
This thesis argues that these differences exist because of the starting point of these
companies, which is different and depends on the very first shared histories of
learning in each company (Wenger 1998). Mintzberg (1987) would argue that the
cross-project learning capabilities in 2000 were the result of an incrementalist
approach. in which a continuous and adaptive process has taken place through
small steps and actions, gradually changing shared histories of learning. These
steps are in fact an 'emergent' strategy (Mintzberg and Waters 1985), to be
realised only after a series of events. The learning at YellowTech, TAMAM and
Rafael emerged as these companies realised the results of previous steps that led
to the gradual adaptation of the so-called cross-project learning 'strategy'I''. In line
with Grant's (1995) 'resource-based' theory, the internal resources at
YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael, which include tacit (e.g. know-how of product
families, autonomy) and tangible assets (technologies, equipment), skills and
patterns of co-operation (matrix structure, multi-functional teams), will gradually
transform themselves and change because of the learning process. Perhaps the
latter proposition would mean a shift in the core competencies (Prahalad and
Hamel 1990) of an organisation as the changes in its contexts are realised by the
internal organisational process.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter opened with the following question: what are the mechanisms and
conditions for the implementation of a successful cross-project learning?
10 This argument will be further developed in Chapter 7.
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The above analysis presents three different approaches to cross-project learning
implemented in the case study companies. In addition, an analysis of recent
business performance of the case study companies has been undertaken,
suggesting a successful implementation of cross-project learning. Though each
case study company has introduced a rather different approach to cross-project
learning. by and large the three case study companies have significantly improved
their market and product success since they have pursued the cross-project
learning 'strategy'.
Following this, an analysis of the differences and similarities between the three
studied companies has been provided, suggesting that there are differences in the
way these companies organised their cross-project learning activities. A set of
competitive explanations has then been introduced to conclude that differences
and variation are the result of the different unique resources that a company
possesses and considers as core capability. Also it has been suggested that these
capabilities change and evolve over time during the course of learning and
adaptation that take place in organisations.
The process through which core capabilities change during the course of learning
is at the centre of Chapter 6. Very little is known about the impact that process
innovation has on interrelated, interdependent organisational processes. Thus,
Chapter 6 aims to address the following question: how did the introduction of
cross-project learning and the acceleration of product development impact the
organisation of product development and other organisational processes?
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6 CHAPTER SIX: CROSS-PROJECT LEARNING AS A
DISTURBANCE-PRODUCING SYSTEM: AN ACTIVITY
THEORY PERSPECTIVE
6.1 Introduction
Thus far, Chapter 5 has provided an analysis of the mechanisms and structures
that supported cross-project learning activities in the Israeli electronics defence
industry. The analysis presented in Chapter 5 suggests a great diversity in the
approaches to cross-project learning between the case study companies. Yet,
despite this diversity, the analysis of the case study companies' recent business
performance suggests that the 'strategy' of cross-project learning has significantly
enhanced product and market success in all three companies.
The transformation of the innovation system in the studied compames was
intended to speed up product development processes (Coombs 1998). New tools
and structures were introduced at YellowTech and TAMAM, and the value of
reusability as a strategic cross-project learning process to competitiveness has
grown tremendously across the industry (Markus 2001).
However, how did cross-project learning and the acceleration of product
development impact the product development environment?
To anticipate our conclusions, data suggest that cross-project learning activities
and the acceleration of product development, which emphasise the reusability of
designs, have had a significant impact on expertise development, gradually
eliminating the historical mentoring system. In contrast to the diversity in
approaches to cross-project learning, the data suggest that the three case study
companies have experienced a similar change in the way engineers and managers
develop their expertise and share knowledge.
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Furthermore, the focus on knowledge management and expertise development
processes provides a unique opportunity to examine the nature of the relationships
between two activity systems central to product development. The account reveals
new tensions between these activity systems that have not been reported before,
and offers an opportunity for further developing situated learning theory to take
account of the process of learning in unexpected directions.
Through the lens of activity theory (Leont'ev 1978; Engestrom 1992; Blackler
1995), the impact that cross-project learning and the acceleration of product
development activity have had on the organisation of work in product
development will be analysed. The gradual shift in the organisation of innovations
will be analysed, with an emphasis on tensions and contradictions between two
concurrent though interrelated organisational processes: expertise development
(ED) and knowledge management (KM).
Section 6.2 proposes a theoretical framework to analyse the transformation of
product development from an activity theory perspective. Section 6.3 is devoted to
the innovation process prior to the transformation of product development,
providing a historical context of the studied organisational processes (Engestrom
1992). Section 6.4 provides an activity theory perspective on the transformation of
the innovation system, highlighting the centrality of cross-project learning
initiatives in this process. Section 6.5 analyses the impact that cross-project
learning and the acceleration of the innovation process have had on product
development, expertise development and knowledge management processes.
Lastly, section 6.6 highlights tensions and contradictions between these
organisational processes and engages in discussion of the process through which
activity systems are transformed.
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6.2 An Activity Theory Perspective on Multi-Activity
Environments
The transformation of an innovation system can be studied from numerous and
various angles. Previous studies have mainly emphasised several chief factors
essential for the successful transformation process II. Nevertheless, there is little
known about the impact that the re-organisation of innovation systems might have
on other organisational processes. Perhaps the reason for this neglect is embedded
in the pursuit of superior performances and extraordinary skills with which
Cartesian approaches are obsessed (Engestrom 1992). For example, the study of
expertise by Ericsson and Smith (1991) sought to present a rather stable picture of
skills and performances involved in innovation work, ignoring inconsistencies and
contradictions which are often inherent in expertise systems (Engestrom 1992).
The application of some aspects of activity theory enables the present study to
investigate disturbances and tensions in product development and thus address the
question that opened this chapter: how did cross-project learning and the
acceleration of product development impact on the product development
environment?
Through the analysis of the historical development of the innovation system in the
case study companies, this chapter will examine disturbances and conflicts
generated throughout the change process within and between the two activity
systems under investigation (Blackler et al. 1999).
11 See Slappendel (1996) for a useful organisation of the literature on innovation and factors for a
successful change process. Two distinct studies that emphasise factors contributing to a successful
organisational transformation are Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) and Walton (1987).
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6.3 Multi-Activity System Development in Product Development
: Phase 1
6.3.1 Introduction
Figure 38 illustrates the relationships between expertise development and
know ledge management as two activity systems that coexist within the product
development activity system. In order to distinguish old from new practices, some
kind of historical perspective is necessary (Kuutti 1999). Further, activity systems
change because artifacts, procedures and rules have changed internally
(Engestrom 1992). Tensions and disturbances are generated because of the
continuous self-movement of the innovation system towards a culturally more
advanced activity system, as new procedures, rules , technologies and structures
are introduced, creating contradictions within the activity system and between the
activity system and neighbouring systems (Engestrom 1992).
Phase 1 Phase 2
1960s 1980s 1990s
Figure 38: The Development of an Innovation System
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Two phases will be discussed (see Figure 38). In terms of the time dimension ,
Phases 1 & 2 cannot present a clear break between specific years. This is because
the implementation of cross-project learning took place in different forms and
times in each case study company, as described in Chapter 5. Yet broadly
speaking, Phase 1 describes the years prior to the 1990s, before the collapse of the
Soviet block that was followed by major changes in defence procurement, as
described in Chapter 4~ whereas Phase 2 covers the years after this.
The relations between three activity systems -- product development (central
activity system). expertise development and knowledge management (two
neighbouring activity systems) will be analysed. Product development is defined
as the process through which market opportunity and a set of assumptions about
product technology are transformed into a product available for sale (Krishnan
and Ulrich 2001). Expertise development is the learning process through which
individuals and groups develop skills, know-how, identity, and meaning that
facilitate their participation in organisational activities (Wenger 1998).
Knowledge management is the practice through which the exchange and sharing
of technological knowledge and learning between individuals and groups is
facilitated (Wenger 1998; Lave and Wenger 1991).
Thus, a review of the historical development of PD, ED and KM during the years
of phase 1 will follow.
6.3.2 The Product Development Process in the Israeli Electronics Defence
Industry During Phase 1: The Scientific-Inventor Process
Product development during Phase 1 was characterised by a heavy concentration
on developing a mastery and cutting-edge design of technology and products
(Blackler et al. 1999). Engineers enjoyed a high degree of autonomy to pursue
their interests. An idea to improve or develop a product starts when there is a need
to find a technological solution to a new battlefield problem. The process of new
product development starts when clients request such a solution or need to replace
their old system. In some cases, a new product development cycle starts with the
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company launching self-financed or government-sponsored research. Having
decided to respond to the client's request, engineers start to design the product.
Often. the company allocates engineers to their tasks without knowing whether it
has won the contract. During the tendering process, the company will present a
concept of the complete product design. preferably ready to be tested by the client.
Electronic defence companies believe that a 'Fly Before Buy' strategy -- which
means having a testable system ready during the tender -- gives them a distinct
competitive advantage over their rivals. In order to maintain this competitive
edge, the bidding company will offer one of their existing off-the-shelf products,
to demonstrate the technology and features available at present time. Based on this
product, the bidding company will ensure the client that any additional features
requested by the client will be built into the final product.
In the event of the company winning the bid, it might still be a year before the
contract is signed. This is because of the complex process of approving the
contract in the client's directorate. Both military and government officials must
approve contracts. On both sides there are committees that examine the contract
carefully before the Ministry of Defence approves it. During this time, the client
negotiates financial arrangements with a view to reducing the final cost of the
project. The client also further audits the technological specifications and adapts
them to the stipulated requirements.
The full project activity actually starts only after signing the contract. Only on rare
occasions, for example when the product is an upgraded version of a previously
supplied system, does the company launch a project without signing a contract.
When a contract is signed, the project team is quickly staffed with hardware and
software engineers who are readily available. At this stage the conception of the
product is revised and an updated revision is proposed. This is mainly because
products in this industry have to be tailored to each client. Rarely will the concept
of the revised product be similar to the product demonstrated to the client in the
bidding stage. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, projects during Phase 1
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enjoyed a cost-plus contract system which guaranteed the winning company the
full cover of their R&D costs plus a 10% minimal margin. For this reason, the
winning company often launched a generic R&D effort as there were no
financial constraints against doing so. Secondly, engineers advocated the use of
cutting-edge technologies in new products. The implications for using cutting-
edge technologies in airborne systems are tremendous, mainly because of the
continuous improvement in semiconductor technologies offering much smaller-
sized components. although more condensed in functionality, that allow engineers
to implement more features without needing to physically enlarge the system.
The picture emerging from the stories told by engineers is of a scientific process
that involves a trial-and-error learning mechanism in order to match the system to
the client. Individuals pursue this approach to development mainly because it
gives them the opportunity to explore new technologies or to experiment with new
applications of existing technologies. Thus, in the case study companies designs
often went through endless iterations that changed the original design of the
product. Some of these changes were because of mistakes in the original design.
However, in many cases engineers made changes in order to improve product
performance and add 'bells and whistles' features (Blackler et al. 1999). Hence,
each product was unique and was often developed from scratch, even those from
the same product family.
The phases of system retrofit and the maintenance of software and other parts of
the product are part of the late stages of projects. During these stages, members of
the project team no longer work together but are allocated to other projects.
Hence ad hoc teams are allocated to missions, usually in parallel to other,
activities in which they are involved.
During the course of the project -- which can be anything between two and fifteen
years in this industry, the project team maintains interactions with other groups
outside product development. Sales are involved in negotiations with the client to
agree on the pricing model, while Marketing provide the pricing model.
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Procurement and Production are involved in this process in two simultaneous
stages: when the product design is approved by the client in principal and the
component list is issued to Procurement for purchasing; in parallel, the component
list and detailed assembly instructions are issued to the assembly team in
Production.
It is rare for projects to be regarded as officially finished. Often they are resumed
because clients and companies introduce retrofits, upgrades or a second generation
of the system. However, although a project may stay active for a long time, its
engineers will be allocated to other projects.
Figure 39 suggests that the activity object of product development during Phase 1
was realised as a problem-solving design process resulting in a novel product each
time a project starts, leading to cutting edge technologies and products, although
embodying high costs and often late deliveries.
Technical and organisational competencies of
individuals and groups, trial and error techniques,
electronic equipment, labs
Newcomer and
expert engineer
Developmental
orientation,
mentoring
Project Team
and Other Teams
Outcome:
Cutting edge products,
top quality designs
Tension:
high costs, late deliveries
Design as a process
of problem solving
Matrix Organisation,
Sequential
problem solving
Figure 39: Product Development Activity Phase 1
Though Figure 39 suggests a harmony between individuals, groups and the object
of the activity system through the use of technology, organisational structure and
language, in reality there is internal tension between the elements of the activity.
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For example, the contradiction between use value and exchange value is a
particular problem (Engestrom 1992). In the case study companies, engineers
wanted to spend time on solving problems and innovation but were restricted by
management, who were concerned with deadlines and markets. Nevertheless,
market conditions that saw highly unsophisticated and very forgiving customers
who were willing to pay the cost of the R&D effort, combined with the relatively
loose management of projects in the years of Phase 1, led to a greater focus of
engineers on the innovation process. This resulted in a habitual pattern of late
delivery of projects and high costs associated with R &D projects in this industry
(Blackler et al. 1999).
6.3.3 Expertise Development During Phase 1: The Historical Development of
Legitimate Peripheral Participation and Mentoring Processes
In the years during Phase 1, the expertise development process was based on
mentoring. Learning in the studied companies mainly meant the development of
scientific-invention skills. Engineers were considered as scientists-inventors and
were given the right to pursue their scientific interests (Blackler et al. 1999). This
scientific interest was driven through many years of technology development,
exploration and experiments. As the Head of the Hardware Group at YellowTech
explained:
You cannot teach electronic warfareology at school; neither can you teach it
formally in the organisation. It is something that one understands and develops
during many years ofwork and experience.
Another manager from Rafael added:
Experience is still the most important learning mechanism through which we
developed expertise. Other means of training were not practical for us because
they did not focus on those outcomes we would like to see from our employees.
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And one project manager from TAMAM reinforced the above remarks, stressing
that expertise evolved during the course of time through involvement in projects:
Doing and experiencing is a key issue in developing expertise and knowledge. The
longer H'C are working on projects the more we know. During this time, technicians
and engineers upgraded their knowledge and got a better understanding about
technologies and system configuration.
Though it is not the only learning process that took place in the studied
compames, interviewees tended to emphasise the process through which
newcomers were introduced and encouraged to participate in activities. To
understand the processes involved in developing expertise through a mentoring
learning mechanism, a situated learning view developed by Lave and Wenger
(1991) and also known as Legitimate Peripheral Participation (LPP) was adopted.
This theory offers an alternative view to the cognitive perspective (e.g. Argyris
and Schon 1978) on learning. Lave and Wenger (1991) argue that individuals
develop their knowledge and expertise primarily through participation in activities
within communities to which they belong. In linking their view on learning to
other schools of thought, Lave and Wenger suggest that situated learning offers a
bridge between 'a view according to which cognitive processes (and thus
learning) are primary and a view according to which social practice is the primary,
generative phenomenon, and learning is one of its characteristics' (ibid.: 34).
Legitimate Peripheral Participation, according to Lave and Wenger, is perceived
as a 'descriptor of engagement in social practice that entails learning as an integral
constituent' (ibid.: 35). Gherardi and Nicolini (1999: 5) point out that 'peripheral'
indicates the route that the novice needs to follow in order to gain the respect of
the community, while the idea of 'legitimate participation' stresses the actual and
relevant stages in learning that the novice has to go through in order to achieve the
community's esteem.
Thus, the theory of Legitimate Peripheral Participation helps to explain the
process through which expertise development evolved in the studied organisations
in Phase 1. Engineers and technicians developed their expertise mainly through
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participation in what Kuhn (1970) described as 'social practices', gradually
becoming part of the organisation by assuming more responsibilities and
accomplishing more tasks.
The Head of the Software Group at YellowTech explained:
The tasks 1fe gave new software engineers in the beginning were simple. It could
be either to write a short programme, just a patch to the code or maybe to re-
programme an existing sub-programme. We wanted them to study the system
rather than to achieve results.
This kind of learning gives newcomers the time to acquire knowledge about
products. tools, organisational systems and organisational procedures that
facilitate product development processes (Lave and Wenger 1991). Engineers at
Yellow'Tech described how they developed programming skills for a specific chip
called Xilinx 12. This chip functioned as a signal processor that captured the time
of arrival of the radar pulse, its width, angle of arrival and certain other
parameters. Initially, newcomers were given simple tasks to design only one
function of the Xilinx, such as the block that captured the pulse's time of arrival.
For the newcomers it was a do-able challenge that allowed a rather relaxed
learning process and comfortable introduction to the technology and processes. In
these cases, it was claimed, a veteran engineer would walk the newcomer through
the requirement documentation, explaining the meaning behind each requirement.
Furthermore, the newcomer was given specific instructions on how to proceed and
was often mentored upon completion about the next steps. In one case, one
engineer from YellowTech recalled that when he had been in the company for
only one month and was working on designing one function in an analog card, his
mentor, now the Chief Scientist of the division, reviewed with him the state of his
12 Xilinx is the brand name of the component producer. The technical term for the above chip is
either Gate Array or Programmable Array Logic (PAL).
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work and sympathetically told him to scratch the card. This engineer argued that
the mentor simply justified this by saying:
At least you 'l'e learned how not to design this function.
Progress in becoming an expert was gradual. Usually in the next stage, newcomers
were given tasks that required them to design a number of functions linked
together within the Xilinx. This task required their understanding of the product in
terms of knowing the integrated unit. Further stages in the learning process
challenged engineers to link different electronic cards in one unit and later on to
integrate different units into one system mastered by the software.
The art of designing a sophisticated unit was considered to be highly complex and
to require a deep and thorough understanding of various scientific areas including
physics, electronics and mechanical engineering. Engineers and managers from
the studied companies emphasised the long and slow learning process for
newcomers. One engineer from TAMAM recalled that as a newcomer he worked
with an experienced engineer for almost a year before he was allowed to design
one part of the system. He commented:
We took the time to learn technologies and our line ofproducts.
Problem solving, which lacked any reference in the theory of Situated Learning by
Lave and Wenger (1991), was at the centre of newcomers' learning experience.
Blackler (1999:14) reports that:
[in] order to be able to continue to solve more and more difficult (and interesting)
problems the engineer as scientist inventor needed to develop his or her
professional excellence.
Thus, problem solving and expertise development were joined together in the
studied companies. Highly developed unique expertise contributes to solving
difficult problems in this field, and the engagement in solving complex problems
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assists In developing expertise and a better understanding of the tools and
concepts needed for the task (Engestrom 1999). Data from the interviews
reinforce this argument. One project manager at YellowTech explained:
~Vc encouraged learning through work and in teams. The guys here developed their
knowledge while working and solving problems.
The Head of the Popeye Programme at Rafael articulated the contribution of
problem-solving sessions to the learning process:
Information is not transferred unless there is a problem. We learn only when we
are involved in problem solving [' ..J then we need to consult with someone or
check what we already knoll' about the problem. This is what makes it a learning
process.
Thus, newcomers learned about becoming a master via interaction with others and
through problem solving. Learning also evolved as newcomers acknowledged
their responsibilities and achievements (Lave and Wenger 1991). Following this,
newcomers extended their participation by becoming part of the community's
discourse and by generating achievements and stories (Orr 1990). Identity as
'negotiated experience', 'community membership' and 'learning trajectory'
(Wenger 1998) has also become central to the process through which engineers
and technicians develop their mastery and expertise.
The researcher heard a number of stories that demonstrated this ritual. One
engineer said that he had joined YellowTech after working for Intel for several
years. Obviously he was under the impression that since he was not a new
graduate, he would join the design team fairly quickly. Nevertheless, when he
joined, the first task he was given was to tune an analog-receiving component, a
relatively simple and boring task. This engineer felt insulted that his experience
with Intel was not valued. When he asked his boss about the low-tech task he was
given, he was told that at YellowTech 'we prefer the step-by-step approach. You
will get to design digital cards soon'. He recalled that at first he felt depressed
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about doing this task, but he was determined to succeed. He said that he felt
envious when he saw others working on digital cards, and to keep his morale high
he engaged in conversations with them. To his surprise, he learned that all of them
had been through the same process that started with the same analog-receiver
component. He even learned a few tricks from these colleagues about how to
improve the tuning accuracy. After a relatively short time his manager assigned
him to a project that involved working on a digital system. Later he learned that
some of the people he was having discussions with put in a 'good word' about
him.
Despite its informal role in the Israeli electronics defence industry, mentoring has
become the main learning mechanism to support the inclusion of the newcomer in
the studied companies (Wenger 1998:100), to introduce the newcomer to
procedures, and to create a dynamic involvement in multi-functional work that
enhances outcome-orientated entrepreneurial work and the development of
collective expertise (Engestrom 1992). This ritual was integral to the culture in the
studied companies in Phase 1. As the Head of the Litening project claimed:
First and foremost it was important for us to have the best people in the business.
We invested months in bringing these guys up to speed and it [mentoringJ paid
back well. Most of them stayed with us for many years and helped us to be
successful.
A similar line of argument was expressed by the Chief Scientist at YellowTech,
who compared the current attitude to learning to the approach in the past:
Then [Phase 1] we could spend time mentoring people. The situation was
completely different. I admit that mentoring was good in past times. We would not
be where we are without investing in our people.
In the studied companies mentoring was greatly supported by the shared attitude
and atmosphere of a 'small village' where people knew each other and hence
perceived mentoring as a ritual that everyone goes through. Making mistakes was
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never an indicator of a lack of fitness of the novice. Rather, experienced engineers
and managers accepted mistakes and tolerated failure and sometimes even
supported it (Tushman and Nadler 1996). Mistakes were justified by the
opportunity they provided to learn how to do things properly, despite the costs
involved in recovering from them.
Thus, mentoring In the studied companies, from the perspective of legitimate
peripheral participation theory, is perceived as the mechanism through which
individuals develop expertise. From the engineer's viewpoint, the object of this
activity is to form identity, develop mastery and participate in the innovation
process.
An activity system model presents the components of expertise development
activity in Phase 1 (Figure 40).
Long-term development projects,
trial and error learning techniques,
laboratories, electronic equipment, research reports
Troubleshooting
sessions in lab
Outcome:
Collective expertise
Tension:
High costs associated with
learning, duplicate efforts
Develop Knowing,
mastery
Newcomer and
engineer
Become an expert,
fonn identity .M::.:.... ..x. .....
Project Team
and Other Teams
Figure 40: Expertise Development Activity During Phase 1
The expertise development activity was by no means free of internal
contradictions and tensions. Expertise development in its form in Phase 1 involved
high costs associated with the learning process. In addition, the loose management
of technology and the desire of individuals to learn and experiment with new
6-177
technologies drove them to develop solutions that already existed in the company.
The tension between exploration and exploitation presented by March (1999) is
one factor that may explain the internal contradictions in the expertise
development activity.
In the next section, knowledge management as an organisational process will be
reviewed and analysed.
6.3.4 Knowledge Management in Product Development During Phase 1: The
Historical Development of Knowledge Sharing
Knowledge management processes in the Israeli electronics defence industry
during Phase 1 were unplanned and informal in nature. Furthermore, engineers
and managers described those processes as related mainly to knowledge sharing;
however, closely they were associated with expertise development and learning.
Possibly one reason for this is that Information Systems (IS) had just started to
emerge in this industry, which also meant that knowledge systems (such as
GroupWare systems) and repositories (such as knowledge base for specific
domain information) had not yet been developed (Markus 2001). Therefore,
knowledge sharing based on social interactions (Tushman and Nadler 1996) and
participation (Lave and Wenger 1991) in problem solving took place between
individuals and projects during Phase 1 as an informal, unplanned practice. As one
engineer from YellowTech explained:
Sharing knowledge was something we used to do every day. We were excited about
our products, the cutting edge technology, and wanted to be involved and help.
Sharing knowledge allowed us to be involved.
Another project manager from TAMAM added:
The day I joined TAMAM I realised that here you don't keep secrets. You cannot
work together if you do not share your knowledge with others.]. ..} You get to the
point where you might risk the product [if you do not share knowledge}.
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The Chief Engineer at Rafael also referred to this point:
In research-driven organisations such as Rafael. sharing knowledge is essential.
Designing systems is II complex task and requires everybody to pull together.
One enabler of knowledge sharing was the autonomy (Handy 1976) that engineers
were granted by management in the years of Phase 1. One project manager at
TAMAM observed:
Back in those days. pressure to finish projects on time was mild. To be honest,
sometimes ll'e did know when the deadline of the project was. All we cared about
was that the design worked in the field.
Engineers and managers were given the autonomy to explore solutions and engage
in work and discussions with others in order to ensure that the best solution would
be applied in the product. By these means, knowledge was shared. One project
manager from Rafael explained:
If it were needed, we would have spent days with other teams, working together to
help them solve problems with their project.
Another project manager from YellowTech described how he spent time working
on another project and contributing his experience:
[' ..J because I had run testing before, the project manager of the other project
approached me and asked whether I could join them to do testing. At that time I
was responsible for another project but I knew that these guys needed me. I
decided to spend two weeks helping these guys in the testing site in the south of
Israel, showing them how to run testing. Nobody made a fuss of it.
The Chief Scientist at YellowTech justified the autonomy engineers were granted
in those years, saying that:
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Time and money wt're not the issue for most ofour clients. The conception was that
our systems have to be smarter than those of the enemy's [ } It . b
. '" was Just a out
technology. Nobody bothered then whether the project would take another six
months or would cost a few more millions.
He went on to suggest that:
Back then engineers could easily have spent a couple of weeks working with other
teams in order to overcome a specific problem. That [working with other groups}
was the way we shared knowledge.
This was explained by one engineer from Rafael:
You have to understand the atmosphere in those years. People did not hold
information mainly because of that atmosphere. We were doing something different
from the rest of the industry. We were at the cutting edge of technology, doing
national projects, working in secrecy. Like a special task force for the Israeli
Defence Forces.
Motivation was another enabler of participation in knowledge sharing. It was
indicated that the level of motivation was high in the studied companies in the
years of Phase 1. The image of being a 'special team' helped to boost engineers'
motivation. In addition, salary, job security and working conditions were reported
as satisfying employees during the 1980s and the early 1990s (Herzberg et al.
1959). The Human Resource Manager at YellowTech referred to the motivation
issue, noting that:
The company was doing fine then (during Phase 1). Negotiation with trade unions
used to take a couple ofdays and every couple of years we compensated employees
with a rise that exceeded the average in the market. We had a training budget and
a special budget for social events. People were highly motivated then.
Expectancy Theory (Vroom 1964) explains the individual's motivation In
organisations. Motivation, it is argued, is based heavily on people's expectations.
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However. these expectations do not take place in isolation. It is suggested that
expectations evolve based on the individual's interactions with the environment
(Fudge and Schlacter 1999). Therefore, the high motivation in the Israeli
electronics defence industry during Phase 1 was based on the personnel policy of
promoting and rewarding individuals and investing in their personal development.
Some interviewees kept mentioning the relationship between power and
knowledge in the context of knowledge sharing (Pfeffer 1992; Kirkbride 1992).
Some argued that power games and politics existed from day one, mainly because
of personality clashes and the personal ambitions of individuals that were not
always fulfilled and sometimes frustrated these individuals (Myers and Briggs
1962). A few cases were described of some team players who were labelled non-
cooperative individuals. However, it was agreed by all interviewees that power
games in terms of individuals holding information related to a project were rare.
For example, the Head of the Popeye Programme at Rafael claimed that there was
a good atmosphere around knowledge sharing in his programme:
I cannot remember politics and power games at Rafael as we have now. I think we
started to see political games at Rafael only when the Israeli government started to
talk about changing the company's orientation and turning Rafael into a profitable
business [around 1995}.
To conclude, sharing knowledge in the studied companies emerged as an activity
system which realised its motives in both product development and expertise
development. Through this organisational process engineers mentored others
while solving problems, and shared with others their understanding of the
organisational procedures and rules. Engineers were motivated by their desire to
reinforce their identity, to gain accreditation for their mastery by demonstrating
their knowledge, and to mentor others. In addition, engineers were motivated to
share knowledge in order to extend their participation in the innovation process.
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Figure 41: Knowledge Management Activity during Phase 1
There were some sources of tension in the knowledge management activity. The
contradiction between use value and exchange value was especially problematic
(Engestrom 1992). For example, the practice of time management and task
management by engineers suffered from a very loose approach. In particular,
management was rarely involved in the prioritisation of tasks and people, and they
left this terrain for the engineers.
Thus far three activities have been reviewed from a historical point of view. In the
next section, an analysis will be presented to show that during Phase 1 expertise
development and knowledge management coexisted in harmony within product
development.
6.3.5 The Coherence between Expertise Development and Knowledge
Management During Phase 1
In contrast to the evident tension within expertise development and knowledge
management, tension between these two organisational processes was not evident
(see Figure 42).
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Figure 42: The Sources of Coherence between Expertise Development and Knowledge
Management during Phase 1
It seems, then, that expertise development and knowledge management coexisted
in harmony and maintained coherence within product development in the years of
Phase 1. We can identify a number of elements that support our observation.
6.3.5.1 Inter-Activity GoallMotive
There were interrelations between the goal of knowledge management and the
motive of expertise-development activity (Leont'ev 1978). Experienced engineers
shared knowledge with newcomers in order to mentor them, to include them in the
socialisation process and to upgrade their technical mastery. Newcomers sought
mastery and appreciation of their social position within the organisation and of
their technical capabilities in problem-solving sessions. These two dimensions
went hand in hand and were complementary. One way of explaining this
observation is to use Weick's and Roberts's (1983) conception of how individuals
and groups pursue a shared objective through the constitution of a collective mind.
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6.3.5.2 Inter-Activity Mediating Artifacts
Mediating artifacts and processes of knowledge management correspond to
mediating artifacts and processes of expertise development (Engestrom 1992).
Individuals engaging in knowledge management activities make use of the same
material tools (e.g. oscilloscopes, laboratories), concepts (e.g. mastery, autonomy,
socially constructed knowledge), language (e.g. engineering terminology), and
techniques to learn and share (e.g. problem-solving techniques) as individuals who
participate in expertise development. The use of artifacts and processes is related
to the level of operations in Leont'ev's (1978) analysis. People make use of these
artifacts when they need to define how they are going to achieve a goal (Leont'ev
1978: 65). The creation of new tools and artifacts is what makes possible the
transformation of the activity (Engestrom 1999:10). Thus, understanding the
transformation of an activity is intimately associated with the use of artifacts at the
operations level of human activity. The use of artifacts in knowledge management
seems to be linked to two activities: expertise development and product
development. Leont'ev (1978:64) explains this by arguing that 'one and the same
action may accomplish various activities and may transfer from one activity to
another. showing its relative independence in this way'. According to Engestrom
(1999), this transferability of action across activities takes place at the operational
level through the change in material tools.
6.3.5.3 Inter-Activity Outcome and Tension
The outcome and tension generated following knowledge management actions
corresponds to the tension introduced by expertise-development activity. We
observed that such activity generated tension around issues relating to the high
costs of learning, and often led to excessive technology development.
Complementarily, the tension ansmg from knowledge-sharing activities
demonstrated a rather loose organisation of people and tasks, leading to inefficient
management of tasks and time. These tensions represent the inefficiencies that the
studied companies had to bear during Phase 1.
6-184
We sought an explanation of this in Activity Theory, which would explain the
meaning of corresponding interactions between the outcome and tension of two
concurrent activity systems. Blackler (1993: 871) theorises about the relationships
between activity systems. arguing that 'activity systems do not exist in isolation
one from another: the outputs of one system provide the input to another'. Yet
Blackler and his colleagues (1999) tend to focus on the sequential development of
one activity system, the engineering system, over time, attempting to include
themes related to knowledge management and expertise development under the
engineering activity system umbrella. The present study sympathises with their
proposed analysis of the transformation of a single activity system over time and
with the intention to enlarge the unit of analysis to comprise a network of multiple
activity systems: however, the researcher is in favour of understanding the
'internal systemic connections' (Leont'ev 1978) between concurrent activity
systems (Engestrom 2000).
Engestrom (1992), in addition, does not provide assistance In explaining the
systemic connections between outcome and tension of concurrent activity
systems. Engestrom (1992) suggests four levels of interactions, which are in fact
contradictions, between activity systems: (i) inner contradictions, within each
constituent component of the central activity system; (ii) between the constituents
of the central activity system; (iii) between object/motive of the dominant form of
the central activity and the object/motive of a culturally more advanced form of
the central activity; and (iv) between the central activity and its neighbouring
activities. Despite this useful mapping of the contradiction network that may arise
in a multiple activity environment, Engestrom (1992) does not interpret the
meaning of systemic interactions between concurrent activity systems, in
particular with regards to the meaning of corresponding tension between two
activity systems.
Thus, this leaves the present study with an unresolved theme needing further
investigation. Perhaps, this theme raises the following questions: how can one
interpret data suggesting that the tension of two concurrent activity systems
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correspond? And what are the implications for future transformations of these
activity systems?
6.3.6 Conclusion: The Dominance of the Expertise Development Process
The data presented above suggest that expertise development and knowledge
management as two concurrent activity systems coexisted in harmony within
product development. Furthermore, these two activity systems evolved based on
social interactions. developing knowing and learning as socially constructed
phenomena.
The corresponding goals, artifacts and tensions between expertise development
and know ledge management demonstrate the close interactions between these two
activity systems. These two activity systems were imminently interconnected and
interrelated to the point that perhaps separating them would be almost impossible.
Engineers shared knowledge to develop expertise and they developed expertise as
they were sharing knowledge.
Yet, activity theory fails to explain the empirical data observed in this study. The
meaning of corresponding internal tensions of concurrent activity systems,
observed in the present study, has been ignored by activity theorists so far. Before
an explanation is offered, there is a need to complete the picture of these
systematic interactions between activity systems during Phase 2. Only then
perhaps, will this study be able to draw a conclusion.
In addition, the learning theory associated with activity theory is based on Lave
and Wenger's (1991) Peripheral Legitimate Participation concept. Though we
sympathise with Lave's and Wenger's (1991) situated learning theory, we have to
acknowledge that the theory is one-dimensional and in one direction, i.e. from
novice to expert. It does not provide any reference or explanations of learning in
unexpected directions when individuals and groups, sometimes novice but often
experienced, encounter unknown situations -- situations that require novices and
experienced individuals to get up to speed with new knowledge, propose solutions
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in no time and sometimes improvise, without having a clear understanding of the
motive that drives the activity of which they are a part.
In many ways Phase .2 symbolises a rather new era in the case study companies,
characterised by new values (market-driven instead of research-driven values) that
are diffused in the studied companies, by the introduction of new concepts to
manage product development (reusability instead novelty) and by new processes
and tools that facilitated this change process. Thus, the following sections will
provide empitical data suggesting that individuals and groups generate learning in
unknown and unexpected directions. It will be argued that the introduction of
cross-project learning and the acceleration of product development processes in
the Israeli electronics defence industry produced new and unknown situations for
both the skilled and novice workforce in the studied companies, in particular with
regard to knowledge management practices. Thus, the following sections will
focus on analysing the impact of cross-project learning on expertise development
and knowledge management. The question that will be addressed here is: how did
individuals and groups respond to the transformation of the innovation system?
6.4 Cross-Project Learning Initiatives and the Acceleration of
Product Development Processes in the Israeli Electronics
Defence Industry
Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a growing pressure to regulate
and accelerate product development processes. From the perspective of activity
theory, it is argued that some rapid changes were introduced in the predominant
object of product development activity (Blackler 1993). The motivation for these
sets of changes will be discussed in the following section. The succeeding section
will discuss the changes in product development from the viewpoint of activity
theory. Then, expertise development and knowledge management during phase 2
will be examined. The concluding section will consider the implications of the
main changes during Phase 2 for the study of the transformation of activity
systems.
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6.4.1 Reinventing the Wheel: The Motivation for Change
Eldred and McGrath (1997) discussed in two consecutive papers the challenges
facing product-development and technology-development teams in trying to build
a coherent process that integrates both sets of activities in extensive R&D
organisations. One of the areas that they considered as especially challenging was
the perception by the technology development groups that the product-
development team (ibid.:30) 'was either not technically capable of receiving the
incoming technology or was trying to "reinvent the wheel"'. As seen above, the
latter perception, i.e. duplicate technological development efforts by horizontal
teams, became a common practice in the Israeli electronics defence industry
during the years of Phase 1.
There is more than one factor which led to the evolution of the 'reinventing the
wheel practice in the Israeli electronics defence industry'<. Stories from engineers
demonstrate the breadth of the 'reinventing the wheel' phenomenon. Similar
technologies were developed simultaneously, sometimes in two nearby
laboratories, but the teams did not know about each other's efforts. One project
manager at YellowTech explained:
All these vears (Phase 1) we were driven by the concept ofproviding 'the best': the
best technology, the best quality, and the best solution. Clients were willing to pay
and we focused on developing technologies. In some cases, some projects
reinvented the wheel. Management did not care much because the company was
doing well at that time.
Another engineer from Rafael argued that this practice evolved mainly because of
internal competition. He explained:
13 See section 4.4 for a detailed description of changes in defence markets
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Rafael is the Israeli Defence R&D Laboratory. You get this title only if you have
been proven to provide top quality, sophisticated technological solutions. Our
people \\'cre expected to excel and }I'ere even evaluated based on their
'sophistication '. To prove how good they were, they developed from scratch
solutions that we alreadv had ill house.
The case in TAMAM was no different. Engineers and managers provided similar
examples when speaking about duplicate efforts in technologies, often referring to
the phenomenon as 'reinventing the wheel'. As one software engineer observed:
In software it is much more difficult to reuse the base code. And yet, now we see
that ten years ago H'e did not even bother considering an approach to reusability.
As seen in Chapter 5, since the middle of the 1990s the Israeli electronics defence
industry has urged its engineers to reuse concepts and technologies. For example,
in the six studied projects, interviewees stated that now they extensively reuse
concepts and technologies in their final product. In one project at YellowTech, the
project manager described how after six years of development, the team decided
to scrap their microprocessor and use one that was developed by a different
project. One interviewee estimated that 80% of total development has been based
on reused concepts and technologies since 1995.
6.4.2 Context in Activity Theory
In activity theory, context is a process and not a set of factors. Furthermore, as
Lave (1996: 17) argues 'activity is its own context', reiterated by Engestrom
(1996:67) who suggests that 'contexts are activity systems'.
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Figure ..+3: Cl.)ntextualism in Activity Theory: The Internalisation of Market Changes
Thus, from the activity theory perspective, changes in defence markets need to be
realised as an activity system that interacts with product development activity (see
Figure -+3). Contexts are neither containers of given problems and knowledge
domains nor are they situationally created experiential spaces. Rather, contexts
integrate the subject, the object and the instruments involved in an activity system
(Engestrom 1996).
However, accepting the notion that a context is an activity system, one has to
wonder how such an activity system, which is often external to the organisational
activity system network, is internalised, diffused and turned into action?
Activity theorists (e.g. Blackler et al. 1999; Engestrom 1996; Lave 1996) suggest
that any activity system is connected to other activity systems through all its
components. It is also argued that the injection of a strong new factor into one of
the activity system components will emphasise the contradiction between that
component and other component of the system, leading to further disturbances
within the 'injected' activity system. Innovations will follow tension and
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disturbances as individuals attempt to overcome 'persistent mistakes', resulting in
the transformation of the activity system (Engestrom 1996).
This means that by observing tension and contradiction, one should assume that a
'contextual' activity system has injected a strong novel factor into another activity
system, gradually transforming the latter.
The following section explains, from an activity theory perspective, the injection
of a strong factor into product development that has triggered the transformation
of this activity system and disturbed the coexistence between expertise
development and knowledge management activity systems.
6.4.3 Avoid Reinventing the Wheel: The Change Process
The studied companies set about their task not just to eliminate technological
duplication but also to use and reuse existing technologies and products from the
same family in future products. The chief objective was to accelerate product
development cycles and reduce costs, goals that aimed to enhance their
competitiveness. Many of the changes were in the areas of organisational
structure, project management practices, communications and the redefinition of
the roles of managers and engineers in the innovation process. In addition, new
technologies were also introduced, such as Computer Aided Design (CAD)
applications, Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) applications, and Project
Management applications. However, changes in organisational structures and
processes were reported as the most aggressive and effective in targeting the
above objectives. These changes were widely described and analysed in Chapter
5.
The metaphors used by engineers and managers to describe technological
development were strongly associated with the chief problem these companies
were experiencing (Bradshaw 1992). For example, almost all interviewees
referred to the issue of excessive and duplicate technological development as the
'reinventing the wheel' syndrome. The solution to this problem was coined by
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these interviewees as 'avoid reinventing the wheel'. Using this metaphor made it
clear to engineers what they were expected to do and what were the desired results
from this change process (Weick and Roberts 1993).
Thus, the realisation of changes in markets was injected into product development
in the form of a metaphor suggesting that the solution to excessive technological
development was the efficiency that the slogan 'avoid reinventing the wheel' had
to offer. Obviously, the scope of the actions involved in 'avoid reinventing the
wheel' is far more broad than just reusing technological platforms and designs. As
seen in Chapter 5, numerous and various mechanisms were implemented in order
to satisfy management's slogan 'avoid reinventing the wheel'.
Of particular interest in the following sections is the impact that the introduced
mechanisms have had during Phase 2 on three concurrent, although interrelating,
activity systems: product development, expertise development and knowledge
management.
6.5 The Impact on Product-development, Expertise-Development
and Knowledge-Management Activity Systems during Phase
2
Solutions to past problems may themselves become the source of future
difficulties (Blackler et al. 1999: 28). In the Israeli electronics defence industry the
introduction of the above initiatives triggered a transformation chain reaction of
organisational processes within product development. Of more interest is the
directions that expertise development and knowledge management have taken
following the above initiatives. However, because expertise development and
knowledge management take place in the context of product development, it is
first necessary to describe the impact on product development.
6-192
6.5.1 The Product-Development Activity System during Phase 2: An Accelerated
Development Process
The product-development activity system experienced a growing pressure to
change its object of activity during Phase 2. Project teams were urged to
accelerate the product-development cycle, reduce costs and rapidly address client
requirements by applying such solutions as reusability. These processes and the
impact on product and market success were extensively reviewed in Chapter 5,
undermining a rather successful contribution of these initiatives to business
performance.
However, as argued before, rapid changes in the conception of the activity system
often generate tension between the elements of the system (Blackler 1993).
Reservations were also expressed by a number of interviewees with regard to the
new conception of the activity system. In particular, some areas were identified as
problematic, indicating the complex situation that individuals and teams ran into
when they were required to cope with new, often interrelated, processes.
For example, project managers and engineers were not comfortable with the
approach of 'tying up all loose ends' in the first stages of the project (Kerzner
1995). They argued that product development by nature requires an approach that
is receptive to continuous changes in design. Engineers argued that now they get
the feeling from management and Sales that project teams should not make
changes and should 'stick' to the design agreed in the conception phase. Changes,
engineers argued, have been and will be introduced after the conception phase
because of interactions with clients and recent technological development.
Blackler and his colleagues (1999:22) explain this situation by stating that 'the
design process is by nature a journey of discovery'. However, Sales and top
management argued against this perspective, saying that changes after the
conception phase jeopardise deadlines and increase costs. The Head of the
Hardware Group at YellowTech provided his view on last-minute changes:
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Modifications to inventory and electronics design sheets will be required and the
instructions to the assembly line will have to be updated. These are, in many cases,
unneccssarv costs.
Because of changes in hardware-generated overheads within the studied
companies. often problems in hardware found their solution in software changes.
Hardware engineers justify the handover of design problems to the software
domain by arguing that changes in software are less tangible and do not require
changes in inventory, design sheets or assembly- line instructions. Hence, to avoid
negotiations with Sales, who tend to bring last-minute changes to projects, project
managers (who are usually hardware engineers) tend to push these changes on to
the software team.
In return, software engineers expressed their frustration with this situation,
claiming that Sales tends to agree to implement software changes because they do
not understand what is needed. By taking this approach, Sales in fact legitimises
project managers' attitudes to meeting any new requirement or sometimes dealing
with poor system performance through software changes. One software engineer
from Rafael claimed:
These changes are quite major for us. You change one place and the entire
performance of the system might be impacted.
The Head of the Software Group at YellowTech reiterated this view:
Everybody is pointing fingers at us as the reason for delays in projects. They do not
understand that making changes in software is like making changes in hardware.
Any patch has a tremendous impact on the system.
The tension between those involved in product development reached the point that
software engineers at TAMAM requested the Head of the Division to consider
them for the role of project manager. One software engineer at TAMAM
explained that part of their motivation to become project manager was:
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[Their} desire to control the development process.
He explained that the software in his project accounts for more than 50% of the
total man-hours invested in the project, and yet a hardware engineer is 'running
the show'.
On the other hand, project managers argued that they were left with no other
choice but to make changes in the software. They put the blame on management
and Sales, who were pushing them to get the specification of the product to the
client in a very short time. One project manager at TAMAM explained:
The most important stage (of the project) is the beginning of the project, during
which 5S1c of the project time defines the remaining 95% of the project.[' ..J this
stage has shrunk tremendously in recent years.
Lastly, project managers claimed that they were now spending more time on
numerous meetings and design reviews that aimed to transfer knowledge and
ensure that the project teams were reusing concepts and technologies. They felt
frustrated because it seemed to them that the primary goal was now 'to reuse'
concepts rather than develop products. Project managers also claimed that they
felt trapped in the 'reusability' circle, meaning that they often chose to reuse
components because of the excessive time they spent on discussing this option. In
fact, some claimed that in some cases, having reused some components, they
realised that their decision to do so in their project was not necessarily wise and
did not save them time.
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Figure ..+..+: The Product-Development Activity System during Phase 2
Figure -t.-t. presents the emerging interactions between individuals and groups
during Phase 2. It is noticeable that the activity of product development has
changed. New tools and mediating artifacts have been introduced, making the
transformation of the activity possible (Engestrom 1999). The object of the
activity. often described as enhancing product development processes, has
introduced an orderly process in which individuals, through language games and
the use of the metaphor of 'reinventing the wheel " have become aware of the
collective motivation of the activity (Leont'ev 1978; Weick and Roberts 1983).
Actions directed towards reusability have helped to achieve the complex task of
enhancing the product-development process for new products. However, tension
is evident in particular between software and hardware engineers, mainly in terms
of their accountability for last-minute changes.
In addition to the changes in product-development activity, there has been an
impact on expertise-development and knowledge-management processes. The two
following sections will describe these organisational processes during Phase 2.
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6.5.2 The Expertise-Development Organisational Process during Phase 2
The acceleration of the innovation system has reduced mentoring and changed the
conception of the expertise-development process. Interviewees described a
learning process still mainly based on situated learning rituals 14 (Lave and Wenger
1991), although also strongly associated with the emerging product- development
motive.
Newcomers who have joined project teams during Phase 2 report that they have
learned the system they were working on fairly quickly. Most of them have
become involved in design from the early stage of working with the company and
were asked to take design decisions after a relatively short time. For example, two
young engineers from YellowTech described their first days with the firm. They
said that they were given a task to design one specific feature after a couple of
days in the company, and were told by their boss that if they did not understand
what they were asked to do they should ask for help. Both argued that this was the
best way to learn the system. They acknowledged that part of this approach was
because of the tremendous pressure that the project was facing to meet a major
deadline.
One experienced engineer from the Popeye project at Rafael explained the
difference between the present and the past:
When I arrived at the company, I was given guidance on the job and had the time
to digest my role and my responsibilities. Today we have less time to devote to
mentoring. We are busy with our work and focusing on daily results. The new guys
are thrown into the deep end and need to learn how to swim quickly.
Five interviewees from the studied companies were newcomers whose projects
were involved in reusing technological components. They report that their
14 Described in detail in section 6.3.3.
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familiarity with the reused technology has been acquired fairly quickly. They
describe the process through which they have learned about the technology.
Usually, according to two interviewees from Rafael, they would join a senior
engineer who led the reusability effort at meetings with other project teams to
discuss the compatibility of the design, system performance and the technological
platform used to develop the design. The other three interviewees, two from
YellowTech and one from TAMAM, describe a rather different approach during
which they joined Design Review sessions during which the option to reuse
components or a technological platform was raised by senior managers or system
engineers.
When asked about their understanding of the system after these sessions, they
reported that the sessions were important in helping them to become educated and
to engage in discussions and debates about the specific design on the table. These
discussions revolved around a specific problem, and the analysis of the solution
was also specific and problem-solving orientated. It is also necessary to mention
that none of the interviewees was involved in modifying the design to fit the new
system configuration. One project manager explained this as follows:
Not everyone can do this work [modify the design of a reused technology]. You
really need to understand the history of the system. One touches one place and the
rest of the system can be affected. We cannot afford these mistakes.
The development of gaining know ledge of reused components for experienced
engineers has also revolved around meetings and Design Reviews. Only when the
reused component was from the same product family did engineers prefer to
proceed in their product family laboratories15. Experienced engineers also reported
that the introduction of a solution was very focused and aimed at the potential
15 See section 5.4.2.2 for further elaboration about the organisation of projects according to their
product family.
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application of this solution in a new design. One project engineer from
YellowTech described the process:
Often before the meeting we would exchange some material to make sure that the
other project [base project] understood the system requirements and for us to have
a clue about the components that they had used in the card. Then, we would meet
in the 'sanctuary' [the small conference room at YellowTech] and go over the
design sheets. Usually the first 30 minutes was for the base project to describe the
functionality and then 15 minutes were for us to ask questions. In my case there
were four meetings before we started to make modifications in the design.
These actions were mainly directed at the achievement of successful and enhanced
product-development activity. though they were in essence making use of tools
and artifacts related to expertise development. The growing emphasis on quick
results has raised concern among engineers and technicians with regard to their
personal development. A few engineers at YellowTech argued that following the
growing concentration on reused components and products, in particular within
the product family, they feel that they get fewer opportunities to learn about new
technologies. In particular, technicians and engineers who were previously
involved in R&D expressed concern that they were excluded from the design
work because of the excessive reuse of technologies. One technician at
YellowTech expressed this anxiety:
We don't have time to learn new developments any more. We just deliver systems.
We have become the blue-collar workers of the company.
His boss, the Head of the Hardware Group at YellowTech, justified the approach,
saying that:
We cannot afford the luxury of everybody being part of the learning process in the
organisation. It is too expensive. We had to take some tough decisions about who
would be up-to-date with technologies and who would be more on the production
side.
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A similar frustration was expressed by an engineer from TAMAM, who stated
bluntly:
Everybody here is telling me 'don't reinvent the wheel', check what we have and
lise it. It is always like that when we start a project. My boss [system engineer]
asks me to 'borrow applications from other projects. We all use the same
microprocessors and write in the same program language so it is easy to 'borrow'.
The thing is that l learn l'cry little from this.
Solving problems and engaging in troubleshooting, which used to be the stage for
the mentoring of newcomers and experienced engineers, was described as a 'war
against the clock' by one engineer from Rafael. He explained that:
Troubleshooting should not take long these days. We have deadlines to meet and in
many cases the technology is not new.
Furthermore, engineers and technicians stated that management and Sales push
them to provide 'a solution' rather than 'the solution' to problems in design. As
one system engineer at YellowTech commented:
We never get to the bottom ofproblems. Instead, what we do here is 'put out fires '.
Management breathe on our necks, asking us to finish the development when we
are still working on problems. No wonder that we always end up having many
'stitches' [corrections] on our cards and always have to go through a retrofit
stage.
Written research reports, which were another avenue to develop expertise for
young and experienced engineers, were replaced by product configuration
documents in the three studied companies between 1995 and 1997. Research
reports were written by engineers in order to document their experiments and
results. These reports served an internal audience who were curious to understand
the development process of the technology. The work on research reports has
received less focus in recent years, and project managers are more concerned
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about delivering product-specification and product configuration documents,
which are part of the delivery package to clients.
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Figure 45: The Expertise-Development Activity System during Phase 2
The paradigm shift in the product-development activity system has impacted on
the expertise-development activity system. Speeding up the product- development
processes has resulted in reduced mentoring (Blackler et al. 1999). Also, concerns
about personal development are one of the key results of the transformation of
expertise development. Another area in which confusion was expressed was the
lack of guidance for new and emerging groups, such as Sales, Marketing and
ASIC. Areas such as job definition and the definition of responsibilities for new
groups were elusive and created confusion and frustration. Individuals lacked the
necessary tools and did not even know about the need for specific tools to do their
job properly, which often generated debates within groups and across the entire
organisation. It seems that expertise development has now shifted towards
individual effort rather than group endeavour.
To conclude, expertise development as an evident process has become a set of
actions realising the product development motive. New mediating artifacts (e.g.
product configuration reports), concepts (e.g. reusability) and processes (e.g.
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learning by doing) have been introduced to allow the transformation of the
previous expertise development activity from an object-orientated activity to a
goal-directed set of actions.
Changes in product development have also affected the knowledge- management
process. In the next section we will review this impact.
6.5.3 The Knowledge-Management Organisational Process during Phase 2
The enforcement of the reusability strategies in product development has affected
knowledge-management processes in the studied companies. As described above,
individuals and groups were expected to engage in knowledge exchange sessions
which would facilitate the transfer of concepts and technologies between project
teams (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; Nobeoka 1995). A set of new actions
involving new mediating artifacts and processes was introduced by individuals
and teams to enable the transformation of knowledge management. However,
according to the field data, the motive for these actions was somewhat confusing.
On the one hand, engineers saw the motive as closely associated with the
reusability strategy. On the other hand, management saw knowledge transfer
actions as associated with the enhanced product-development process. Despite this
uncertainty, knowledge management has changed from a collection of actions and
artifacts associated with knowledge sharing in Phase 1 to a more orderly
knowledge-transfer process during Phase 2.
As seen above, new processes and mediating artifacts were introduced In
knowledge-management processes during Phase 2. Yet the experience of
individuals participating in knowledge transfer has varied.
Two different routines emerged from the field data for knowledge-transfer
processes. One is the transfer of technology between projects of the same product
family, and the second is that between two projects of two different product
families. The following examples took place at YellowTech; however, similar
patterns were observed at TAMAM and Rafael.
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The routine for the first case is based on the experience acquired at Light Systems
Programme. The transfer of designs was considered successful by members of the
team and management. The project manager estimated that the entire activity,
involving the understanding of the problem, seeking a solution within the group,
and, once it was found, completing the action by making some changes, did not
take more than a couple of weeks. In addition, the transfer of the design from one
team to another provoked only a few debates about some specific features and
their application in the new design. These were resolved quickly. The project
manager summarised the experience as follows:
It was a good experience. The fact that the solution came from our 'family' made it
l'ery easy to implement. We know each other's work and have already worked
together on problems in the past.
The second example is from The Galilee Rose Project, where the design of this
project was transferred to another project from a different product family. This
process experienced more difficulties, though it was still considered as successful
by management. The project engineer of the receiving project described the
process of knowledge transfer that he was involved in with another project. The
emphasis in his description was on the ambiguity of procedures for knowledge
transfer, the lack of clear definition of responsibility, the role that each party plays
in the process, and the priority that this process is given by both parties:
[l} had to chase this guy for a couple of weeks before we could sit down and start
nailing down some issues. But even then we ran into arguments about almost any
issue. First he got defensive when I asked him why they designed the TOA [Time Of
Arrival} function this way. Later on he had to run to another meeting, and finally
he asked one of the junior engineers to walk me through the design sheets.
In the end the project engineer from the receiving project was asked to work out
the design by himself and raise any questions if he did not understand specific
areas in the design. The project engineer from the receiving project complained:
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I was left alone with a document that did not say much about the design but rather
gave me the general spec of the system. I managed to go over the missing bits and
eventually understood the electronics card completely. Looking back at this
experience I am not sure I would like to do it again.
The system engineer from the transmitting project provided his view on the same
event:
How can I transfer knowledge that was developed in three years of problem
solving, debates, decisions and sometimes without any systematic methodology?
The trouble is that we are asked to reuse components but they [management] do
not understand what it means.
He went on to suggest that transferring a product design is not really the transfer
of the knowledge that is embedded in the product. In fact, the engineer's
knowledge of the product (Blackler 1995) or the tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1967;
Nelson and Winter 1982) that he or she possesses about the product is at the
centre of the transfer process. Other engineers suggested the same and implied
that the transferability of knowledge was not trivial. They did not explicitly refer
to the implicit side of knowledge but repeatedly stated that 'it is not enough to go
over the design sheets in order to understand the design' (interview source).
Thus, the knowledge about a skill which has evolved as a socially constructed
process as part of learning and knowledge-sharing in the years prior to Phase 2 has
changed meaning and lost the context within which these skills have evolved
(Blackler 1995). Suddenly, skills and information have been seen by management
as a pragmatic object that can be moved from one place to another, like a ball
(Hosking and Morley 1991). The practicality of transferring a design from one
project to another seemed attractive and simple to management. This
transferability of knowledge as a concept was also promoted by the diffusion of
CAD technologies, which made it possible to store and easily retrieve design
sheets from one central point. The field data provided three examples of
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knowledge transfer, and in all of these examples a rather technical process was
illustrated, putting the transfer of the design sheets in the middle of the process.
Management and the Sales team in the studied companies perceived the
reusability strategy as a generally positive move. The Head of the Popeye
Programme at Rafael did not see any problem with the process. Furthermore, he
argued that management should only provide a general direction for the strategy
and let engineers plan the necessary actions in detail. He put this idea in very
militaristic language:
We put a circle around the target we want to hit and let the guys decide on the
tactics to get the job done with no injuries.
In reality, engineers who were reusing concepts and technologies found that they
needed to define tools and set rules and procedures, as this area of activity was
new and different. Individuals reported that often, in order to 'get the job done'
and to ensure the complete process of knowledge transfer, they needed to define
simple rules for the knowledge-transfer process. For example, project engineers
often did not stay until the end of meetings related to the reusability strategy. One
project manager from YellowTech described how after three meetings with the
project manager of the base project, he felt frustrated because of the low priority
that the other side was giving to this activity. With the Chief Scientist it was
decided that after each meeting a summary of the issues discussed and agreed
would be circulated by email in the R&D Division. The impact was tremendous
for two reasons. First, more people became involved in the reusability strategy of
a specific project, and these emails enhanced their understanding of the process
and the reasons for reusing a specific solution. Secondly, both sides involved in
the reusability process had to be more committed to the results each time they
met. Nevertheless, rules and procedures often changed, depending on the
dynamics between participants.
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Additionally, project managers sought tools to ease their struggle with the
reusability strategy. Some started to preserve and share information through
repositories and knowledge bases. These were very basic tools that were usually
created by one project team and were rarely shared across the division. Two
examples of such initiatives illustrate the new trend.
The ASIC group at YellowTech created a repository of designs. The Head of the
ASIC team claimed that the repository would help members of the team to quickly
deploy solutions from one project to another. Project teams in all three studied
companies started to log solutions on the Intranet. A search engine was installed
on the database to assist others to find solutions to reoccurring problems in
designs. These improvisations were initiated and managed locally by either the
project team or the functional team in an attempt to preserve their knowledge in
the form of content stored in databases, and to make it available to others in order
to speed up the development process.
One Sales manager at Rafael described how he created a repository of
presentations for the Litening Sales team. He identified this need when the group
was bidding for contracts in a number of countries at the same time. He explained
that it was obvious that the members of the team duplicated effort, and hence
proposed to the Sales team that he would create a database of presentations, and
that this would be accessible to the members of the Sales team. When he was
asked about making the concept available to other Sales teams within Rafael, he
bluntly replied:
l do not want to run in the corridor and shout 'I invented the wheel'. l could make
myself afool if [find out that someone has already 'invented the wheel'.
One more action worth mentioning was initiated as part of the knowledge-
management process in the studied companies. This was an attempt to map
knowledge centres based on the expertise that individuals possessed at that time.
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This process pushed individuals and groups to form new rules and procedures, and
in one case to seek advice outside the organisation.
Mapping expertise was a new process for the studied companies. Rafael and
TAMAM started the process in late 1998 and both abandoned the idea soon after.
YellowTech started mapping expertise in 1999 and is still updating the 'Yellow
Pages' system, though the real usage is reported to be low.
The justification for mapping their knowledge was expressed by one engineer
from YellowTech:
How do you knol-l , who knows what? Some of us have worked in the same product
family for the last five vears and we don't really know what other project teams are
working on.
This argument was expressed by many interviewees. They made the point that
organisational knowledge is not necessarily known and accessible. Bahrami and
Evans (1995) studied 37 hi-tech firms in the USA and identified some
organisational features that supported communications and enhanced knowledge
sharing. These were mainly associated with information system technologies such
as email systems and shared databases. As seen above, these tools have just
started to emerge in the studied organisations. For example, at TAMAM some
employees did not know how to use the email system. At Rafael and YellowTech,
it was claimed that security issues prevented employees from having access to the
Internet, and that there were restrictions on the usage of email outside the
company.
Hence, management was decisive in its approach of mappmg organisational
knowledge and became involved in setting the direction of mapping expertise.
However, in order to reach an agreement about the criteria of expertise and who
would be considered as a 'knowledge centre', a committee was formed, chaired by
the heads of the R&D Divisions for both Rafael and TAMAM. At Rafael the
committee met once a month and its work was terminated after four months. At
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TAMAM the committee met once every six weeks and their work was terminated
after five months. Both committees failed to complete their tasks. In theory, the
emphasis in committee work is on sharing information among all the committee's
members, a joint decision-making process, and the rational examination of
proposals and their alternatives (Barber 1966). In reality, interviews with
managers involved in the committee and others suggested that the committee had
spent time debating other topics. In many cases, issues related to problems in
specific projects, which were sometimes related to lack of expertise or lack of
resources, were raised in the committee. In other cases, some members used this
forum to complain about the lack of formal training in their company. One system
engineer, a member of the committee at Rafael, described a meeting that took
place a couple of weeks before the interview:
A debate about who was accountable for one specific bug was carried on from a
morning meeting to the knowledge management meeting. Since all the people
involved in the problem were in the KM forum, we spent these two hours discussing
this bug.
YellowTech, on the other hand, preferred to give the task of mapping knowledge
to one person, the Head of MIS. He was responsible for defining and categorising
expertise and coding the tree of expertise of the R&D Division. Helped by two
members of the MIS team, this person conducted a number of interviews with the
heads of professional fields and after this stage submitted a proposal to follow up
this activity by contracting with a consulting firm. In 1999, KnowledgeWare
ROM was chosen as consultant to YellowTech on how to proceed with their
project. A two-phase project was conducted. The first phase aimed to identify and
map core knowledge assets within the R&D Division. A second phase of the
project mapped 'knowledge centres' by linking knowledgeable workers to
knowledge assets. The entire exercise was concluded in 1999. Since then
YellowTech has maintained the system, and once in six months it updates the
knowledge assets and knowledge centres. Despite the resources put into this
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project. interviewees reported that they rarely use the 'Yellow Pages' knowledge-
management system.
Project managers and engineers at YellowTech argued that the 'Yellow Pages'
system has contributed little to accelerated product development. They added that
the system has mainly tagged individuals as 'experts', and those who were not
included were tagged as 'non-experts'. They felt that actually the 'Yellow Pages'
system led to more confusion. Instead of accessing knowledge, they often felt they
were pulling knowledge from the 'experts'. Those who were tagged 'experts' in
the 'Yellow Pages' system became extremely busy and it was hard to work with
them anymore.
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Figure 46: Knowledge-Management Activity during Phase 2
Figure 46 describes the knowledge management activity system during Phase 2,
showing that this activity system has become more orderly and regulated in terms
of the objective of the activity. However, it remains very loose with regard to the
tools and processes needed for the accomplishment of the knowledge-transfer
process.
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Concerns about the process of knowledge transfer were raised as individuals
debated the different perceptions of knowledge and its transferability. Also,
different tools emerged within different groups as management left engineers to
decide how the reusability strategy would be executed. Thus, the diversity of
formats and type of data stored in knowledge bases and other Information System
tools have added to the disagreement between project teams during the
knowledge-transfer processes.
Thus, knowledge management has emerged as an activity that realises two
motives: accelerating product development by management, and reusing hardware
and software components by engineers. New artifacts and processes have been
introduced which allowed the transformation of this organisational process.
Tension between individuals and groups has emerged because of new work
practices which lack any means of organisation. Contradictions with regard to
tools and procedures during the knowledge- transfer process were described as
breakdowns in the process of transferring knowledge. However, these were in fact
avenues to learning (Bodker and Gronbaek 1996).
Thus far we have described the transformation of the expertise-development and
knowledge-management organisational processes following the acceleration of
product development mainly through the introduction of cross-project learning
and reusability process in the studied companies during Phase 2. In the following
section, the tensions between expertise development and knowledge management
will be analysed to examine the breakdown of the collective expertise activity.
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6.6 Discussion
6.6.1 Introduction
This chapter opened with the question: how did cross-project learning and the
acceleration of product development impact the product development
environment?
The above analysis suggests that expertise development and knowledge
management have significantly changed following the introduction of cross-
project learning and the acceleration of product development. If Chapter 5 has
emphasised the conditions and value added in cross-project learning, this chapter
highlights the difficulties and perhaps caveats for those companies wishing to
follow the road taken by the case study companies. These pitfalls become evident
through the application of an activity theory lens (Engestrom 1992), revealing
systemic tensions within and between each activity system. Sections 6.6.2 and
6.6.3 will briefly recap the main areas of transformation in expertise development
and knowledge management activity systems.
6.6.2 The Transformation of Expertise Development: Phase 1 - Phase 2
Expertise development has significantly changed. The notion of mentoring which
supported the participation and identity formation of engineers and technicians has
gradually faded. The recent trend to reuse software and hardware components also
has impacted the notion of exploration for engineers and technicians, reducing the
time spent on exploring and implementing new technologies and thus directing the
learning of design towards a rather goal-orientated task. Instead of these two
fundamental concepts in R&D work, i.e. mentoring and exploration, a learning
by doing, goal-orientated expertise development activity has emerged raising
concerns about future personal development for engineers and technicians (see
Figure 47).
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Figure 47: The Transformation of Expertise Development
In addition, changes in the way engineers learn and develop their expertise were
also detected. Previous concepts and modes of operation have changed, often
replaced by processes that ensure high effectiveness from the R&D process
(Coombs 1998). For example, trial and error has been completely eliminated by
the recent use of simulation software packages that provide a clear picture of
mistakes in the design and in some cases even automatically correct man-made
errors. The average project life has shrunk dramatically to three years in Phase 2,
cutting the lengthy periods of time that engineers and technicians previously used
to study new technologies in a relaxed mode. Lastly, the practice of writing
research reports was replaced by on-demand configuration documents.
6.6.3 The Transformation of Knowledge Management: Phase 1 - Phase 2
Knowledge management has shifted from knowledge sharing to knowledge
transfer activity. Knowledge management has gradually been transformed from a
set of actions aiming to share knowledge often without a specific goal, to become
a rather goal-orientated activity that includes designated participants who aim to
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transfer specific knowledge to reuse a specific design (see Figure 48). The shift in
knowledge management has also been from the notion of invention and mastery as
two central values in the innovation system in Phase 1 to the notion of 'avoid
reinventing the wheel' in Phase 2, promoting the reusabi lity of designs.
Knowledge Management
Phase 2
Knowledge Transfer
for Reusability
Knowledge Sharing
Unplanned, Unstructured
Knowledge Management
Phase 1
Figure 48: The Transformation of Knowledge Management
Other notable changes in knowledge management have been, for example, the
shift in the social spaces within which knowledge management has taken place.
From a laboratory-based activity in Phase 1, knowledge management in Phase 2
has taken place mainly in conference rooms, during Design Review sessions
involving debates about knowledge management procedures, the meaning of
knowledge under transfer and the areas of responsibilities of those involved in the
transfer process. In addition, it is evident that individuals and groups have
invented solutions addressing their very immediate needs to preserve and
'manage' knowledge and also to quickly retrieve knowledge. In a way, a new
cycle of 'reinventing the wheel' has started, in which, for example, rules relating
to the management of knowledge transfer have been introduced, along with
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repositories storing the content of different groups, sometimes shared but often
isolated (e.g. ASIC, Sales, project teams).
Thus far, the above sections have addressed changes in expertise development and
knowledge management following the introduction of cross-project learning and
the acceleration of product development. The picture which emerges from the
analysis suggests that both activity systems are in transition.
The relationships between expertise development and knowledge management
during Phase 2 are yet to be revealed. Section 6.3.5 suggests that there was a
coherence between expertise development and knowledge management activity
systems during Phase 1. The next section will examine the present relationships
between expertise development and knowledge management during Phase 2,
suggesting that tension and contradictions emerged between these two activity
systems in two distinct areas: inter-activity mediating artifacts, and inter-activity
concepts. Nevertheless, corresponding sources of internal tension between
expertise development and knowledge management still persist during Phase 2.
6.6.4 Tension between Transferring Knowledge and Developing Expertise
In contrast to the previous observation suggesting that expertise development
coexisted in harmony alongside knowledge management during Phase 116, it is
argued that the above activity systems, during phase 2, presented incoherence and
inconsistency, in particular in two distinct areas: the different interpretation of the
meaning of knowledge, and the use of different artifacts in these activity systems
during Phase 217.
16 described at length in section 6.3.5
17 see Figure 45 and Figure 46 for a detailed illustration of the differences
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Figure 49: The Sources of Tension between Expertise Development and Knowledge Management
during Phase 2
Figure 49 describes the tension and contradiction between expertise development
and knowledge management activity systems. These will be described in detail
below. in an attempt to address the following question: what are the sources of the
tension and why have they emerged between expertise development and
knowledge management?
6.6.4.1 Inter-Activity Mediating Artifacts: Contradicting Mediating Processes
Tension has emerged because of the different 'social spaces' accommodating the
knowing and doing in knowledge transfer and expertise development activity
systems.
The different mediating processes and artifacts in knowledge management and
expertise-development activity systems have presented further challenges to the
co-existence of these two systems. The communication channel through which
knowledge becomes visible and accessible -- as in the designed 'knowledge
management' activities -- has been based on project meetings, Design Reviews
and informal conversation in corridors. These artifacts have created a social space
facilitating the activity of knowledge transfer, which is needed for the process of
'perspective taking'; a term that was originally coined by Boland and Tenkasi
(1995) and was later further developed by Blackler et al. (1998). Perspective
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taking is the process through which "distinct individual knowledge is exchanged,
evaluated. and integrated with that of others in the organisation' (Boland et al.
1995: 358).
Brown (1981) suggests that effective communication requires that the point of
view of the other be realistically imagined. The present study argues that
imagination in knowledge transfer, as part of perspective taking between
communities, must start. continue and end using mediating artifacts, including
physical and social spaces, similar to those through which this knowledge was
created, e.g. in laboratories. Furthermore, co-existing practices need overlapping
areas. such as mediating artifacts and physical and social spaces, in order to allow
the build-up of perspective taking. At the studied companies, expertise
development has thrived on intra-community interaction and participation,
whereas knowledge management has focused on inter-community activities,
lacking any active participatory dimension in product design. Moreover, the
present study shows that the knowledge-management activities introduced did not
really encourage perspective taking, and in fact have failed to understand the
importance of it.
6.6.4.2 Inter-Activity Concepts: Contradicting Images of Knowledge/knowing
Tension between knowledge management and expertise development has emerged
because of the different images of knowledge developed within the two activity
systems.
The expertise development practice has thrived on images of knowing and doing
as described above; it has been contextual, situated and mediated (Blackler 1995).
Knowing is specific and requires the participation of individuals and groups in the
process through which this knowing is created.
On the other hand, the knowledge management activities treat knowledge as a
commodity, i.e. as generic, accessible, codifiable and context-independent (Smith
1995). For example, the project management practice at YellowTech has
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encouraged the perception of knowledge as an object by promoting management
concepts such as cost-effective design, design centres, profit-centred projects and
minimum learning costs.
Lam (1997) describes a simi tar case in a study of a collaboration effort between a
Japanese and a British hi-tech company. Amongst other reasons for the difficulties
in this collaboration project is the different way these companies organise,
structure, apply and transmit knowledge, which is an integral element of their
social settings.
Scarbrough (1999:6) suggests that this conflict is between 'the social conditions
that promote the formation of knowledge and the economic conditions that allow
the appropriation of its value'. Scarbrough (1999) goes on to suggest that many of
the sources of conflict are outside the control of management, proposing that
'conflict may be either stimulated or attenuated by changes in the institutional,
organizational and individual contexts for knowledge work'. This study, taking an
activity theory perspective, argues against Scarbrough's proposition. Indeed
conflict is inherent in activity systems (Engestrom 1999); however, it is argued
that contradictions and tensions are stimulated because of the introduction of new
artifacts, social rules or perhaps a new division of labour. These innovations are in
management control through the set of capabilities put in place to encourage
creativity and innovations (Coombs 1996).
Having analysed the sources of contradiction between expertise development and
knowledge management, this study must examine the systemic interactions
between the tensions of these activity systems.
6.6.4.3 Inter-Activity Tension: Corresponding Concerns about Reduced Exploration and
Excessive Exploitation
The outcome and internal tension generated in expertise development corresponds
to the internal tension introduced by knowledge management activity. In the case
of expertise development, internal tension has revolved around issues relating to
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reduced opportunities for exploration and degraded personal development.
Complementarily, the tension arising from knowledge-transfer activities as
demonstrated above, is concerned with excessive reusability and over-
exploitation of technologies, resulting in reduced exploration.
Expertise Development
Phase 2
~Corresponding concerns about
Exploration and Exploitation
Knowledge Management
Phase 2
Figure 50: Corresponding Concerns about Exploration and Exploitation
March (1999) argues that tension may exist in organisations between exploration
and exploitation. Excessive exploitation of internal capabilities to the exclusion of
exploration may lead to a trap where organisations will be operating in 'sub-
optimal stable equilibria'; whereas systems that engage in exploration to the
inclusion of exploitation may find that 'they suffer the costs of experimentation
without gaining many of its benefits' (March 1999: 114). Similarly, tensions of
knowledge management and expertise development interact according to the
tension between these two concepts, i.e. exploitation and exploration. Knowledge
management as a knowledge transfer process has now emerged by aggressively
promoting the exploitation of technologies within an environment that was
traditionally based on technological exploration.
This scenano has emerged perhaps because project managers understood the
multifaceted nature of their collective expertise (Engestrom 1987) but were unable
to accommodate 'complex, perhaps competing priorities' (Blackler et al. 2000) or
to develop an understanding of 'the adequacy of existing approaches to
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perspective making and perspective taking and perspective shaping for the self-
regulation of the network'.
~
The product management practice has urged project managers and engineers to
appreciate the development of expertise as a multi-project socially-constructed
activity, but it has not developed the same understanding concerning knowledge
management activities. The expertise development practice has contributed to
individuals' personal development as well as to project success. Driven by a
desire to be promoted, or by their personal interest in technologies, individuals
and groups participate in the expertise development practice, thus contributing to
its legitimisation across the organisation. Yet knowledge management activities
have failed to develop the same level of perspective taking. Communities have
developed a high level of perspective making, supporting 'domain innovations',
but with minimum appreciation of 'boundary innovation', which refers to the
alignment processes across communities of activity (Blackler et al. 2000).
6.6.4A Sources of Tensions between Expertise Development and Knowledge
Management: Summary
The above analysis suggests that the shift from the knowledge sharing activity-
motive in Phase 1 to a knowledge transfer activity-goal in Phase 2, and the
acceleration of product development, was accompanied by changes in concepts
and shared social spaces.
Engestrom (1996:73) suggests that ' [... ] contradictions of the activity are the
moving force behind disturbances and innovations, and eventually behind the
change and development of the system. They cannot be eliminated or fixed with
separate remedies, they get aggravated over time and eventually tend to lead to an
overall crisis of the activity system. In this process, practitioners may experience
them as overwhelming "double binds", dilemmas where all available alternatives
are equally unacceptable'.
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According to Engestrom, the aggravation of contradictions in product
development would lead managers to the point. that all available alternatives
would not be worth pursuing. This means that managers participating in the
activity system that is "in crisis' will, at some point, stop pursuing alternatives that
could ease present contradictions. Instead, managers will abandon traditional
concepts and tools and introduce new concepts that will unavoidably bring the
activity system to 'crisis'. A 'crisis' in the activity system would mean a change in
the predominant conception of the activity, for example from knowledge sharing
to knowledge transfer activity system.
Engestrom (1992) confirms our findings that managers and engineers endeavour
to ease present contradictions by presenting new tools and concepts. However, in
the context of this study, data suggest that the knowledge management activity
system did not change its predominant conception during the introduction of new
tools and concepts, neither were there any signs of a 'crisis' during Phase 2.
Rather, the knowledge management activity system presents an incremental
innovative process in which managers introduce new tools and concepts to ensure
the survival of the activity system by gradually easing present contradictions;
however, generating new tensions. A 'crisis' does not occur overnight in activity
systems, but rather there is an evolutionary process during which activity systems
change their identities.
This weakness of activity theory restricts the researcher to seeking a certain point
in time in which presumably the activity system has been metamorphosed. Having
applied a similar concept in the above analysis which suggests that expertise
development, knowledge management and expertise development have
metamorphosed between Phase 1 and Phase 2, this study would like to present a
rather different view on how activity systems metamorphose themselves in the
context of the present study.
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6.6.5 Is the Knowledge Management Activity System in Crisis?
To answer this question an Activity Systems Transformation model is proposed.
The terminology of 'perspective making and taking' suggested by Boland and
Tenkasi (1995) is borrowed, and a rather different interpretation of 'perspective
shaping' (Blackler et al. 2000) is offered for the model presented below (see
Figure 51). In addition, a new concept central to the continuous transformation of
an activity system is introduced and will be coined here as 'proximal innovations'.
6.6.5.1 The Continuous Transformation of Activity Systems
6.6.5.1.1 The Lingo of Continuous Transformation of Activity Systems
Perspective taking and perspective making refer to the mearung of domain
innovations and boundary innovations respectively (Boland and Tenkasi 1995;
Bladder et al. 1999).
Perspective Shaping refers to the management of the capabilities (Coombs 1996)
that are required to bridge the tension between domain innovations and boundary
innovations (see Figure 51). In a way, perspective shaping can be understood as
the innovation that drives the organisation towards its vision (Senge 1996). These
capabilities can be seen as the organisational structure, vertical integration
mechanisms, horizontal coordination structures and groups.
The invention of new artifacts, social rules and technologies will be coined here as
'proximal innovations'.
A few researchers referred to the notion of 'proximal' in the context of innovation
and knowledge (e.g. Vygotsky). Polanyi (1966) suggested that tacit knowledge
has two distinct properties: proximal and distal. The proximal term is the part that
is closer to us, while the distal is further away. Polanyi describes how the police
help a witness who is unable to describe a perpetrator to create a phantom image
by selecting pictures from a large selection of human features as eyes, noses and
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hair. By attending from the first, closer image that resides within, to the second,
more distant picture collection, the witness is able to communicate her awareness
of the face. Polanyi (1966) argues that we become aware of the proximal term
only in the presence of the distal term but remain unable to communicate the
former.
Applying Polanyi' s approach here, we suggest that the distal is the object of the
activity system, i.e. to transfer knowledge, and the proximal is the small step
innovations that individuals make to overcome 'normal but persistent accidents'
(Blackler et al. 1999) and to ease tension between domain innovations and
boundary innovations. Proximal innovations can be new tools, procedures, rules,
technologies. division of labour etc. Proximal innovations are injected into activity
systems and affect the perspective shaping of the activity through negotiations,
discussion and the application of these innovations in other settings. Gradually,
proximal innovations become part of the organisational capabilities (Schroeder et
al. 1989). Proximal innovations are not trivial and they depend on the facilitation
of the autonomy to act, the creativity and improvisation in the organisation.
6.6.5.1.) The Transformation of Activity Systems
Figure 51 describes the dynamics of transformation by suggesting that there are
three forces involved in transforming an activity system: perspective making,
perspective taking, and perspective shaping. It will also be emphasised that
activity systems do not break down neither they are in 'crisis', but rather suffer
mini-breakdowns which eventually lead to their further development in line with
the perception of the object of the activity.
There is an inherent tension between perspective making and perspective taking.
The manifestation of this tension can be described as the inherent contradiction
between exploration and exploitation (March 1999), or between intra-community
and inter-community interests, or between knowing as a socially constructed
phenomenon and knowledge as an object. These tensions lead to mini-breakdowns
in the knowledge management activity system, as described in section 6.5.3. This
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can be metaphorically expressed that domain innovation and boundary
innovations pull in two different directions. This may create inconsistency and un-
coordination with regard to priorities, responsibilities and procedures, as seen in
section 6.5. For example, the concept and application of a project as a profit centre
may collide with the desire to shift attention to cross-project practices. Or perhaps
the expression of frustration by one project manager when the transmitting project
has not co-operated to transfer knowledge according to their expectation indicates
sources of miscommunications and mini breakdowns of the procedures system in
this specific company. Concepts, such as ownership of ideas, associated with
small but effective project teams may clash with the aspiration to facilitate cross-
project learning. But how is this tension between these two vectors being
resolved?
Perspective Shaping
Proximal Innovations
Perspecti ve Making
Proximal Innovations
Perspective Taking
Figure 51: Activity System Transformation
Proximal innovations are the key to resolve these inconsistencies and tensions.
Yet, and this is where our argument departs from Engestrom's, proximal
innovations are also the source of future tensions without 'breaking down' nor
bring the activity system to a 'crisis' mode. An on-going interaction between
domain and boundary innovations continues, which represents both cooperation
and contradiction between the elements of these processes. However, through
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'skill, determination and creativity' (Blackler et al. 1999:8) individuals overcome
'normal accidents' and inconsistencies in activity systems.
Furthermore, this process expands the span of artifacts available in the
organisation to maintain and enhance the organisation's ability to organise
innovations in accordance with the context within which the organisation operates
(Schroeder et al. 1989).
Having said that, there might be collective forgetting in an activity system, which
refers to the process through which communities lose touch with their intellectual
and practical heritage (Engestrom 1991). Collective forgetting takes place because
of the silence and solitude involved in the application of tools, skills and concepts
(Blackler et al. 1998).
6.6.5.2 Proximal Innovations and the Transformation of Knowledge Management:
Learning and Forgetting
Though management introduced some formal structures in the studied companies
to facilitate knowledge transfer between projects18, it has been evident and
previously reported that individuals and groups introduced additional mechanisms
supporting the organisation of knowledge management activity. These
mechanisms are considered here as proximal innovations that ensure the
continuous transformation of the knowledge management activity system
(Schroeder et al. 1989).
Amongst the examples provided above are the creation of knowledge bases by
individuals in the Sales team at Rafael, a knowledge base for ASIC solutions at
YellowTech, a repository for malfunctions at YeIlowTech, TAMAM and Rafael,
the constitution of rules with regards to responsibility and accountability of
individuals during the knowledge transfer process, the invitation of the researcher
18 See Chapter 5 for detailed description
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to study knowledge management processes, the attempt to map knowledge and
expertise, the work with knowledge management consults, and more.'".
These proximal innovations were a source of debate, disagreement, and
sometimes even failure, such as in the case of knowledge mapping at Rafael and
TAMAM or the knowledge committee at Rafael as a source for power games.
Nevertheless, these proximal innovations generated discussions and participation,
in particular across different communities, such as in the case of knowledge
management consultants who interacted between R&D, Human Resource and
top management at Rafael.
Yet evidence for collective forgetting has been observed in the case study
companies as well. For example, engineers at Rafael were reluctant to share with
colleagues their idea about creating a repository for presentations. The exclusion
of project members from becoming involved early in the design stage at
YellowTech is another example. And at TAMAM, knowledge management
committees spent their time discussing software bugs instead of knowledge
management matters. These instances and others hinder the development of
discussion and cross-community participation essential for the development of
capabilities, and in fact stimulate collective forgetting through silence and
solitude.
Thus, it will be argued not only that the knowledge management activity system is
not facing a breakdown, it is actually changing fast, seeking solutions for present
tensions within the activity and between the activity and others by applying often
'separate remedies', small step innovations that gradually become part of the
organisational capabilities through use, discussion, and negotiation.
19 d i . 65These innovations were reporte In section .
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With regard to the transformation of expertise development we argue that this
activity system has lost touch with its mentoring practice, but has introduced
rather, a goal-oriented problem-solving learning practice. Therefore, expertise
development is also changing, demonstrating both collective forgetting and
collective learning experiences.
6.7 Conclusions
This chapter addresses the question: how did cross-project learning and the
acceleration of product development impact the product development
environment?
The analysis of the historical path through which expertise development and
knowledge management activity systems have evolved in the case study
companies, has demonstrated that the past coherence between expertise
development and knowledge management has broken down following the
introduction of cross-project learning and the acceleration of product
development. The anal ysis revealed that the source of tension between expertise
development and knowledge management is embedded in (i) the different artifacts
and social spaces used by these activity systems, (ii) the different images of
knowledge that emerged between management and engineers, and (iii) the
managers' inability to strike a balance between the concept of exploitation and
exploration.
Knowledge management processes have seemed to suffer from continuous
disturbances with regard to the entire process, manifested by 'normal accidents'
such as lack of coordination, misinterpretation or lack of procedures.
Against the proposition that such disturbances would lead to a total crisis of the
activity system (Engestrom 1996), we theorised and then demonstrated, supported
by empirical data, that inherent tension is resolved through the introduction of
proximal innovations. Furthermore, we showed that proximal innovations are
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negotiated to become part of the organisational capabilities and in fact they are the
driver of future transformations of the activity system. These proximal
innovations require management support for creati vity and improvisation. These
characteristics were found to be manifested in the studied organisations through
autonomy and loose job description.
We would like now to pause and recap some of the arguments in this thesis. In
Chapter 4 we reviewed some central characteristics of the defence industry and of
each case study company separately. It was argued that amongst the
characteristics that vary between these companies was ownership. In addition
contextual factors were presented, demonstrating the growing pressure by
stakeholders (past and present Israeli governments, the Israeli MoD, Koor) to
improve financial results, increase market share, and stay competitive. In addition
we outlined the case for changes in defence markets as another driver of the
change in product development practices, resulting in a series of actions aiming to
accelerate product development through, amongst other steps, the reusability of
hardware and software components.
Chapter 5 addressed the organisation of, and conditions for cross-project learning.
Three different approaches to cross-project learning were identified in the studied
companies. It was suggested that the game rules imposed by the natural evolution
of the firm were amongst the reasons that can be taken into consideration when
one proposes explanations for the differences in cross-project learning approaches.
This chapter launched an investigation into changes of two central activity
systems in product development: expertise development and knowledge
management. It was demonstrated through a historical-path analysis that the past
coherence between these two has collapsed following the acceleration of product
development and introduction of cross-project learning. Yet these activity systems
did not break down, but rather changed direction, disconnecting from their
historical practice and gradually generating new collective historical learning.
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One more question is still unanswered: what can other companies learn from the
journey of the Israeli electronics defence industry?
The next chapter analyses and draws conclusions from the development path of
cross-project learning in the Israeli electronics defence industry. The proposed
model attempts to position the set of cross-project learning capabilities in the
context of present strategy and future strategic direction.
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS.
PROJECT LEARNING STRATEGIES
7.1 Introduction
Three different approaches to cross-project learning were presented in Chapter 5,
suggesting variations in the way the case study companies pursue cross-project
learning. Yet it was suggested that each approach has contributed to product and
market success.
Chapter 6 has suggested that the past harmony between expertise development
and knowledge management activity systems has been replaced by contradictions
and conflict following the introduction of cross-project learning and the
acceleration of product development.
This chapter attempts to conclude the analysis of the lessons learned in the Israeli
electronics defence industry by addressing the following questions: is there a
strategic pattern to cross-project learning from the data presented above? If so,
under what conditions are these cross-project learning strategies subject to
change?
It will be argued that the most relevant literature on cross-project learning that
also presents empirical data (Nobeoka 1995; Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998) is
limited to the Japanese and u.s. car industry context, which has unique and
specific characteristics. This thesis suggests that though we value the latter study,
the strategies for cross-project learning offered by these scholars are irrelevant to
the case study companies. Instead, two main strategies will be offered, based on
the empirical data presented above. Our analysis suggests two strategies that
companies can undertake: exploit product success and/or design to reuse.
An analysis that combines path development and contingency theory will be
offered, built on the Right Path model for organisational development (Victor and
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Boynton 1998). The analysis wi II suggest that cross-project learning strategies
evolve in the studied companies subject to two factors: present identity/strategy
and future strategic direction. These variables represent two values: (i) research
orientation. and (ii) business/market orientation. With this approach we build upon
and extend previous work by Coombs and Hull (1998) and Hull et al. (2000).
Lastly, the future of the Israeli defence industry will be outlined, suggesting that
cross-project learning in the three companies studied will produce further tension
between present identity/strategy and future strategic direction.
In terms of the outline of the chapter; Section 7.2 will present two strategies for
cross-project learning identified in the companies studied. Section 7.3 will discuss
the theme of best practices. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 will outline the rationale for
choosing present identity/strategy and future strategic direction as the conditions
for the development of cross-project learning practices. Section 7.6 will analyse
the dynamics of present identity and future strategic directions, followed by an
examination of the dynamics of cross-project learning in the studied companies
subject to the above factors. Lastly, the future of the Israeli electronics defence
industry will be reviewed and the implications for cross-project learning
development will be outlined.
7.2 Two Strategies for Cross-Project Learning
The model that Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) provided presents four types of
strategy for cross-project learning: new design, sequential technology transfer,
concurrent technology transfer and design modification. They conclude their
analysis of cross-project learning in one main statement, arguing that concurrent
technology transfer is the better practice for companies (ibid.: 189). Thus, in the
context of their study, companies should plan in advance situations where two
projects of the same product family overlap in order to maximise the technology
transfer effect.
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In the context of the Japanese and U.S. car industry it seems that their conclusion
is appropriate. However, their conclusion excludes a large number of companies
operating under different conditions and contexts, such as the defence industry.
Companies in the defence industry rarely launch generic R&D projects, in
particular since the significant reduction in defence R&D budgets in western
countries since the beginning of the 1990s (BICC 2000). In addition, the nature of
the defence business, as explained in Chapter 4, dictates different game rules,
unlike those in the car industry. In the defence industry, and perhaps in other
manufacturing and service industries, companies cannot arrange or plan two
concurrent projects to start at the same time. It is even more complex to ensure a
two-year overlap between two projects of the same product family (Cusumano
and Nobeoka 1998). This is because the process of launching a project is subject
to winning a tender in a long bidding process and getting all the contract
documents signed, as explained in Chapter 4. In a complete contrast to Toyota,
Nissan and other car manufacturers, YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael respond to
tenders and rarely initiate their own self-financed R&D projects.
Thus, according to Cusumano and Nobeoka's (1998) cross-project learning
strategies, companies such as YellowTech, Rafael, and TAMAM are inevitability
obliged to use a less effective sequential technology transfer process. Yet business
performance indicators suggest that the companies studied have improved
business performance since they have pursued the cross-project learning path.
Thus, another explanation is needed. Based on the research data and the context
within which the defence industry operates, we propose two main strategies for
cross-project learning. These strategies refer to the vertical integration of
technologies, components and knowledge which resides in projects. These
strategies target either long- or short-term competitive advantage but can be also
integrated. The strategies proposed here are:
=> design for reusability. This strategy aims at designing platforms and
components for potential reusability in the future. The organisational
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capabilities supporting this strategy are aimed at setting standards to guide
engineers to design components with a thought in mind that the base design
will be reused in the future. For example, modularity and commonality
supports product design for potential reusability in the future. Another
example is a Design Centre (e.g. at YellowTech), which produces ASIC
solutions with a view to sharing these components between projects. These
capabilities aim to improve the process of reusability by introducing
technological platforms that have been designed in line with some reusability
procedures. tools and metrics. Our data suggest that these organisational
mechanisms are located outside the matrix structure (see Figure 52). In
contrast to Cusumano and Nobeoka's (1998) proposition, which argued that in
the case of new design the potential for technology transfer is low, this
strategy suggests that a new design actually paves the way for an effective
reusability strategy. However, we confirm that new designs, particularly for
reuse, require the longest lead time (ibid.: 116; Clark and Fujimoto 1991).
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Figure 52: Mechanisms Supporting the Design to Reuse Strategy outside the Matrix Structure
Th O t t aims at exploiting product and=> exploit product success. IS s ra egy
technological platform success by transferring components from the base
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project to others. In this case, the process can be either sequential or
concurrent (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). The organisational capabilities
that support this strategy are aimed at opening communication channels
between projects, making existing solutions and technologies visible to others,
and creating links between projects. Some of these capabilities are, for
example. the matrix structure, knowledge transfer structure at YellowTech,
interactions with clients, integration with Sales, and the horizontal
coordination of concurrent engineering activities by cross-functional teams.
These organisational mechanisms are within the matrix structure (see Figure
53).
Professional groups
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Figure 53: Mechanisms Supporting the Exploit Product Success Strategy Inside the Matrix
Structure
lfable 6 suggests some capabilities that may be associated with the above
strategies.
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Design for Design centres, commonality, modularity, metrics for reusability PM
Reu ability practices for reusability ,
E. ploit Product Matrix structure, programmes, system engmeers, cross-functional
ucce s teams, interactions with clients, integration with Sales, Design
Reviews, Knowledge Transfer structure, Knowledge Transfer forums
Table 6: Capabilities According to Cross-Project Learning Strategy
Based on this categorisation we now analyse the strategic approach In each
company studied.
7.2.1 Cross-Project Learning Strategies at YellowTech
YellowTech has taken up both strategies, design to reuse and exploit product
success.
7.2.1.1 Design to Reuse at YellowTech
The organisational capabilities integrated for design to reuse include, amongst
others, the Design Centres, such as the ASIC group, a team of engineers that
operates outside the matrix structure. This design process in the ASIC group is
aimed at reducing learning costs but more importantly creating a knowledge base
of solutions for future reusability. Data presented above demonstrated how the
ASIC team has improved lead-time despite the growing complexity in new
products . Other Design Centres were mentioned by interviewees, such as the RF
group that designs RF components for the entire R&D Division; however, this
group has not been included in the scope of this study.
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YellowTech also introduced modularity of (Baldwin and Clark 1997) and
commonality in hardware and software components. Modularity and commonality
are two central development practices that integrate parallel projects (see Figure
54). The concept behind these practices from a cross-project learning viewpoint is
to establish the foundation upon which future shared platforms will evolve. The
technological development platforms are the enabler for sharing technologies,
mainly because of the required compatibility of development tools between two
projects in order to implement changes in the transferred component, in particular
in the case of sequential technology transfer (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). One
simple example that demonstrates the problem when commonality is avoided is
the past difficulties in transferring files between a Macintosh computer and an
ruM computer because of the different operating systems.
7.2.1.2 Exploit Product Success Strategy at YellowTech
YellowTech also applied the second strategy; exploit product success. To achieve
success in this strategy the company introduced a modular knowledge transfer
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procedures and practices have been introduced to include a reference to potential
technology transfer. Interactions with Sales have been enhanced and clients have
been integrated into the development process.
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Figure 55: Exploit Product Success at YellowTech
These capabilities were integrated into one system through the leadership of the
Chief Scientist, and because of the high priority that the theme of cross-project
learning has been granted at YellowTech (see Figure 55).
7.2.1.3 YellowTech's Cross-Project Learning Strategies: Summary
The above analysis suggests that YellowTech has positioned the strategy of design
to reuse at the centre of its strategic vision while operationally YellowTech has
been pursuing both directions: exploiting present success and improving
reusability processes for the future. Also, YellowTech has introduced methods to
measure the quality of the cross-project learning product and sought ways to
improve the results of this process.
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7.2.1.4 Cross-Project Learning Strategies at TAMAM: Exploit Product Success
TAMAM has mainly focused on the exploit product success strategy, though
some steps towards the design to reuse strategy were observed.
For the exploit product success strategy TAMAM has promoted the involvement
of the system engineer in cross-project Iearning''. The system engineer acted as a
linkage unit. commonly known as 'knowledge centre', which co-ordinated
technology transfer between base project and other projects. The system engineer
operated within the matrix structure and in some cases across programmes
(Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). The grouping of projects into one programme
further assisted system engineers in vertically integrating knowledge of one
product family to be transferred to other projects (see Figure 56). However,
TAMAM' s approach to cross-project learning, which was based on 'middle-
down' management style, has by and large depended on the commitment of the
system engineer to promoting the reusability process. This approach has put
tremendous pressure on system engineers, who often need to engage in technology
transfer processes in addition to their role as architects of the system. This has also
led to a gradual shift in the positioning of the system engineers in the matrix
structure, from the vertical professional group towards the more 'desired' and
glamorous horizontal project management.
20 For a detailed description see section 5.4.2.1
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Figure 56: Exploit Product Success at TAMAM
There are indications that TAMAM is shifting towards the design to reuse
strategy. The issue of commonality, though it has yet not been managed centrally,
has attracted management attention. Also, the advantages of the Object Orientated
methodology, as a modularity practice for creating transferable software modules,
have started to emerge. Yet data presented above suggest that TAMAM has not
integrated the capabilities necessary to leveraging the design to reuse strategy.
In conclusion , the above analysis suggests that TAMAM has positioned the
exploit product success strategy at the centre of its cross-project learning
operations and has taken some first steps towards the design to reuse strategy. Yet
TAMAM has not introduced methods to control the quality of the cross-project
learning, but rather has focused on generating more opportunities for reusability
through the centrality of the system engineer in the matrix structure.
7.2.1.5 Cross-Project Learning Strategies at Rafael: Exploit Product Success
Rafael has focused on the exploit product success strategy. One system engineer
at Rafael referred to the reasons for reusing technology, and put his view in a
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simple and blunt way: 'it has to be the default'. In another words, the conditions
within which Rafael operates lead to the unavoidable conclusion that only if they
reuse technologies and components they will maintain their competitiveness. Yet
Rafael's case is different from the other two companies.
The entrepreneur has been at the centre of the reusability strategy at Rafael.
Through social networks, Design Reviews and the structure of programmes, the
entrepreneur has created the dynamics needed for leveraging the reusability
process. Through social networks:", Rafael managed to integrate horizontal
knowledge in projects (see Figure 57).
The implementation of commonality and modularity at Rafael was unstructured
and loosely managed. Yet management interest in knowledge management
practices in general, and in facilitating cross-project learning in particular, may
suggest that the company has started to shift towards enhancing its design to reuse
process. Yet this evidence is not conclusive enough to determine the present
position at Rafael with regard to moving towards the design to reuse strategy.
However, it is evident that Rafael has not pursued the design to reuse strategy.
21 For detailed description see section 5.4.3.1
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Figure 57: Exploit Product Success at Rafael
To conclude, Rafael has focused on the exploit product success strategy by
facilitating the conditions allowing the development of strong social networks and
a sense of entrepreneurship. Rafael did not introduce methods to control the
quality of the cross-project learning. Furthermore, Rafael's management expected
that through social networks, engineers would be able to reuse technologies. The
above analysis suggests that the results from the reusability process were
satisfying from Rafael's management viewpoint, yet the process was described as
unstructured, unplanned and based on entrepreneurship.
7.2.1.6 Summary
The above analysis suggests that YellowTech has taken a different strategy to
cross-project learning from the other two companies by facilitating the conditions
to pursue both the design to reuse and exploit product success strategies.
TAMAM and Rafael have been focusing on the exploit product success strategy
with a gradual yet not significant or conclusive shift towards the design to reuse
strategy.
7-240
As we attempt to conclude the analysis of the lessons learned from the experience
acquired by the Israeli electronics defence industry associated with cross-project
learning. one cannot avoid raising the question: what would be the best practice
for cross-project learning and how can a best practice be transferred across the
industry'?
7.3 Why not Best Practice Analysis
The attempt to answer the questions posed above raises another argument
requiring further investigation: what would constitute the best practice for cross-
project learning in the Israeli electronics defence industry (Jarrar and Zairi 2000).
The answer proposed in this study is: it depends (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).
In assessing what would constitute a best practice for cross-project learning, it will
be claimed that practices for cross-project learning in the Israeli electronics
defence industry are contingent to the context within which they have evolved
(Pettigrew 1987; Wenger 1998). Furthermore, context-dependent practices offer a
major challenge for the transfer of context-specific practices, assuming that one
company does not operate in the exactly the same manner as, and rarely within the
same contexts as, others.
Hence, against the vast literature on best practice and benchmarking (e.g. Raval
and Subramanian 2000; Jarrar and Zairi 2000), this study challenges the notion of
best practice transfer that may suggest that a practice is a static body of knowledge
that can be transferred across an industry. Rather, practice is a dynamic process, a
way to organise innovations, which is contingent to the context within which the
practice has been created, evolved and transformed (Wenger 1998; Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967; Olson et al. 1995; Collinson 1999).
Thus, perhaps the question which needs to be addressed in this chapter is: is there
a path that would explain the development of cross-project learning strategies in
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the studied companies and, if so, what are the factors that shape this path of
development?
7.4 The Justification for Present Identity and Future Strategic
Direction Analysis
One can find many factors that may have shaped different forms of organising
cross-project learning capabilities in the Israeli electronics defence industry.
Amongst the factors studied in the past and which may relate to the context of the
present study are: the age and size of the organisation, technical systems,
environment and power (Mintzberg 1983). Yet studies in the field of contingency-
structure relations have shown contradictory evidence as to the direction of the
relation between organisational structure and contingency variables (Tayeb 1987).
Thus. in this contested terrain, instead of seeking correlation between contingent
variables and structures, this thesis, based on our findings, proposes to explore the
dynamics of the development of cross-project learning based on two contingent
factors. One is the present identity of the studied companies (Wenger 1998;
Whetten and Godfrey 1998). The second is future strategic direction of the
studied companies (Victor and Boynton 1998). These two factors will be located
on the horizontal and vertical axes in a 2x2 matrix (see Figure 58).
Present identity, in this study, is a socially and symbolically structured notion
intended to lend meaning to experience (Whetten and Godfrey 1998:27). Wenger
(1998) adds that identity is the formation of a dual process: (i) identification,
which is the process 'through which modes of belonging become constitutive of
our identities by creating bonds or distinctions in which we become invested'
(ibid.: 191); and (ii) negotiability, which 'refers to the ability, facility, and
legitimacy to contribute to, take responsibility for, and shape the meanings that
matter within a social configuration' (ibid.: 197). Identity is a trajectory of learning
and adaptation that defines who we are (Wenger 1998:153). In a way, present
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identity is the 'emergent strategy' that led us to where we are now (Mintzberg and
Waters 1985).
Future strategic direction represents the notion of who we would like to be.
Thus, the development of cross-project learning is assessed here subject to two
simple questions: one, who (where) we are; and the second is who (where) we
would like to be.
Senge (1996) suggests that there is a natural, creative tension between these two
concepts, though he coined them current reality and vision. Creative tension can
be resolved in two basic ways, Senge argues. First, by raising current reality
towards the vision. Second, by lowering the vision towards current reality.
We assume that Senge's suggestions may help managers to simplify the world
within which they operate. Yet Senge's (1996) conceptualisation of current reality
is based on the structuralist approach in which reality is objective and independent
of human affairs (Browing 2000). On the other hand, the present study suggests a
socially constructed view, in which reality, or perhaps current identity, is multi-
faceted, dynamic and rarely expressing one voice and opinion.
We argue that the answer to the question; 'who we are' would provide a short
description of the role we hold in society; however, the meaning behind this
description is often diverse and multiple. Our role in society may represent the
identity we have at work, in our family or perhaps in the football team we play in
every Sunday. These are different identities, representing the historical
development of learning that we have accumulated throughout the years at work,
home and play. These various identities are rarely coherent and often they are in
tension with each other (Engestrom 1992; Blackler et al. 1999). To understand
who we are today, one has to understand the historical development of the
identities of an entity, either a person or a company (Blackler et al. 1999).
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Thus. instead of seeking to locate the notion of current ide tit ' if
n I y In a speer IC time,
we propose to treat current identity as a continuum ad'
, ynamic process that
reflects on past and present experiences (Engestrom 1992).
7.5 Present Identity/Future Strategic Direction Model
Figure 58 presents a 2x2 matrix that suggests four possible modes:
Present Identity
BusinesslMarket Driven
[IV] [I] Strategic Direction
Research Driven Business/Market
Driven
[III] [II]
Research Driven
Figure 58: A 2X2 Matrix: Present Identity and Future Strategic Direction
Quadrant [i] represents a state in which the present identity and future strategic
direction are business driven. Most profit-orientated organisations will be located
in this quadrant. The most obvious example in the 1990s is Microsoft.
Quadrant [ii] suggests that the subject organisation has a research-driven present
identity but is seeking business-driven strategic direction. One example of this
scenario would perhaps be higher education institutions in the UK, which are
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experiencing shrinking research funds and hence gradually introducing market-
orientated practices.
Quadrant [iii] portrays a state in which the subject organisation is research-driven
both in its present identity and future strategic direction. Any fully sponsored R &
D institutions would fit in this quadrant.
Quadrant [iv] characterises another state in transition in which the subject
organisation possesses a business-driven identity; however, it is moving towards a
research-driven strategic direction. This case is rare in the business world;
however. one example of this state could be an organisation that changes the
objectives and activity of one team within Engineering from product design and
development to become an R&D activity.
Because of the simplicity of the proposed model, it may suffer from some
drawbacks that need to be considered.
First. individuals and groups may produce conflicting identities as part of their
engagement in different activity systems that pursue various objectives.
Engestrom (1992) demonstrates how one Medical Doctor (M.D.) engages in both
administrative and medical activities at work, suggesting that our attempt to
associate a group of people with one single identity might not represent well the
complexity and often 'two hates situation' that reality often dictates.
Secondly, this model represents a rather specific case, built upon the learnt
experience in the Israeli electronics defence industry. Thus, practical implications
from this model would be most suitable to the studied industry or perhaps
companies with some similarity. The applicability of this model to other industries
in other contexts has yet to be considered.
The next section proposes an analysis of the dynamics of present identity and
future strategic direction in the three studied companies.
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7.6 The Dynamics of Present Identity and Future Strategic
Direction at the Studied Companies
Figure 59 presents the dynamics of change in present identity and future strategic
direction at YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael. The situation which emerges from
Figure 59 suggests that these dynamics of change represent not only the future of
the companies but also their bodies of shared historical learning. In this sense,
past, present and future identity cannot be separated (Engestrom 1992).
Present Identity
Business/Market Driven
Strategic Direction
Business/Market
Rafael Driven
2001
YellowTech
2001
TAMAM
2001
[ I ][ IV]
19 8 ~ i
· .1964 - . - · _. .~ ..
·: 1990s
·
·
·
·1950········································ .....:[ III ] [ II ]
Research Driven
Research Driven
Figure 59: The Dynamics of Present Identity/Strategic Direction in the Studied Companies
YellowTech was established as a business-driven entity and maintained a
business-driven focus to its objectives through growth in revenue, profit, mergers
and joint ventures and recently through acquisitions (Dror Marom, Globes,
16/01/2001). YellowTech is positioned in quadrant (iii), representing strong
business/market orientation that also grew throughout the years. Yet, though
positioned as a business-driven organisation, YellowTech' s roots are in R&D,
which represents some research-driven orientation from its past.
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TAMAM was formed in 1964 as a government owned company and enjoyed a
generous R&D budget subsidised by Israeli governments. The late 1980s saw a
major reduction in government R&D defence budgets, which impacted its
operations. TAMAM gradually shifted from a research-driven to a business-driven
paradigm, yet with strong ties to its historical roots as a research institution.
Voices within the company still debate the identity of the company, seeking the
recognition of TAMAM as the Israeli Navigation and Optronics laboratories by
Israeli governments. Thus, TAMAM is in a transition mode from a research
driven to a business driven identity.
Rafael. a sub-unit of the Israeli Ministry of Defence, known as the Israeli defence
laboratories. has for long established an image and identity of a research-driven
institution. Recent years have seen change in past governments' resilience towards
inefficiencies and continuous losses at Rafael. Past governments sought to change
the ownership of Rafael to a government-owned company, in attempt to introduce
more strict financial practices and control over defence projects. Rafael is also in
transition, gradually shifting from its past historical roots that were strongly linked
to research to a rather more business-orientated approach/f. However, debates and
confusion about the present identity and future strategic direction of Rafael still
dominate the political agenda in both the Israeli MoD and Rafael's top
management.
Figure 59 describes the dynamics of change during the course of the last 30 years,
implying that both TAMAM and Rafael are moving towards business
identity/business strategic direction entities. Another way to illustrate these
changes is presented in Figure 60.
22 See Smith (2000) for a similar case in Canada.
7-247
Present Identity
Business/Market
Driven
YellowTech
2001
TAMAM
2001
Strategic Direction
Research Driven -------+--~--::~=-----Business/Market
Rafael Driven
2001
1950
Research Driven
Figure 60: Towards Business/Business-Driven Identity/Strategic Direction at TAMAM, Rafael and
YellowTech
Based on the above analysis, we now seek to integrate our findings from previous
chapters into the above framework, by introducing the findings on the strategies
undertaken by the studied companies and locating them in the proposed
framework. However, before integrating the framework of cross-project learning
strategies into the above framework, we would like to briefly introduce the
concept of the Right Path proposed by Victor and Boynton (1998).
7.6.1 The Concept of the Right Path
In their 1998 book 'Invented Here', Victor and Boynton suggest that a company
can create a market value by acquiring a core capability necessary to compete
more effectively in a particular market at a particular time. There are four stages
for a company to progress through: each stage targets a rather different market,
client's needs, organisation of work, and core capabilities.
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Victor and Boynton (1998:7) describe these stages and capabilities as follows:
Craft is strong in inventing and creating high-priced novel products that make
strong. unique impressions on customers. Mass production is strong in discipline
and achieving value through predictable. standard, 'no-surprise', low-price
commodities. Process enhancement is strong in thinking and doing, and wins by
creating products that customers perceive as having superior quality. Mass
customisation is strong in modular configuration and can dominate a market with
precision, providing made-to-order, affordable, tailored products and services.
(italics in the source)
They suggest that the Right Path progresses from craft to mass production,
process enhancement, mass customisation and back to craft via renewal (see
Figure 61). Development is the process that transforms craft to mass production. It
involves a set of actions such as: codify processes, train people, analyse process,
select best process, automate process, build controls over the process and output,
and create ability to replicate consistent quality, volume and delivery (ibid.: 139).
Modularization l\1ass
.... Customization
I .. Precision
Process
Linking Enhancement
....
r
..
Quality
Development
Mass
Production
...
r
..
Commodity
Craft Renewal
....
....
ovelty
Figure 61: The Right Path (Victor and Boynton 1998)
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Linking takes mass production to process enhancement and involves, amongst
other actions, creating overlapping know-how, building broader skills, creating
teams that swap innovation and efficiency, dropping manager's 'command and
control' mentality, and designing controls for output control.
Lastly, modularization drives process enhancement towards mass customisation
by introducing the following steps: identify reusable process resources,
modularise resources, link resource capabilities directly to markets, and
implement information technology for efficiency and control.
Because this thesis concerns the development of cross-project learning in an
organisation, which is the chief interest in Victor and Boynton's (1998) study, we
would borrow their model and apply it to the framework proposed in Figure 58. In
particular. the present study will address two issues: (i) the development stage of
cross-project learning for each company; and (ii) the stage of transformation for
each company.
7.6.2 The Dynamics of Cross-Project Learning by Present Identity and Future
Strategic Direction
Hull and his colleagues (2000:636) suggest that the path dependency of
innovation is:
[... ] determined by the bodies of accumulated knowledge and experience within
a given organisational culture, management style and set of operational
routines.
The present study builds upon and extends the above view by suggesting that this
development path of bodies of accumulated knowledge and experience may
change subject to the dynamics of present identity and future strategic direction
shown in Figure 60. In other words, as seen in Chapter 6, organisations may
change the organisation of innovation and start creating new experiences
disconnected from past practices (Engestrom 1996).
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Figure 62 presents the development path of cross-project learning strategies
subject to present identity/future strategic direction.
The main conclusion from the proposed analysis is that the more an organisation
is market-orientated the more it will seek a high quality result from its cross-
project learning strategies.
Another conclusion from this analysis suggests that the more an organisation is
research-orientated. the greater is the likelihood that its cross-project learning
processes will be based on craftwork.
The following section will analyse the present stage of cross-project learning
strategies in each company.
Present Identity
Business/Market
Driven
Process
Enhancement
Quality
YellowTech
Research Driven
Strategic Direction
Business/Market
Driven
Craft
Novelty
Rafael
Research Driven
Figure 62: Cross-Project Learning Strategies by Present IdentitylFuture Strategic Direction
7.6.2.1 Rafael: Craftwork and Novelty
Rafael, which maintains its research-driven identity and still debates the recent
trend towards markets and business orientation, has based its strategic approach to
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cross-project learning on craft. In line with Pelz (1985) and Rogers (1983), we
argue that the cross-project learning strategy which emerged at Rafael was
unplanned and unstructured, mainly because it originated from a bottom-up
management style. This led the company to pursue the exploit product success
strategy. a rather short-term solution that has maintained the company's
competitive edge.
The process of reusability has been 'reinvented' each time such a process starts.
The novelty in the process is manifested by the result of the cross-project learning.
The product of the cross-project learning varies in quality and depends on the
quality of the communication in the social network involved in the process.
7.6.2.2 TAl\IAl\I: Mass Production and Commodity
TAMAM. which has been a government-owned company for many years, and
which presents a historical research orientation that is still vocal in the company,
has a prospect, nevertheless, of becoming a private company in the near future.
TA:NIAM has established its strategic approach to cross-project learning on mass
production. It has pursued the exploitation of product success but has taken steps
towards enhancing cross-project learning processes.
TAMAM has been orgarusmg cross-project learning capabilities around the
function of the system engineer. Through this channel and by vertically
integrating knowledge from parallel projects, TAMAM has been seeking to
expand the instances in which a technology can be transferred from one project to
another.
7.6.2.3 YellowTech: Product Enhancement and Quality
YellowTech, which has always been a business, market-driven company, has
pursued a process enhancement strategy for cross-project learning.
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YellowTech introduced a variety of mechanisms for short- and long- term
strategic development and methodically measured the cost effectiveness of its
cross-project learning acti vities.
7.7 The Conditions for Cross-Project Learning
The model presented in Figure 62 suggests an alternative approach to the
rationalist view offered by Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998) to understand the
conditions for cross-project learning. The present approach, based on contingency
theory, argues that the organisation of capabilities for cross-project learning is
subject to the trajectory of present identity and future strategic direction, as seen in
Figure 62.
Having said that. it would be of particular interest to explore how an organisation
can change its development path. In other words, if in section 7.6 we had
addressed the question: how did we get here?, the following section would debate
propositions appealing to the no less important question: how can we get to where
we would like to be?
7.7.1 Competing Propositions for Changing the Development Path
The classical theorists will argue that in order to change the development path of
cross-project learning, TAMAM and Rafael need to focus further on market
orientation (see Levitt 1960). The voices within these companies that still
associate the identity of the company with the notion of invention and research
orientation restrain these companies from building the capabilities and
competencies needed to achieve consistency with markets (Levitt 1960). Rafael
should invest more resources in taking the social network-based cross-project
learning practice to the stage that cross-project learning maximises profit.
Marketing at Rafael needs to be further integrated in product development, and
knowledge about markets should be integrated with product development
decisions. By getting closer to markets, companies like Rafael would be able to
rationalise strategic decisions about allocating resources towards the exploit
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product success strategy, based on the sophistication of the client and by
addressing clients' unique needs. TAMAM should follow the same strategic
decision, by tying up links between Sales and product development and ensuring
returns on investment from cross-project learning strategies based on market
knowledge. YellowTech is on the light track, according to Gupta and Wilemon
(1990). YellowTech has built its marketing and Sales group based on talented
engineers. Communication about market knowledge at YellowTech is being
translated into product development strategic choice. For example, YellowTech
has practised a technology 'lockout' strategy (Schilling 1998), based on the
practice of commonality across electronic warfare systems. YellowTech upgrades
electronic warfare systems by adding 'bells and whistles' to the functionality of
the system in each generation; however, it keeps the compatibility of the system to
the aircraft platform and other electronic systems unchanged. In this way,
according to classical theorists such as Schumpeter (Whittington 1993),
YellowTech enhances its competitive edge over rivals by utilising market
knowledge that suggests that aircraft platforms change every 20 years whereas
airborne system platforms would be upgraded every 7 years (interview source).
Thus. to classical theorists the recent engagement of the studied companies in
knowledge management projects is irrelevant unless these activities assist in
turning market knowledge to profit maximisation.
Evolutionary theorists will argue that in order to change the development path,
perhaps the only thing the studied companies should do is to launch as many
'strategic initiatives' as possible. After all, managers do not decide on the winning
strategy but rather environments do. Rafael perhaps will learn more about its
markets, if one follows the classical argument; however, would this mean that, by
investing in a long-term cross-project learning strategy, Rafael will be able to
survive, in particular considering the $375 million total loss that the company
reported between 1995 and 1999? Would Rafael enjoy the same sympathy
towards losses from the Israeli MoD in the years to come?
7-254
Thus. Rafael can only survive and change the development path of cross-project
learning by launching knowledge management initiatives in different directions in
the hope that one will be successful (Henderson 1989). However, launching such
initiatives should be relative to the costs involved in this strategy. Williamson
(1991) suggests that leveraging cross-project learning beyond the costs that Rafael
can bear would only hurt the company. There are 'transaction costs' in pursuing
the classical approach: for example, the financial investments associated with
introducing design centres. or perhaps the costs associated with training engineers
to use reusability metrics to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of modularity.
However. there are also other types of costs involved, such as those associated
with detaching activity systems from their shared histories of learning, i.e.
disturbances and tensions between expertise development and knowledge
management. as analysed in Chapter 6. Introducing a profit-maximising system is
not the way to change the development path, Williamson (1991) would argue.
Rather. managers need to ensure that the associated costs from knowledge
management initiatives are bearable to all stakeholders. This includes, for
example. ensuring that knowledge management initiatives will not enforce control
over social network-based cross-project learning practice at Rafael. This will be
an unbearable cost that may bring political unrest to Rafael (Pfeffer 1992). In this
sense. TAMAM and YellowTech are no different.
Micro-politics is already part of the path development of cross-project learning at
Rafael, the processualists would argue (Pettigrew 1973). Power games between
the members of the knowledge management committee are setting the agenda for
future development of cross-project learning. Power struggles, perhaps latent in
nature, are likely to exist at TAMAM and YellowTech as well (Lukes 1974).
Also, changing the development path of cross-project learning cannot take place
in one great leap; after all, managers are incapable of considering more than a
handful of factors and their rationally is bounded (Cyert and March 1963). Rather,
processualists will argue that taking small steps would be a better strategy for
Rafael, TAMAM and YellowTech. According to the processual theory, Rafael,
TAMAM and YellowTech are already changing their development path. In the
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processual theory. it is not the Chief Scientist who shaped the cross-project
learning strategy. Rather. it is the adaptation process that creates a 'strategy'. In
this process. participants introduce mini-innovations that are relatively small and
their impact seems minimal (Whittington 1993), perhaps similar to the concept of
proximal innovations that was introduced in Chapter 6. This concept of
innovations may ease the tension between perspective making and perspective
taking and between intra- and inter-community interests.
This thesis concludes by arguing that the above competing theoretical arguments
are the present reality at YellowTech, Rafael and TAMAM.
Debates about where the focus of knowledge management should be within the
organisation were part of the experience that these companies acquired in the last
five years. YellowTech has decided to invest in two areas: R&D and Sales.
TAMAM and Rafael decided to enhance the knowledge management practice in
the Sales team. It is too early to predict whether these strategic initiatives will
narrow the differences with regard to the organisation and the applied strategies of
cross-project learning between the studied companies.
These recent strategic initiatives In the studied cornparues will continue to
accumulate the bodies of knowledge and experience necessary for the
development of cross-project learning at YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael. Yet
the dynamics of present identity and future strategic direction will continue to
dominate the change in the development path of cross-project learning. Therefore,
one has to ask: what may the future bring to YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael?
7.7.2 The Future of YellowTech, TAMAM and Rafael
The Head of SIBAT, the R&D body at the Israeli Ministry of Defence that is also
responsible for approving technology transfer to foreign countries, predicts that
market competition is only going to intensify for the defence industry in the future
(interview source).
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RepOt1S in the media, and data collected in a number of interviews with officials
from the Israeli MoD, with top mangers in the studied companies, and with
informants from the Israeli Air Force portray the following picture.
The Israeli electronics defence industry has suffered from substantial cuts in
Israel's defence R&D budget (BICC 2000), which fuelled in past years the
development of cutting edge technologies (Sadeh 2001). On the other hand, data
presented above suggest that revenues and backlogs are in a steady growth,
mainly from foreign clients.
The Israeli electronics defence industry has started to consolidate and further talks
are underway (Sadeh 2001). The first merger in this industry took place in
February 2000 between YellowTech, BVR and Tadiran, creating the YellowTech
Group (Dror Marom, Globes, 16/01/2001). In July 2000 Elbit and EI-OP, two
companies that participated in the pilot stage of the present study, followed
YellowTech and merged, creating the largest group for radar systems in Israel
(Elbit Web Site). Government-owned companies, including TAMAM, are planned
to be privatised, and Rafael, a sub-unit of the Israeli MoD, is expected to change
ownership and become a government owned company, once the negotiations with
trade unions are concluded.
However, these developments are conditional on the Ministry of Defence's
demand that a law will be put in place to safeguard the nation's interests by
establishing procedures regarding the ownership, control and influence over the
privatised companies (Sadeh 2001).
Thus, we conclude that the future strategic direction of the Israeli electronics
defence industry will be by and large in the business, market-orientated domain.
TAMAM, Rafael and YellowTech would very likely see a growing pressure by
stakeholders to present profits, increase revenues and secure a large backlog of
orders in the near future.
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However. because of the ongoing conflict in the Middle-East, past and present
Israeli governments have sought to maintain the Israeli defence industrial base as
the source of advanced technological solutions in the battlefield, reinforcing the
perception held by engineers that their identity is highly associated with research
and invention.
So, yet another stage of development emerges that introduces further tension
between current identity and future strategic direction in the Israeli electronics
defence industry.
7.8 Conclusion
This chapter addresses two questions: is there any strategic pattern for cross-
project learning in the data presented above? If so, under what conditions are these
cross-project learning strategies subject to change?
It was argued that the most relevant literature (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998)
does not provide a suitable framework to understand the strategies carried out by
the studied companies. Following this, a 2x2 model was developed suggesting two
contingent factors, revealed in the context of the present study, for the
development of cross-project learning: the present identity and future strategic
direction. We then incorporated the main findings of this study into a framework
that suggests that the path of development of cross-project learning is subject to
the dynamics of change in present identity and future strategic direction.
Lastly, a projection into the future has been provided, suggesting that the studied
cornparues are yet to experience further tension between the past research-
orientation and the future market-orientation. However, these companies are
moving into the market-orientation domain.
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Introduction
In our journey around the concept of cross-project learning we have progressively
moved from the classical, rational approach to the evolutionary view in relation to
cross-project learning. Furthermore, the analysis of cross-project learning has
revealed that tension and disturbance between organisational processes, l.e.
expertise development and knowledge management, has been associated with the
introduction of cross-project learning in the studied companies. In this journey we
have been comforted by some organisational literature that has attempted to
explore the nature of cross-project learning in organisations and the impact that
this process innovation would have on other organisational systems.
Thus, in this last chapter I shall assess the main contributions of the study in
relation to the existing literature. These contributions can be organised around
three themes: empirical, theoretical, and research methods. Going back to the
main research interests, this chapter will assess what the study has achieved and
what are its main limitations.
Section 8.2 will discuss the empirical contributions of this study. Three areas of
theoretical contribution will then be outlined in section 8.3. The unique research
method approach to cross-project learning applied in this study will be presented
in section 8.4. Section 8.5 will offer an analytical framework to R&D managers
that attempts to capture in one shot the tension between investing in the
company's knowledge base and boosting competitive positioning. The main
limitation of the present study will be outlined in section 8.6, followed by some
suggestions for future research.
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8.2 Empirical Contributions
At the most basic level, the three case studies represent a contribution to the
emerging field in their own light. By putting together the empirical material
collected on the field sites, my main purpose was to convey an image of structures
and activities related to cross-project learning. This is justified because thus far
research on cross-project learning has offered evidence mainly from the
automobile industry (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; Mayer and Utterback 1993;
Clark and Fujimoto 1991: Sobek et al. 1998). Furthermore, by and large, studies
in this area focused on the Japanese case, with little attention to the organisation
of product development for cross-project learning activities in other geographical
areas and contexts. The context-specific characteristics of the Japanese and some
American automobile companies raises a concern that the reported data, although
significant. may represent only those practices which are embedded in the
Japanese/American management style and culture. With this argument, I align the
present study with the approach that argues that the context within which the case
study company operates is imperative to understanding the organisation and its
strategic approach towards cross-project learning (Pettigrew 1987; Collinson
2001). In support of the above argument, this study offers additional evidence on
the practice of reusability. Indeed, the Israeli electronics defence industry offers a
rather different approach to cross-project learning from the Japanese or the
American case. In particular, some of the more central mechanisms reported in
Chapter 5, such as the role of the system engineer at TAMAM and the
entrepreneurship spirit at Rafael, have not been previously reported by studies
addressing cross-project learning (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; Mayer and
Utterback 1993; Baldwin and Clark 1997). The high degree of autonomy
associated with the Israeli electronics defence industry, which was reported as one
of the chief factors for the participation of engineers in cross-project learning, has
not been observed or reported in the context of the Japanese automobile industry.
Also, the strategy to integrate the Sales teams and clients into R&D activities has
been unique to the studied industry. These new findings demonstrate the
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importance of research outside the domain of the automobile industry, despite its
image as "the industry of the industries' (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990).
In addition, the case studies offer a distinct perspective on a variety of themes that,
although sharing an interest with the present study, could well be studied as
phenomena in their own right: the evolution of the innovation system in defence
companies (perhaps in comparison to commercial-civilian innovation systems);
the interplay between product innovation and process innovation in defence
companies: the strategic change in Marketing and Sales in the defence business;
and the different project management practices and styles for managing R&D
projects. A lesson to be learned from the case studies is that some classical
organisational topics, such as those listed above, can possibly be revised through
the application of different analytical lenses, such as activity theory, or by
researching the same phenomenon in different cultural contexts.
8.3 Theoretical Contributions
Cross-project learning is examined in this research from three different angles. It
is analysed in Chapter 5 as a knowledge management practice that enhances
product development activities. In Chapter 6, cross-project learning is studied as a
source of tension in product development. Lastly, cross-project learning IS
presented in Chapter 7 as a strategy. One can look at these three areas of
contribution as associated respectively with the operational, dysfunctional and
strategic levels. The contribution of the present study to the development of theory
in these areas is provided in the following sections.
8.3.1 Cross-Project Learning as a Knowledge Management Practice
There are many advantages in studying innovation processes from a knowledge
management practice perspective (Coombs and Hull 1996). The ability to detail
the activities involved in the learning process, through the observation of
'knowing in practice' in communities, and to understand the effect on the
management and organisation of innovation systems are only some of the values
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that this approach may offer. However, there are additional benefits in applying
the knowledge management practice approach.
First. the knowledge management practice encourages the researcher to perceive
the array of knowledge activities as the knowing infrastructure of the innovation
system under investigation. Similarly, activity theory offers a lens that avoids the
fragmentation of different disciplines and knowledge activities by treating the
space under investigation as an activity system. In particular, the study of cross-
project learning has suffered from fragmentation and segregation, failing to
integrate the various mechanisms, structures, and practices involved in the transfer
of designs into one framework of capabilities. For example, research related to
cross-project learning has separately highlighted the management of product
family (Sundren 1999: Mayer and Utterback 1993), the support for modularity in
designs (Baldwin and Clark 1997), the role of the organisational structure
(Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; Sanderson and Uzumeri 1994), the contribution of
knowledge centres and development centres (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998), and
the integration and coordination mechanisms involved in R&D activity
(Hauptman and Hirji 1999). Instead of segregating these knowledge activities, the
present study. through the lens of knowledge management practice, integrates
these knowledge activities into the framework of the knowing infrastructure of
cross-project learning.
Secondly, the approach of studying innovation systems from a knowledge
management practice perspective opens an opportunity to apply various analytical
lenses that study one single phenomenon from various angles. For example, the
meaning and perception of the knowledge involved in technology transfer can be
manipulated through different analytical lenses. Thus far, the majority of the
studies on cross-project learning emphasise the instrumental, functional character
of the knowledge involved in the transfer process, as it is an object that can be
moved from one place to another (e.g. Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; Nobeoka
1995; Meyer and Utterback 1993). In contrast to the above studies and in order to
extend the theory of cross-project learning in relation to the nature of knowledge
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involved in the transfer process, the present study applied a socially constructed
lens that observed knowledge, or perhaps knowing, in action in communities of
practice. This socially constructed lens on knowledge activities allowed this study
to present a rather different perception and grant different meaning to the
knowledge under investigation. It can be further claimed that by applying a
socially constructed lens this study moves away from the static categorisation of
knowledge to the dynamic terrain of modes of organisation for innovations.
Another example is the literature related to technology transfer that takes a
rational. classical approach to the management of product family (Mayer and
Utterback 1993), cross-project learning (Nobeoka 1995; Cusumano and Nobeoka
1998) and the management of product development as a single project effort
(Clark and Fujimoto 1991). Looking at the same phenomenon but from an
evolutionary approach, a rather different picture of cross-project learning has
emerged, that emphasises the adaptive nature of the organisation of knowledge
activities.
Lastly, cross-project learning as a knowledge management practice allows the
comparison between contexts and environments within which the studied
companies operate. Within the knowledge management framework, three different
approaches to cross-project learning have emerged, suggesting that the
interactions between action and structure cannot be detached from the context
within which these interactions occur. Thus, structures and actions cannot be
treated as independent variables but rather they need to be studied in the context
of the surrounding environments. Structuration theory (Giddens 1984) suggests
that agency and structure are not independent from each other but rather mutually
interact and shape each other. Activity theory provides the tools to understand
these interactions by perceiving the universe of structures as a multi-activity
system environment in which activity systems interact and thus shape each other.
The knowledge management practice framework provides the space within which
such an analysis can be carried out, as demonstrated in the present study.
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8.3.2 Cross-Project Learning as a Source of Tension
The literature on cross-project learning offers little in terms of the discussion of
disturbances and tensions involved in introducing and implementing such a
practice. Furthermore, the literature on process innovation avoids discussing the
dysfunctionality that innovation systems encounter when they evolve and change.
Rather. the obsession of Cartesian approaches to pursue and present superior
performances and extraordinary skills hindered research from thoroughly studying
the disturbances and tension embedded in innovation systems. The present study
takes a step in correcting this injustice. Through the lens of activity theory,
disturbance and tension become evident as the product development activity
system is accelerated. The past harmony between expertise development and
knowledge management activity systems is replaced by contradictory tools, social
spaces and images of knowledge. More importantly, disturbance and tension is
evidently an avenue to learning through the introduction of proximal innovations
that bridge the inherent tension between intra- and inter-community interests and
between the notion of exploitation and exploitation in an R&D environment.
Yet tension has spread into other areas, including my own arguments. There is
tension between the competing interpretations presented in Chapter 5 with regard
to the different organisation of cross-project learning systems in the studied
companies. Tension is also apparent between my own arguments for the potential
future strategic steps to be carried out by the studied companies outlined in
Chapter 7. This tension drives research to question and challenge our own
assumptions and about what we perceive as reality. In the words of Albert
Einstein, 'the important thing is not to stop questioning' .
8.3.3 Cross- Project Learning as a Strategy
Before this study was carried out research on technology transfer between projects
offered four cross-project learning strategies; new design, concurrent, sequential
and modification (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998). The latter also argued that
concurrent technology transfer is the practice that managers should follow.
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The present research challenged the above proposition. This study extends the
strategic approach to cross-project learning by offering two fundamental strategies
to cross-project learning: exploit product success and/or design to reuse. Within
each strategy, managers can plan either a sequential or a concurrent technology
transfer. subject to the contractual and market conditions.
Furthermore. against the classical strategic approach demonstrated in the
technology transfer literature, the present study suggests that the organisation of
cross-project learning capabilities is contingent upon the trajectory of identity and
future strategic direction. There is an evolutionary process in which companies
adapt their innovation systems to various elements that play a role in their
environments.
8.4 Contributions to Research Methods
The contributions of the applied research methods in the present study to
understanding the introduction and implementation of any process innovation
such as cross-project learning are particularly relevant given the interest in
understanding the operational, dysfunctional and strategic levels associated with
the cross-project learning. Research thus far has focused on either the operational
level of cross-project learning or the strategic approach to managing product
families. As far as the researcher knows, this is the first attempt to capture three
levels of analysis in the context of cross-project learning. Thus, the research
methods applied in this study provide a lens (or maybe a multi-lens) that assists in
addressing the following question: how is it possible to gain access to, and explain
knowledge activities associated with the operational, dysfunctional and strategic
levels of cross-project learning?
The technique undertaken in the present study can be described in terms of
photography jargon as the 'zoom in - zoom out' technique. By this I mean that
there are at least two positions that the lens can be in. One, the 'zoom in' position,
in which the photographer attempts to achieve a detailed image of the object in the
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frame. A detailed image will show the beauty of, and some distortion in the
object: however, it will lack the wide-angle view of the surrounding and the
environment within which the object is located. Second, the 'zoom-out' position,
in which the photographer seeks to capture the wide-angle image of the objects in
the frame. In this case the 'big picture' is more important than the detailed image
of each object. A clear overview of the landscape and surroundings is captured in
the frame in this mode, allowing the viewer to realise the elements and the
dynamics involved in the picture.
In Chapter 7, a 'zoom out' technique has been applied to capture the evolution of
cross-project learning strategies during time. The emphasis in Chapter 7 is on the
'big picture' view of cross-project learning, in which the various capabilities have
been categorised into two main cross-project learning strategies: exploit product
success and design to reuse.
In Chapter 6, a close look at the processes associated with product development,
expertise development and knowledge management has advocated the use of the
'zoom in' technique. This research method technique revealed the tension and
disturbance in activity systems which erupt as they interact and change.
Lastly, a 'half-way zoom' research technique has been applied in Chapter 5 to
capture the operations involved in cross-project learning in the studied companies.
This mode allows the study to identify organisational mechanisms, managerial
practices, concepts, tools and other practices that constitute cross-project learning
capabilities in the studied companies.
When taken as a whole, the three lenses provide a coherent framework for
studying the operational, dysfunctional and strategic level of process innovation in
a systematic way.
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8.5 Managerial Implications
In line with the study argument that the context-specific attributes of the
knowledge management practice under investigation would probably inhibit the
successful transfer of best practices across the industry, and following the
argument that cross-project learning strategies are actually evolutionary in nature,
it has not been the researcher's intention to advise management how to organise
innovation systems for a successful cross-project learning.
Rather. in my own perspective and based on the experience gained from
participating in three research projects, perhaps the main theme that management
should be considering as a result of this study is how to creatively manage tension
in the numerous areas presented above.
I argue that there is no one single ideal way to creatively manage tension between
such knowledge activities and concepts. Each case has its own unique
circumstances and hence needs to be carefully studied by either management,
consultants or academic researchers. Only then can a solution be provided. Yet a
solution that works for one company is not necessarily appropriate for another.
Furthermore, 'magic' solutions or industry recipes, such as IT systems, have not
always been proven to solve problems in an R&D environment. In some cases,
IT systems, for example, created even more disturbances to the R&D process.
However, understanding the vectors involved in managing an R&D environment
would assist in providing a solution per situation. I argue that Figure 63 represents
the dilemma that R&D managers face and hence the tension that they need to
ease on a daily basis.
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Knowledge Base
(Hamel and Prahalad)
Trade-off
/
Competitive
Position
(penrose, Ansoff)
Figure 63: Knowledge Base - Competitive Position (based on Hickson et at. forthcoming)
On the one hand managers would like to maximise the knowledge base by
investing in expertise development systems and practices. On the other hand,
managers would like to achieve market success by accelerating product
development processes, customising products and reusing designs. Nevertheless,
there is trade-off between these two concepts. Managers may impede the build-up
of expertise by enhancing product development processes and reusing designs.
This tension is the core challenge that R&D managers face in the Israeli
electronics defence industry and perhaps in other similar industries.
8.6 Main Limitations of the Study
Some of the limitations of this study have already been illustrated in Chapter 3.
These limitations revolved around issues related to security clearance, difficulties
in gaining access, and the studied companies' preconditions for participating in
the research.
In addition, given time constraints, institutional specifications (e.g. maximum
length of a doctoral thesis, and the practical concerns of a PhD endeavour), and
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above all the scope and complexity of the phenomena under investigation, the
study inevitably presents some deficiencies.
First. the design of the research was somewhat artificial: of six projects, three
were well-established product family ones and three were relatively young
product families. In a time perspective, it would have been more beneficial to
study projects belonging to well-established product families. Yet the data
provided by participants from projects belonging to a relatively young product
family contributed to the understanding of how cross-project learning capabilities
are built up. This extended the researcher's understanding beyond the discussion
of how technologies are reused to the point of how capabilities to reuse designs
are born. However. given the research design and objectives, the findings of this
study invite speculation about possible different reuse core capabilities across
product families. subject to the product family maturity. These findings need
further validation and may hopefully stimulate further research in this direction.
Secondly, the selection of the studied companies was a 'second best choice'.
Indeed, all three studied companies operate in the electronics defence industry;
however. they do not directly compete with each other, apart from some direct
competition between Rafael and TAMAM in the Optronic field. A lack of striking
similarities in products and production systems between the studied companies
has limited the debate on the differences between the organisation of cross-project
learning to themes associated with the evolutionary path of these companies. The
different evolutionary paths have directed the discussion to factors that are
associated with the growth of the organisation, i.e. identity and future strategic
path. Perhaps rather similar evolutionary paths of the studied companies would
have extended the discussion beyond these two factors.
Lastly, some potentially relevant themes (e.g. the debate about how knowledge is
created, the debate about the tension between exploitation and exploration, the
discussion about integration and coordination mechanisms in an R&D
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environment and so on) have been deliberately left in the background because of
lack of time and the constraints of length on a doctoral thesis.
8.5 Suggestions for Future Research
The present study will hopefully offer a template for future research on cross-
project learning. The above-mentioned limitations and the context-specific
environment in which this study was carried out suggest a number of interesting
themes and techniques to be pursued by future research on cross-project learning
in organisations.
Firstly. the 'zoom-in, zoom-out' research method needs further testing in order to
validate and possibly refine its contribution to understanding the operational,
dysfunctional and strategic level in innovation systems. The 'zoom-in, zoom out'
research method can be applied in the study of any process innovation or strategic
change process.
Secondly, research in other industries on cross-project learning is needed. Thus far
only the automobile and the electronics defence industry have produced
substantial evidence on the systematic reusability of hardware and software
designs. The context within which the company under investigation operates has
proven to be significant to the unique organisation of the innovation system.
Therefore, future research design should target additional but not only
manufacturing companies.
Thirdly, the links between 'strategic development' (i.e. identity and future
strategic direction) and 'modes of reusability' should be further investigated. The
evolutionary path of cross-project learning within organisations also needs further
validation. Future research should take into account the interplay between
identity/future strategic direction, and modes of organisation for cross-project
learning in the selection of the field settings. Some of the possible variations in the
design of future research may be as follows: (i) comparative studies considering
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companies operating in the same sector and belonging to the same evolutionary
path: (ii) comparative studies considering companies operating in different sectors
but belonging to the same evolutionary path; (iii) comparative studies considering
companies operating in different sectors and geographical regions but belonging
to the same evolutionary path.
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APPENDIX 1
The Context of Cross-Project Learning: Product Development
Themes in Product Development Relating to Cross-Project Learning
Because cross-project learning was introduced in product development and hence
affected the way products were produced in the Israeli electronics defence
industry. an understanding of the philosophies, theories and methodologies related
to product development is needed.
The successful management of product development has become a key challenge
for companies competing in today's markets (Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Clark and
Wheelwright 1992; 1994; 1995; Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt 1997; Van de Van,
Angle and Poole 1989; Rothwell and Zegveld 1982; Utterback 1994). There is an
impressive body of literature on the managerial and organisational aspects of new
product development. Some studies point to the conclusion that the timely
development and introduction of new products requires the maintenance of a
flexible organisational structure (Bart 1986), frequent communication (Clark and
Fujimoto 1991), the use of multifunctional teams (Cordero 1991), the style of
leadership in new product teams (McDonough and Barczak 1991), an interface
with customers (Gehani 1998), and the use of control practices (Bart 1993).
Nevertheless, these studies and many others provide a rather fragmented picture of
processes in, and factors related to, product development.
There are a number of excellent review articles on product development that assist
in understanding the debates and opportunities for future research in this specific
area (see for example Shocker and Sirinivasan 1979; Whitney 1993; Brown and
Eisenhardt 1995; Griffin and Hauser 1996). Here, these articles and others will be
reviewed in order to critically assess the literature and identify opportunities for
future research.
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Product Development as a Rational Plan: An Atheoretical, Disintegrated Approach
Like much of the literature on product development and project management, the
rational plan perspective, as the name implies, believes in a careful planning of a
product for an attractive market and the execution of that plan by a competent and
well-coordinated team that operates with the support of senior management.
According to this perspective, the successful product development process
depends on three elements: planning, implementation and support. Studies in this
stream (for example, the Stanford Innovation Project, which examined 86
success/failure product pairs) reveal the correlation between cross-functional
teams and high product development project performance (i.e. revenue and market
share). Cross-functional communication, customer involvement and team
organisation of work have also been found to have a strong correlation with
product development project performance (ibid.:350). In one study by Rothwell
and colleagues (1974) 41 factors were found to be correlated with successful
product development. Subsequent studies have added more factors related to
product development, which make it difficult for both academics and practitioners
to identify precise managerial and theoretical implications. Nevertheless, the work
in this stream has revealed some important factors that contribute to the
understanding of product development in this thesis. For example, Cooper and
Kleinschmidt (1987) found a strong correlation between market conditions and
product success. They revealed that products that entered growing and large
markets were more likely to be successful. Also, products that entered markets
with a low intensity of competition were more likely to be successful. And lastly,
internal organisation factors such as a clear product concept and pre-development
planning were found to be more important than market characteristics.
Recently there has been a growing interest in the aspect of speed in product
development as part of the rational plan stream (for example, Cordero 1991;
Gupta and Wilemon 1990). Since the beginning of the 1990s, the emphasis on
accelerating new product innovation has gained more attention as the costs
associated with slow product development have increased (Gupta and Wilemon
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1990). For example, McKinsey & Co show that high-tech products that come to
market six months late but on budget earn 33% less profit over five years
(ibid.i Zv). Gupta and Wilemon (1990) found that increased competition and
market demand were the main drivers in accelerating new product introduction. In
terms of the factors leading to delayed product development projects, Gupta and
Wilemon found that poor definition of product requirements was the main reason
for this situation.
Technological uncertainty during product development is another reason for
delays in R&D projects. Such uncertainty has been associated with a number of
scenarios. One scenario is when new technology becomes available, leading to
last-minute changes in the product because of engineers' desire to incorporate the
latest technological improvement (ibid.: 30). Gupta and Wilemon describe this
desire as the 'creeping elegance' phenomenon. Another scenario concerns the
incompatibility of new technology with in-use product components. A third
example is related to the complexity of learning new technologies in a short time.
All these scenarios affect the organisation's ability to accelerate product
development projects.
To conclude, the literature associated with the rational plan stream is quite
impressive in identifying the breadth of factors involved in product development,
with its emphasis on features of the product, internal organisation, and the market.
The vast majority of the studies associated with this stream emphasise the
relations between a few dozen variables in product development. Yet in some
cases these clearly do not contribute to the understanding of product development
(Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). This is because the results tend to present
multivariate relations, which can be confusing and which suggest some vagueness
with regard to the practical implications.
Furthermore, the rational stream of study suffers from some methodological
weaknesses. In particular, it bases its conclusions on individual informants'
quantified subjective judgements on their tasks and associates these with success
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and failure factors. According to Brown and Eisenhardt (Ibid.: 353), the research
results 'are likely to suffer from a host of attributional and other biases, memory
lapses, and myopia, which are associated with subjective, retrospective sense-
making tasks'.
~
Lastly, the rational plan stream seems to be atheoretical and fails to take the next
logical theory-building step. In particular, many of the studies are not integrated
theoretically with existing research, nor do they report nonsignificant findings.
Despite these limitations, the rational plan stream contributes to the understanding
of the role of markets in product development and reveals the factors that playa
role in successful product development projects.
Results from studies on cross-functional communication confirm that individuals
from different departments often understand certain aspects in the process of
developing a product in a different manner (Dougherty 1990). In other words,
individuals often interpret one specific piece of information, in this case related to
product development, in their own way because they have their own perspective
on what product development is and what are the main goals and ways to measure
success (Krishnan and Ulrich 2001). Cross-functional team communication faces
many barriers, and yet research reveals that overcoming these barriers through a
'combined perspective' (Boland et al. 1995; Blackler et al. 1999) improves
product development projects. Also, Brown and Eisenhardt (1995: 358) argue that
'cross-functional teams that structure their internal communication around
concrete tasks, novel routines, and fluid job descriptions also have been associated
with improved internal communication and successful products'.
To conclude, external and internal communications are critical to product
development. As we have seen, themes such as politics in product development
and the existence of gatekeepers are amongst the major contributions of this
stream to the understanding of the process of product development. The
importance of combining perspectives when it comes to cross-functional project
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teams is another area of study that this stream has revealed, and this focus has
been further developed by scholars from other schools of thought.
One major limitation of this stream is the extreme focus on communication that
scholars employ when studying product development, even though this field
involves many other factors, activities and interactions.
Product Development as Disciplined Problem-Solving: The Vagueness Around the
Balancing-Act Process
This stream associates success in product development with factors such as the
autonomy of the project team, leadership and vision (of the project manager) and
(top) management style. Heavily based on case study methodology and originally
evolved from studies of Japanese organisations, this stream reveals the importance
of suppliers and R&D networks, the diversity of the backgrounds and skill sets of
members of the project team, and overlapping development phases (Imai et al.
1985) in accelerating the product development process. In addition, the
management style for successful products is expected to be based more on 'subtle
control' than a 'supportive' orientation, as previously suggested. Imai and his
colleagues (ibid.:357) explain that 'some checks are needed to prevent looseness,
ambiguity, tension or conflict from getting out of control' during the course of
product development. They argue that management can exercise control through
various channels and still maintain 'self organised' teams. Some of the examples
of 'subtle control' provided by Imai and his colleagues are: selecting the right
people for the project team, monitoring the balance in team membership, adding
or removing members, encouraging team members to extract information from
customers and competitors, and an evaluation system for the team that encourages
multi-learning and supports the formation of self organising teams. Imai and his
colleagues also observed a management practice in successful product
development projects that aimed to maintain the balance between allowing
ambiguity with regard to the autonomy of project teams engaging in problem
solving, and enforcing sufficient control over product and technology strategy
across projects.
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More recent studies (Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Wheelwright and Clark 1998)
replicate these findings and confirm the links between communication, cross-
functional groups and successful products. Their main contribution is to identify
two concepts. First, they stress the role of the 'heavyweight' team leaders who act
as a liaison between project teams and senior management, allowing management
to exercise 'subtle control' over them. Secondly, 'product integrity' implies 'a
clear vision of the product's intended image, performance, and fit with corporate
competencies and customers' (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995: 363).
Accelerating product development is another branch in this stream of studies.
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) examined 72 product development projects from 36
firms in Asia, the USA and Europe in order to explore the factors that determine a
fast adaptive process. Their work confirms the link between fast product
development, multifunctional teams, and the experiential strategy of iteration,
testing. milestones, and powerful leaders. They argue that 'fast product
development emerges as more uncertain than predictable, more experiential than
planned, and more iterative than linear' (ibid.: 104). This observation calls for
further study of the accelerated product development process in order to provide
more insight into the complexity of managing such innovation.
Brown and Eisenhardt (1995: 364) summarise the contribution of this stream as
follows: 'successful product development involves relatively autonomous problem
solving by cross-functional teams with high communication and the organization
of work according to the demands of the development task'. This stream perceives
product development as a balancing act between product vision developed at the
top management level and problem-solving at the project level.
In contrast to the other two streams, this stream focuses on the development
process and less on finance-related determinants of product success. Yet one
weakness of this stream is its relatively vague definition of the central constructs
such as subtle control, product vision and system focus, and of the conditions that
maintain the balancing act described above. In addition, the over-reliance on a
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Japanese perspective, either through the study of Japanese companies or by
adopting Japanese management theories, highlights the need to study R & D-
intensive companies from other regions in the world that apply different product
development philosophies, in order to build a global body of knowledge on
innovations (Collinson 200 1).
Product Development: Concluding Remarks
As we have seen, the field of product development is atheoretical and suffers from
a disintegrated approach towards theory and methodology. In addition to these
shortcomings, research in this field is notable for the fact that some studies
contradict others or imply such complex relations between factors that it is
impossible to formulate clear and precise conclusions.
Future research is therefore needed. In particular, there is a need to study
contemporary organisational structure and its impact on work and processes in
product development. Future research also needs to extend the application of a
theoretical lens when studying product development processes in order to
establish the foundations for theory building in this field. Lastly, product
development needs to be studied in new sectors, preferably in emerging countries,
in order to extend the body of knowledge on the impact of the local political and
social context on product development systems.
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APPENDIX 2
List of Interviewees23
List of Interviewees: YellowTech (34)
r,~nl '" > Position;~t~ '" Time (hours)
vner Raz President , Ye llowTech 1
Benny Raguan Appl ica tion E ngineer 1.5
Danny Beeri Software Engineer 1.5
David Yin grad Project Co -ordinator 1.5
Doron \ ered Manager, Customer Suppo rt 2
Dov Gran t Di rector , Sale s and Contracts 1
Dov Valdrnan Head of HR dep artment 2
Dvir Lavi Head of Applica tion Group 1
Eli Bar Senior Software Engineer 2
Gideon Chen Head of Hard ware Group and Co-researcher 6
Irvine Per ky Head of Software Group 2
Jac ob Limor Chief Scien tist and Research Co-ordinator 5
leir Levental Head of MIS 2
Meir Michaili Head of Q & A Gro up 2
enachem Oren Director, R &D Division 1
Naa va Dabach Software Engineer 1.5
Naftali Rubin Q & A Engi neer 1.5
Oded Shacham Sys tem E nginee r 2.5
Oved Dabach Project Manager 1.5
Rafi Kodman Senior Software Engineer 1.5
Ramy Hazarchi Director, Future Developments 1
Ronen Dadush Senior Hardware Technician 2.5
Shelomo Avni Project Engineer 2
Shula icelush Software Engineer 1.5
Tommy Zusman Head of Planning and Control 2.5
Udi Baruch Project Manager 1.5
23 By alpha-bet order
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Yaron T uvim
Yechzkel Da id
Yeftach Gideony
Yitzchak Yehushua
Yonny Ives
Zee Feldman
Zeev Vishna
Head of Product Configuration Group
Software E ngi neer
Algori thm/Software Engineer
Senior Hardware Technician
Senior Hardware Technician
System Engi neer
System E ngi neer
Time (hours)
1.5
1.5
1
1.5
1.5
2
1.5
2
List of Interviewees: Rafael (26)
~Ib~t~~ ;;-' , Position " iii " ", ~ l:.Iime \~ l ;.~ ~.:-v,,- '$'(* f , ,. ", , .~ ~~ .mj\ /1' j1!i'll!\ClrW~" :,:~
Arnirarn Ash Project Manager Popeye 1
Avi Gazit Project Manager, Popeye 1.5
Barak Tur System E nginee r 1
Chanoch Gelman Project Engineer 1
Da vid Pereg Project Engineer 1
David Saar Project Engineer 1.5
Da vid Shatmer Head of Popeye Administra tion 1.5
Da vid Zeith Head of Litening Programme 1.5
Eran Moore Head of Programme 1
Gad y Zi Iberman Algorithm/Software Engineer 1
Haim Yacobovitz Programme Ma nager, Litening 1.5
Israel Greenfeld Project Manager; Litening 2
Ita y Dinnerman Sales, Manager 1.5
Loret Golan Planning and Control, Manager 1
Michael Moscovitz System Engineer 1.5
Mordechai Zimmerman Project Engineer 1.5
Naama Toker HR Specialist, Co-researcher 6
Nachum Nechemia Project Engineer 1.5
Niv Kaplan Sales Manager 1.5
Ramy Fabian System Engineer 1
Ruth Berman Software Engineer 1
Tuvya Ronen General Manager of Operations and Research 2.5
Co-ordinator
Yechzkel Saggy Project Engineer 1
Yehuda Liabook System Engineer 1
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Position
, Time (hours)
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Yossi Matalon Head o f HR department 2
Zeev Mitelrnan Proj ect Manager , Pop eye 1
Z iva Peled Operation s manager 1
._-
List of Interviewees: TAMAM (25)
ame Position " : ;~\Pl,(J1~':!r~l~, , ~,
,,# ,#.1 w~, iW>*.,,· iJj
rik Mei ter System E ng ineer, senso rs 1
rik lelt zer System E ng ineer 1
rik Rabin System E ngineer %
Arlet tern Product Configuration Manager 1
vi Bar System Engineer 1.5
Boaaz Bibi Project Engineer 1
David Liv ata n Senior Hardware Technician 1 II
Eli Molian System Engineer 1
Ger hon Leshe m Head of Q & A and Research Co-ordinator 6
Ieir Mazor Project Manager 1.5
1 Iordechai Harari Logistics, Manager 1
10 he Benisti Hardware Technician 34 I
aftali Margalit Project Manager 1
Dr echama Yelli n R&D Manager and Co-researcher 3
eomi Admony Product Configuration Manager 1
Shalom Vilk Software Engineer 1.5
Shelomo Katshh Operations, Manager %
Shelomo Stelreed Senior Software Engineer 1
Sigalit Noyman Senior Software Engineer 1.5
Yaron Green Software Engineer %
Yitzchak S arazin Project Engineer %
Yitzchak Moore Technical Manager 1
Yossi R itstien Senior Hardware Technician 34
Yehuda Katash Project Engineer 1
Zee v Nachmo ni General Manager, Electronics Division 1
,
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List of Interviewees: The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Israeli Air Force (IAF) (4)
.-
1~~111 , Position Time (hours)
lrnr Tov Fina nc ial Adv ise r, MoD 1
Ia: onego Project Manager , IAF 2
Ronen Wolf Project Manager , IAF 2
Yit zch ak Ben Israel Head of SIBAT, MoD 1
List of Informants (16)
- - -II,Nam .' Affiliation
nya E lda n c.E.O ., ITS , IAI
Profe or Ama ri Seginer Director , Samuel Neaman Institute, Technion, Israel
Dr Edna Pa her Co nsultant, Knowledge Management, Hertzelia, Israel
Efrairn \ alach Manager , R&D, EL-OP, Israel
Han Kuziatin Consultant, Defence Industries, Israel
Israel Baharav Pilot, Israeli Air Force (Reserve)
Kobi Abraharni Knowledge Management Manager, Tower Semiconductor,
Migdal , Israel
Meir Bartov Director , Marketing, YeIlowTech I
Ofir Baharav Pilot, Israeli Air Force (Reserve)
Rafi Bronstein Director , Knowledge Management ,Scitex, Hertzelia, Israel
Ramy Bar-Joseph Director, The Patent Group, Rafael
IIRan Herstein Knowledge Management Manager, Elbit, Israel
Shamay Keidar Manager, Sales and Contracts, YeIIowTech
Tzvika Rosen Former Sales Manager, YeIIowTech
Yaacov Nuss Director, Finance, Electronics Group, IAI
Yaacov Zur Consultant, Defence Industries, Israel
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APPENDIX 3
Interview Schedules'"
Pilot Study: General Description ofthe Interview Schedule'?
• Describe the main changes in defence markets in the last 10 years.
• What are the main differences between the way your company competed in the
past and the way it competes in the present?
• How did the company re-organise its product development process to cope
with recent changes?
Case Study: General Description ofthe Interview Schedule with R&D personnel
• Describe your role in the company and how you learnt your job
• Describe how the company develops products
• Describe how the company reuses hardware and software components
• Describe the interactions with groups inside and outside the division during the
reuse process
• Describe the organisational structure and its contribution to the reuse process
24 The interview schedule was translated from Hebrew. The interview schedules are just general
guidelines that the researcher followed in order to explore the operations, disturbances and strategy
associated with cross-project learning.
25 The interview schedule slightly varied according to the role of the interviewee in the company.
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• Describe the involvement of management in the reuse process
• Describe coordination mechanisms and their contribution to the reuse process
• Describe the culture in the company and its contribution to the reuse process
• Describe positive and negative implications that are directly associated with the
reuse process
Case Study: General Description of the Interview Schedule with Non-R & D
personnel
• Describe your role in the company and how you learnt your job
• Describe the main activities of your department
• Describe developments and changes in your field/department in the last 10
years
• Describe the impact that your department has had on product development
activities
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